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Using the historical method, this study of terrorism in
Northern Ireland examines the variables of conflict, the
existing violence and government endeavors to eradicate that
violence. This study does so within the framework of United
States' interests. Irish terrorism has been a problem for
the British government for centuries. The current round
since 1969 has produced vast improvements in the security
forces and enforcement techniques, yet the I.R.A. and its
political wing, Sinn Fein, survive. Government actions must
include measures aimed at the root causes of terrorist
movements. The relative degradation of the Catholic
community within Northern Ireland has received international
attention and has been the focus of much of the British
government's efforts to legislate improvements in Northern
Ireland. It appears that only through this process can




A. IRELAND TODAY 3
B. THE ELECTIONS 5
C. IRISH NEUTRALITY; THE QUIET SUBJECT 7
II. A BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT 15
A. A ROAD FROM THE PAST TO THE PRESENT 15
B. ENGLAND'S EXTREMITY IS IRELAND'S
OPPORTUNITY 20
C. THE ANGLO-IRISH TREATY, 1921 24
III. THE OPPOSING FORCES 26
A. THE H-BLOCKS, 2 MAY 1987 26
B. THE IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY 29
C. THE PROTESTANT PARAMILITARIES 3 4
D. THE COUNTER-TERRORIST FORCES — 3 6
E. MORALE; THE INTANGIBLE EDGE 4 2
IV. EMERGENCY LEGISLATION 48
A. THE CIVIL AUTHORITIES (SPECIAL POWERS)
ACT, 1922 49
B. THE OFFENSES AGAINST THE STATE ACT, 1939 52
C. THE PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE (TEMPORARY
PROVISIONS) BILL, 1939 53
D. THE NORTHERN IRELAND (EMERGENCY
PROVISIONS) ACT, 1973 54
E. THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM (TEMPORARY
PROVISIONS) ACT 56
V. THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT 66
A. BACKGROUND TO THE ACCORD — 66
B. REACTIONS TO THE ACCORD: LOYALIST 72
C. REACTIONS TO THE ACCORD: NATIONALIST 7 5
VI. THE U.S. -UK SUPPLEMENTARY EXTRADITION TREATY 7 9
A. THE WATERSHED EXTRADITION CASES — 81
B. THE SUPPLEMENTARY EXTRADITION TREATY
BATTLE 86
VII. CONCLUSIONS 92
LIST OF REFERENCES — 99
APPENDIX A: MAPS — 104
APPENDIX B: GLOSSARY ________—.... , 10 7
APPENDIX C: A SCENARIO FOR PEACE 112
APPENDIX D: COMMON SENSE — - 122
APPENDIX E: AN END TO THE DRIFT 133
APPENDIX F: THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT — 142
APPENDIX G: THE U.S. -U.K. SUPPLEMENTARY
EXTRADITION TREATY 152
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST —— — 160
VI
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
A thesis is not a simple project and v/hen it is
completed many people are owed thanks. The first thank you
I would like to credit is to Katherine Naughton, my
grandmother, for her soft-spoken support. Regretfully she
never lived to see this thesis completed. I cannot thank
Professor Stolfi enough for his help and direction he has
given me from the very inception of this project. The
library staff of the Naval Postgraduate School responded to
my every need and must be credited as a first class group of
professionals led by Roger Martin. Elaina Danielson of the
Hoover Archives at Stanford University was also most helpful
in assisting me in the search for original material.
The British Consulate in San Francisco provided me with
up-to-date results from the 1987 British general election
and copies of documents published in Northern Ireland by
some of the different political parties. The San Francisco
Irish Forum also deserves much thanks for their invaluable
help. The thesis research trip to Great Britain and
Northern Ireland taken 19 April through 9 May 1987 was
infinitely more fruitful due to the planning and
organizational ability of Patrick Goggins. Given the time
constraints and distances traveled, there was no stone left
unturned.
VII
Two images must be recorded here from that trip as a
snapshot of what characteristics the "Troubles" in Northern
Ireland have produced in the people involved. The first is
of Sister Sarah Clarke, a nun in the London suburb of
Camdentown. Although short in physical stature, her
personal efforts in caring for the families of Irish
prisoners who come from Ireland and Northern Ireland to
visit their loved ones in British prisons is no small
achievement. This is a thankless job for which she receives
little support. Sister Sarah speaks with greater
understanding about the concerns of the everyday people
involved in the "Troubles" than most politicians,
academicians, or civil servants directly responsible or
closely involved.
The second image to put this picture in perspective is
one of dinosaur of the British Empire, Ian Gow. Leader of
the Friends of the Unionists, Mr. Gow is a conservative
member of parliament who resigned his ministerial post in
protest against the Anglo-Irish Agreement. His archaic
rhetoric allows for no reconciliation between the
Nationalist and Unionist communities. He is an example of




Can terrorist violence be curbed through government
action? Through careful examination of the case of Northern
Ireland, this paper examines the success and failure of the
British government's attempts to cope with Irish terrorism.
Anti-terrorist legislation, international agreements and
massive security efforts have produced some positive results
in the war against terrorism. Unfortunately, these measures
have also often proven counter-productive, producing a
backlash of violence, nonsupport for the security forces and
electoral success for Sinn Fein, the Irish Republican Army's
political wing. The chasm between the Catholic Nationalist
and Protestant Loyalist communities widens; moderate
proposals fall on deaf ears and extremists win the day with
unequaled intransigence.
All attempts to adopt a coordinated, coherent policy to
deal with the violence in Northern Ireland meet great
resistance from the Northern Irish population. This is
because any threat—real or supposed—to the political
status quo in the province elicits violent counter-
protests.-'- The government's effectiveness has thus been
greatly hampered. To counteract this ineffectiveness the
-'-Keith Jeffrey, Northern Ireland; The Divided Province
(New York: Crescent Books, 1985), p. 87.
successive governments of Ireland, Northern Ireland and
Great Britain have consistently resorted to draconian
measures in an effort to deal with the "Troubles.' 1
Stormont, the Parliament of Northern Ireland, was
brought down in 1972 in the aftermath of escalating violence
and the government's failure to restore law-and-order. The
Parliament had become a monolith of Protestant Unionism
known for sanctioning policies of discrimination towards the
Catholic minority. The prorogation of Stormont and the
introduction of direct rule by Westminster was welcomed as
the "least worst" of possible solutions by both Catholics
and Protestants because of institutionalized discrimination,
and because of Stormont 's ineffectiveness in coping with the
terrorist violence.
In the February 1987 elections of the Republic of
Ireland only five percent of those eligible to vote
considered Northern Ireland as a main issue. While
possessing the capability to jump into the headlines with
the endless campaigns of violence, Northern Ireland is no
longer a top-level policy priority for the British or the
Southern Irish. Within the British Parliament, Northern
Irish MPs 2 are relatively powerless, holding only 17 of the
650 seats in the House of Commons, while ministerial
positions for Northern Ireland are appointed by the Prime
2Members of Parliament.
Minister from her Tory benches and fall directly under the
British Home Secretary of State.
Resolving the differences between the two communities in
Northern Ireland must be done in methodical steps and
progress measured in decades, perhaps centuries. Such
progress must be achieved, however, to "dry up" the seas of
nationalist support for the Irish Republican Army. That
support was created from centuries of mistreatment and
mishandling of Irish Catholics by successive British
governments and is an almost classical historical example of
man's inhumanity to man. Now the British government is
committed, whether it be through reluctant enactment of
civil rights legislation for Catholics, or deep resolve not
to be beaten by terrorist actions, in an attempt to make up
for past injustices. The more enlightened civil servants
recognize that any structure of devolved government must
accommodate the two legitimate traditions of Unionist and
Nationalist in Northern Ireland. The same civil servants
realize a unique triangular relationship between Belfast,
London, and Dublin must also be taken into consideration.
A. IRELAND TODAY
Ireland is a large island in the North Atlantic. The
southern five-sixths of the island constitute the sovereign
nation-state of Ireland while the northern one-sixth chooses
to remain as a part of the United Kingdom governed directly
through London. The total population of this Irish island
today is approximately five million, 3.5 million in the
south and 1.5 in the north. From this relatively small
inhabitancy has come a sizable portion of the population of
North America, not to mention the Irish sent to the
Australian penal colonies and those Irish who chose to live
in England. Over forty million Americans claim Irish
ancestry. From these millions, important political leaders
have emerged (no less than 11 U.S. Presidents, John F.
Kennedy and Ronald Reagan, to name a few, as well as
Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulrooney) . Yet, while these
leaders may reflect favorably to Ireland's credit as sons
and daughters of "Erin," this island has not yet produced a
leader of such caliber as to lead her out of the civil
strife that tears at Northern Ireland today.
A permanent solution to the deep-seated sectarian split
that divides the Irish population—both North and South
—
into Catholic and Protestant remains an elusive dream, but
some progress has been made. The people of Ireland on both
sides of the border are living better today than any other
period of history, albeit living conditions and the standard
of living in Ireland are the lowest of any West European
nation and the standard of living in Northern Ireland is the
lowest within the United Kingdom. The present party line
for Northern Ireland promulgated from both Dublin and London
is that any solution will take a great deal of time and will
not be enacted against the will of the majority of the
Northern Irish population.
The birth rate of the Northern Irish Catholics,
outpacing that of the Protestants, alludes to an eventual
Catholic majority and a future reunification with the South.
Protestant extremists in the North, however, violently
oppose any thought of a Dublin government having a legal
influence in the affairs of Northern Ireland. The
conclusion of the Anglo-Irish Accord was considered a
betrayal to the Loyalist cause and is duly commemorated in
the tradition of deadly violence that characterizes life in
Northern Ireland. 3
B. THE ELECTIONS
In February 1987 men and women of the Irish Republic
went to the polls to elect a new government replacing the
one which had been brought down under its own weight from
government overspending and large debt. High taxation, low
pay, 2 percent unemployment, gasoline at two pounds seventy
pence per gallon, and long lines to emigrate were the issues
in this election, not Northern Ireland. 4 The "Irish
Question," while it remains an emotive issue in the
3
"50 Injured in Massive Belfast Protest," San Jose
Mercury News , 16 November 1986, sec. 1, p. 3, and "Ulster
Protestants March to the Old Tune of 'No'," The New York
Times, 13 August 1986, sec. 1, p. 6.
4
"Dublin's Choice is All Forlorn," The Guardian
(London), 17 February 1987, sec. 1, p. 12.
Republican tradition, 5 has been preempted by more serious
immediate issues as Ireland struggles to recover from the
"Sick Man of Europe" syndrome. The election of Charles
Haughey as Prime Minister gave rise to the hopes of
Unionists that the Anglo-Irish Agreement, enacted 16 months
earlier by the former prime minister, would be abandoned by
the New Irish government. Mr. Haughey had been a leading
critic of the Anglo-Irish Agreement; while his party was in
the opposition even though many of the initiatives of the
Accord had been generated during his previous tenure as
Taoiseach. 6 In power once more, Mr. Haughey came out
strongly supporting the Agreement. Sinn Fein, the radical
nationalist political wing of the Irish Republican Army,
received a dismal 1.8% of the vote.
The June 1987 general elections of the British
government produced mixed success for moderates. Enoch
Powell, Official Unionist Party MP for South Down, lost his
seat to Eddie McGrady of the moderate Social Democratic and
Labor Party (SDLP) . Mr. Powell had been one of the most
vociferous opponents of the Anglo-Irish Accord, while John
Hume, leader of the SDLP, had been one of its leading
architects. In West Belfast where the Provisional I.R.A.
5The "Republican Tradition" refers to Irish Catholic
Nationalist's aspirations for the Irish nation to encompass
the whole island of Ireland, completely independent of
Britain.
6Irish Gaelic for Prime Minister.
thrives and the constituency is represented by Sinn Fein's
president and best-known spokesman, Gerry Adams, another
SDLP candidate, Joe Henderson, whittled away at Mr. Adam's
previous election margin of over 5,000 votes. Although Mr.
Adams retained his seat in West Belfast, there was a swing
to the SDLP candidate of 3.4%, reducing the margin of defeat
to just 2,200 votes. Here the counter-productive nature of
combating terrorism is most visible. Just a month earlier,
eight I.R.A. volunteers attempting to blow up a police
station were killed in an ambush by the British S.A.S. 7
That act, combined with the large police presence at the
funerals of the I.R.A. men, gave Mr. Adams the propaganda to
win out over moderation and perpetuate his legitimacy in the
eyes of his constituency. Of the total 730,152 votes cast
in the 1987 general election in Northern Ireland, 83,389
votes (11.4%) went to Sinn Fein. This is a decrease from
the 102,000 votes cast for Sinn Fein in the 1983 general
election, yet it reflects the successful electoral perform-
ance amassed after the I.R.A. hunger strikes in 1982.
C. IRISH NEUTRALITY; THE QUIET SUBJECT
Irish neutrality is a matter of policy, not
international guarantee, treaty, or constitutional
provision. It has acguired a hollowed status in Irish
7S.A.S.—Special Air Service, the elite counter-
terrorism unit of the British Army.
political culture. 8 Ireland was invited to join NATO in
1949 when the alliance was first formed. While the Irish
government concurred with the general aim of NATO, the
position taken was that it could not be a party to an
alliance which included the very power that was occupying
the northern one-sixth of Ireland. "The continuance of
partition precludes us from taking our rightful place in the
affairs of Europe." 9
Six of Ireland's north-eastern counties are occupied by
British forces against the will of the overwhelming
majority of the Irish people. As a result, any military
alliance, or commitment involving military action jointly
with the State that is responsible for the unnatural
division of Ireland, which occupies a portion of our
country with its armed forces, and which supports
undemocratic institutions in the north-eastern corner of
Ireland, would be entirely repugnant and unacceptable to
the Irish people. 10
While the Irish government rejected membership in the
multi-member NATO, the Foreign Minister, Sean McBride,
sought to secure a bilateral treaty of defense with the
United States. 11 The milieu at the time, however, dictated
that the collective nature of NATO not be undermined by
separate bilateral agreements. To enter into such an
8Trevor C. Salmon, "Irish Neutrality—A Policy in
Course of Evolution," NATO Review , Vol. 32, No. 1, 1984, p.
28.
9William FitzGerald, Irish Unification and NATO
(Dublin: Dublin University Press, 1982), p. 29.
10Salmon, "Irish Neutrality," p. 29.
llTrevor c> salmon, "Ireland: A Neutral in the
Community," Journal of Common Market Studies , Vol. XX, No.
3, March 1982, p. 208.
agreement with Ireland might create a precedent. Irish
membership in a defensive alliance was desirable, but not
essential. 12 Northern Ireland, controlled by Great Britain,
is presently included in NATO.
Irish schizophrenia towards the British is illustrated
by the defense of Ireland during the Second World War. The
Irish Army was assigned a dual role; the First Division was
to hold off a German invasion from the south until British
reinforcements could be invited to support the Irish
defenders; the Second Division was deployed on the border of
the six northern counties, and its commander, Major General
Hugo McNeill, anxiously sought assurances from the German
ambassador that the Axis would help in the event of a
British invasion. 13
World War II verified the strategic importance of
Ireland. The lines of communication between America and
Europe are significantly enhanced with the inclusion of
Ireland as a link. During the War, the newly-formed
coalition government of the Irish Republic refused the
British the use of ports in the south of Ireland. This hurt
British shipping by denying supply route flexibility
channeling convoys into the enemy's path. For the Allies an
12 Salmon, "Irish Neutrality," p. 30. Reference is to a
U.S. National Security Council study of the guestion of a
defensive alliance with Ireland.




abiding lesson of the war was that Ireland remained
strategically vital and that only by relying on Northern
Ireland's loyalty to Britain could the Atlantic be secure
against a future enemy. Were it not for Ulster's loyalty,
claimed Winston Churchill, "slavery and death" would have
been Britain's fate. 14
The northern access route into the Atlantic has risen in
significance as Soviet naval power has increased. And
although Shannon airport ceased to be a necessary refueling
point for trans-Atlantic flights in the early 1960 's,
Aeroflot has become Shannon's second largest customer.
Flights can be made from Moscow to Managua, Lima, Kingston
and Mexico City via Havana without stopping in a NATO
country
.
Northern Ireland gives the NATO alliance a foothold on
the "Gibraltar of the Atlantic." 15 A trade-off between
Irish unification for Ireland's membership in NATO is rarely
a topic of debate, yet it remains an issue as the European
Community seeks to coordinate positions "...more closely on
the economic and political aspects of security." Membership
in the E.E.C. has given Ireland a definite self-interest in
the defense of Western Europe. Although the issue of
14John Bowman, DeValera and the Ulster Question, 1917-
1973 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 254.
15 Lt. Cdr. Robert E. Vinning, "Restatement and Review
of the Situation in Ireland and Northern Ireland," 1943, p.
28; guote from a speech made by James M. Dillon to the Dail
Eireann 15 July 1942, Hoover Archives, Stanford, California.
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bartering Irish neutrality for unification is politically
unpopular, Ireland is going down the path to European
defensive cooperation and it is wrong to assume that the
lack of formal arrangements mean that Ireland is totally
free from any defense commitments or more particularly
defense obligations. 16
The issue of Irish neutrality is not a subject
overlooked by the I.R.A. which takes the position that
Ireland's membership in the European Economic Community
(E.E.C.) is no less than economic subjugation of Ireland by
Britain. Ireland's national sovereignty and neutrality are
undermined by membership. The socialist inclinations of
some of the principal revolutionaries indicate that Dublin,
London, the United Nations (U.N.), the E.E.C. and the United
States have an interest in ensuring that a West European
Cuba does not emerge from a civil war promulgated by the
I.R.A.
The most recent litmus test of this Irish commitment to
the E.E.C. was in May 1987. The Irish government had
ratified a new package of legislation, the Single European
Act (SEA), produced by the E.E.C. designed to promote closer
cooperation among the 12 members on foreign-policy issues.
The SEA gave the European Parliament more influence and
empowers the E.E.C. 's Council of Ministers to make most
16Salmon, "Ireland: A Neutral in the Community," p
226.
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decisions by majority vote rather than unanimity. This
ratification was challenged in court on the ground that it
compromised the Irish Constitution. Ireland's constitution
was born out of former Prime Minister Eamon de Valera's
conviction that Ireland must have absolute sovereignty over
its own affairs and that no foreign power (especially Great
Britain) would have any share in governing Ireland. The
Irish Supreme Court ruled 3-2 that the S.E.A. did breach
this sovereignty and a referendum was called. On May 26,
Irish voters approved by a 2-1 margin the S.E.A. As NATO's
future tacks towards greater European cooperation and a
diminished role for the United States, this approval must be
interpreted as a plus for American interests.
Producing a functional government in a land where
moderation and compromise were, until recent years unheard
of, may appear impossible. But the people of Northern
Ireland have recognized a need for restructuring the
constitutional framework to include the Catholic minority in
the decision making process. A Scenario for Peace
,
17 Common
Sense, 18 and the Unionist party's publication An End to the
Drift 19 each represent proposals generated from within
Northern Ireland instead of those imposed from others
outside the Province. The next giant step is for the
17Sinn Fein document—see Appendix C.
18Ulster Defense Association document—see Appendix D.
19Ulster Unionist party document—see Appendix E.
12
Northern Irish to generate internal dialogues aimed at
compromise.
This study examines the issues of Irish terrorism and
the British government's initiatives to combat Irish
terrorism from the perspective of U.S. interests. The
importance of Ireland to the United States will not diminish
in the near future. Although weighted against other world
issues the tragedy of Northern Ireland takes on a lesser
priority, it still receives a sizable portion of American
attention. U.S. policy towards Ireland since 1916 has been
"non-interference" in the resolution of its national
guestion vis-a-vis Great Britain, which means objectively it
has supported the United Kingdom. 20 The U.S. -UK
Supplementary Extradition Treaty angered many in the Irish-
American community who are sympathetic with Irish
Nationalists. No doubt the thought of a united Ireland
strikes a romantic chord throughout the Nationalist Camp.
Unfortunately many unenlightened Irish-Americans believe
unification is the sole cause of the I.R.A. and are not
aware of the I.R.A.'s socialist leanings. Noraid21 has
20Sean Cronin, Washington's Irish Policy: 1916-1986
(Dublin: Anvil Books, 1987), p. 325.
21Noraid (Irish Northern Aid) is an American
organization established by Irish Republican immigrant
Michale Flannery for the purpose of providing financial
support to the I.R.A. The organization also acts as a
political lobby. See, for example, James Adams, The




successfully used this sympathy to produce money and guns
for the I.R.A. The Extradition Treaty was a signal to an
important ally that the United States could make unpopular
commitments and counter some of the support which flows from
this country to the I.R.A. Monetary contributors to the
International Fund22 also exhibit an active commitment to
peace and reconciliation.
22The International Fund was established as a result of
the Anglo-Irish Agreement for the purpose of "development of
those parts of Ireland which have suffered most severely
from the consequences of the instability of recent years."
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II. A BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT
A. A ROAD FROM THE PAST TO THE PRESENT
The first significant appearance of the British in
Ireland was in the 12th century when Pope Adrian IV granted
Henry II of England lordship of Ireland. This was to
initiate the beginning of the struggle between the English
and the Irish which would continue to the present day.
By the 17th century, three of the four provinces
(Leinster, Munster, Connaught and Ulster) had been
subjugated to an English administration installed in Dublin.
The last holdout, Ulster, was subdued by the resettlement of
170,000 people, 150,000 of them Scottish Presbyterians. 1
This "plantation" proved to be permanent, and the
descendants of those people make up the Protestant majority
of Northern Ireland today.
The subjugation of Ulster was by no means a peaceful
process. In 1641, the indigenous Irish, from whom the land
for the new residents had been expropriated, rebelled.
Thirty thousand Protestants were killed. Later in the
decade, Cromwell and his Puritan army forcefully and
brutally subdued Ireland. In 1690, the Protestants were
securely settled when Protestant King William III of Orange
-'-Keith Jeffery, Northern Ireland, The Divided Province
(New York: Crescent Books, 1985), p. 3.
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defeated Catholic King James II at the Battle of the Boyne.
This event is important because much of the violence today
occurs when the Orangemen (Protestants) march to commemorate
the victory over James. The irony of this victory was that
William had the blessing of the Pope in his war with James.
At the end of the 18th century, when the seeds of modern
nationalism were being sown in America and France, Ireland,
too, was caught up in the spirit of revolution. The year
1798 saw the revolt of the United Irishmen supported by the
French against the English. This group of rebels was led by
Theobald Wolf Tone, a Dublin Protestant who was to become
known as the father of modern Irish independence. The noble
goals of the United Irishmen were to first abolish the
memory of all past dissensions, and second, substitute the
common name of Irishman in place of the denominations of
Protestant, Catholic, and dissenter.
These goals were never realized. As Catholics had
gained the right to bid on leases, they often undercut the
more conservative and long-established Presbyterians. By
the time of the uprising, the Presbyterians were dead set
against Catholics on religious grounds. Night riding and
raids by opposing gangs distinguished this rebellion which
grew bloody and sectarian in character. The rising was
brutally suppressed by Presbyterians in the Yeomanry. This
marked the formation of the Orange Order from the
Presbyterian raiders and Yeomanry and gave formal expression
16
to Catholic hatred. The rising was an embarrassing failure,
but marks the modern foundation of the Irish nationalist
movement with the Catholics in one camp and the Protestants
in another.
As a result of the insurrection, Parliament enacted the
1801 Act of the Union of Great Britain and Ireland. The
British dissolved the Irish Parliament, but in return
Ireland was permitted to send four spiritual lords, 28 life
peers, and 100 representatives to the Commons. The cross of
Saint Patrick was added to the cross of Saint George and the
Scottish cross of Saint Andrew to form the Union Jack,
signifying a United Kingdom. At this juncture, Irish
politics gradually began to divide along religious lines.
The Protestants supported the Union and the Catholics
increasingly espoused nationalistic aspirations.
In 1828, Daniel O'Connell was elected to the Parliament.
He fought for Catholic emancipation and each gain made
towards that end was considered by the Protestants a threat
against them. Each new reform or relief measure added to
the polarization of the communities along religious lines.
Even though Catholics were characterized by Protestants as
anti-British Irish nationalists, O'Connell, with support of
the Duke of Wellington, was able to push through the
Catholic Emancipation Bill. This bill granted the right to
suffrage, the right to sit in Parliament, and made Catholics
17
eligible for any office except Lord Chancellor of England
and Lord Lieutenant of Ireland.
Not everyone agreed with O'Connell's peaceful methods.
For every gain made, there appeared to be an equally
repressive concession. Adding insult to injury, Irish
Catholics were required to pay tithes to support the
Episcopal Church. These circumstances led to the formation
of the Young Ireland Party. Led by William Smith 1 Brian,
this group perpetrated a series of agrarian crimes which
caused the suspension of the writ of Habeas Corpus Act for
Ireland.
The potato famine exacerbated Irish poverty and the
political malaise. Starvation and emigration between 1841
and 1851 reduced the Irish population from over eight
million to six million. This decline in population was not
a temporary phenomenon. Between 1848 and 1914, close to
five and a half million Irish men and women emigrated. 2
This relative deprivation and the 1848 revolutionary
movements radiating from the continent precipitated yet
another insurrection, this time, in Tipperary. The rebels
were unequal to the forces of the constabulary and the
rising was soon foiled, but not completely extinguished.
The next decade saw the establishment of the Irish
Republican Brotherhood (the Fenians) . Despite considerable
2Gearoid O'Tuathaigh, "The Distressed Society," The
Irish World
. ed. Brian de Bieffrey (New York: Crown
Publishers, 1986), p. 189.
18
financial backing from the Irish-Americans, insurrections
attempted by the Fenians failed, but the Irish Republican
Brotherhood survived to form the Irish Republican Army.
Charles Stewart Parnell, the "uncrowned King of
Ireland," became a major political force from 1877 to 1891.
He attained the leadership of the Irish Party in Westminster
and led the fight for the abolition of the Act of Union.
The Act was to be replaced by Irish Home Rule. Parnell was
politically destroyed, however, in a divorce scandal and
died without realizing his goals for Ireland.
Home Rule aspirations remained alive and well even at
the death of their champion. A new defender was found in
John Redmond, leader of the 84 Irish Nationalist Members of
Parliament at Westminster. The specter of the sectarian
split again reared its ugly head; Protestants supported the
Union, and the Catholics Home Rule. By the time the Bill
was finally passed in the House of Commons in 1913, the
North had formed the Ulster Volunteer Force of over 100,000
recruits to take armed action against Home Rule, while the
South had raised 200,000 Irish Volunteers to defend it. 3
The Home Rule Bill was scheduled to become law in the
summer of 1914, but with the outbreak of the First World
War, it was suspended until six months after the close of
hostilities. Redmond had pledged the support of the Irish
Volunteers to fight in the British war effort, and most
3Jeffery, Northern Ireland , p. 13.
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supported him. Thirty thousand of the Ulster Volunteer
Force joined almost en masse and effectively became the 3 6th
(Ulster) Division. 4
B. ENGLAND'S EXTREMITY IS IRELAND'S OPPORTUNITY
Up to this point the numerous rebellions had not changed
the status quo. The English ruled the Irish, usually
incompetently, sometimes cruelly, and almost always
negligently. 5 The Easter Rebellion of 1916, as each
insurrection before it, was also a failure, but it
represented the beginning of the end of British rule in all
but six of Ireland's 32 counties. The date, April 24, 1916
—Easter Monday—was suggested as having mystical
significance. This was to have been the day when Ireland
rose from the grave of oppression.
About 12,000 of the Irish volunteers had remained in
Ireland to secure Home Rule and avert partition. These were
the hard core nationalists led by Patrick Pearse, a school
teacher and poet. Another group of no more than 2 00 called
the "Citizen Army" was led by James Connolly, a Marxist-
Socialist active in the trade unions. Pearse and the
military council, which had assumed command of the Irish
Volunteers, decided to stage an armed rising on Easter and
Connolly agreed to cooperate. General maneuvers were called
4Jeffery, Northern Ireland , p. 15. (author's bold)
5Ferdinand Mount, "The I.R.A. and the Bar Rooms of
America," The American Spectator , January 1980, p. 14.
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and about 2,000 men were paraded with rifles and then moved
off to occupy prearranged positions in the city. An attack
on Dublin Castle failed, but railway and telegraph wires
were cut, and barricades were thrown up in the streets to
block roads leading into the capital. 6
Fighting was heavy for six days. The rebel forces were
greatly outnumbered by the British. Contained in Dublin,
the revolt resulted in many casualties to the towns people,
most of whom were innocent bystanders. Casualties to
bystanders included 216 dead and over 2,500 wounded, mostly
from British artillery fire. The rebels suffered 56 dead
and 132 wounded, 7 the British lost 130 dead and 373 wounded.
By Friday of the Easter Week Uprising, the lines of
communication between the insurgent strongholds were broken,
the post office was demolished and Pearse issued a statement
renouncing hope of military success. By Saturday morning,
the decision to surrender unconditionally was reached, and
by Sunday, the rising was over.
Aside from arresting known nationalists throughout the
country, the British instituted a series of secret courts
martial whose sentences included the execution of the
leaders. Fifteen men were shot, including Pearse and
Connolly, while 65 others were sentenced to life
6 D.J. Goodspead, "Ireland (1916-1921)," History of
Revolutions (West Point: United States Military Academy,
n.d. ) , p. 7-5.
7 Ibid.
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imprisonment. The insurgents' romantic sacrifice struck a
chord of nationalism throughout Ireland. Public
disenchantment with the administration was exacerbated by
revulsion at the long-drawn-out series of executions. While
the uprising had not been widely supported by the Irish
population, the over-reaction of the British Government
ensured a mass base of support required for revolutionary
success.
The next five years were the most violent in the
struggle for Irish independence. The Irish Republican
Brotherhood was reorganized into the Irish Republican Army.
From 1919 until 1921 when the truce was declared between the
British and the I.R.A., 751 people were killed and 1,212
wounded in the Anglo-Irish War. This war was characterized
by I.R.A. guerilla tactics against the British security
forces and repressive British retaliatory measures against
the I.R.A. The Black and Tans, a group of British ex-
servicemen who were brought in to supplement police, came to
be regarded with particular repugnance by the Irish
populace. The toll came to 751 killed—405 of those were
police, 150 British Army, and 196 civilians and I.R.A. 8
Politically the Irish state dates its formation from the
December 1918 general election. Sinn Fein (We Ourselves)
candidates had swept 73 of the Westminster parliamentary
seats. The party had originally been formed in 1905 by
8Jeffery, Northern Ireland , p. 18.
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Arthur Griffith as a constitutionalist group consisting
mainly of intellectuals. At the Sinn Fein convention in
October 1917, the Irish Republican Brotherhood agreed to
frame an article in the Sinn Fein convention declaring the
movement's aim to be the securing of international
recognition of Ireland as an independent Irish Republic. 9
The victorious candidates, 36 of whom were in jail, refused
to go to London and formed themselves into the first Dail
Eireann (Parliament of Ireland) in January 1919. This
tradition of refusing to take the Westminster Parliamentary
seats gained through electoral success still remains as a
policy of the Sinn Fein Party.
The end of the First World War revived the issue of Home
Rule. The guestion was not one of when but how to implement
necessary change. In 192 Westminster passed a Government
of Ireland Act which provided for two separate legislatures,
one in Dublin, one in Belfast, both answerable to
Westminster. The elections held in May 1921 returned a
Unionist majority to the Belfast Parliament and in Dublin,
Sinn Fein candidates took all but four of the 128 seats.
These Sinn Fein MPs refused to recognize the Dublin
Parliament claiming it was another British institution
blocking total Irish sovereignty, and formed themselves into
the second Dail Eireann in 1921.
9Tim Pat Coogan, The I .R.A. , 10th ed. (Glasgow: William
Collins Sons & Co., 1987), p. 41.
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C. THE ANGLO-IRISH TREATY, 1921
The negotiated settlement, the Anglo-Irish Treaty,
dictated the partitioning of Ireland into the six Protestant
majority counties of the North and the 2 6 Catholic majority
counties of the South. This separation represents the
border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland
today. The settlement sparked off yet another round of
violence. The second Dail Direann ratified the treaty 64
votes to 57 and ultra-republicans, led by Eamon de Valera,
quit the Dail in protest. De Valera and his radical
republicans plunged the country into civil war in which
another 4,000 Irishmen were to meet a violent end to their
lives before a unilateral truce was called in 1923.
In 1921, the North, no more than the South, wanted
Ireland partitioned. But Unionists were adamant about not
being ruled from Dublin, 10 a situation that they considered
as quasi rule from Rome. The nationalists in turn stood
fast to the demand for total sovereignty from Britain.
The civil war shaped the political party divisions which
endure in the Irish Republic today. The pro-treaty or
partition party took the name of Fine Gael (Tribe of Gaels)
;
the anti-treaty factions were the radical Sinn Fein and the
more moderate Fianna Fail (Soldiers of Destiny) formed later
by de Valera in 1926. Complete separation from Britain was




to emerge in 1932 as the President of the Free State and in
1937 he introduced a new constitution which was to make
Ireland a completely independent nation. Article two of the
constitution claims the whole island of Ireland as national
territory. This claim, although since repealed, is a
particular irritation to Unionists.
Sectarian violence in Belfast resembled thereafter the
activity of the current 1969 round. Catholics were attacked
by Protestant mobs; security forces, if they did anything,
sided with the Protestants. The present campaign of
violence has been the most enduring and the most savage
resulting in the death of 2,500 people with another 27,000
suffering serious injury. In order to put these statistics
into perspective it must be remembered that the population
of Northern Ireland comprises only one and a half million
people. Had these deadly events occurred on the mainland of
the United Kingdom, the corresponding figures would have
been 87,000 killed and 940,000 injured. 1:L
i:LJohn Cushnahan, Unpublished Article (for the
Commonwealth Parliamentary Association), Belfast, April 1987.
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III. THE OPPOSING FORCES
During a visit in April-May 1987 to Great Britain and
Northern Ireland to conduct research for this thesis, I was
permitted by the British government, along with other
members of my research group, access to Lon Lartin and Maze
prisons. The following are my impressions after
interviewing loyalist and nationalist prisoners in the Maze
prison H-blocks. 1
A. THE H-BLOCKS, 2 MAY 1987
The prison is yet another hallowed symbol in the Irish
struggle against the British. Kilmainham Jail in Dublin,
site of internment and execution for a long line of Irish
rebels, was restored in 1960 as a national monument by
veterans of the 1916 uprising. In 1981 the Provisional
I.R.A. received world attention as 10 men fasted to death in
support of their demand to be treated as political
prisoners. Prison is an expected fact of life for an I.R.A.
volunteer. Their Loyalist counterparts, however, were
relatively free of the threat of internment until 1973 when
the brutal sectarian murders could no longer be overlooked
by the authorities.
1The Maze prison H-blocks are the prison cell buildings
which are constructed in the form of an H, thus the name, H-
block.
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A visit to the H-blocks in the Maze prison today (still
called by its former name of Long Kesh by the Nationalists)
reveals a modern high security prison that appears to be
inescapable. Yet on 22 September 1983 38 I.R.A. prisoners
broke out, 12 of whom remain at large today. The prison
population is separated into those in prior to 1976 and
those after, then again divided into Loyalist and Republican
prisoners and, lastly, divided into the particular group in
which they claim membership.
Prisoners detained prior to 1976 are considered as
"special category" detainere. They were given political
status which enabled them to organize on a prisoner-of-war
basis. These prisoners are billeted on a compound within
the Maze where they live in Quonset huts akin to military
barracks, are allowed a classroom and conduct classes, a
gym, a workshop with tools for woodworking projects,
parakeets and canaries, the wearing of their own clothes,
more frequent visits and more liberal food packages than
non-special category prisoners. Despite these privileges,
the ambience is one of hopelessness. These men are in
prison for life.
After March 1976, those convicted of terrorist crimes
serve their sentences in the prison H-blocks. Here
prisoners live in cells but are permitted to wear their own
clothes. Prison work is not available. Most prisoners are
between 20 to 30 years of age, and almost without exception
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have been sentenced to life terms. Loyalist and Republican
prisoners were unanimous in their disgust towards the
current British/Northern Irish political leadership. This,
however, was where the similarities of the two populations
ceased.
The cell walls of the Loyalist prisoner were adorned
with pictures of women, most of them tasteless. Bookshelves
contained relatively little reading material. Some kept
novels, comic books and old letters, but almost without
exception, educational and intellectual texts were not to be
found. I asked a young twenty-three year old Loyalist
prisoner, who had served five years of his life sentence for
murder, "What would you like to do with your life if you
could be free again?" His reply was that he would "like to
learn a trade, be a builder, or something similar to that."
When I asked a Republican prisoner the same guestion,
there was no hesitation before his reply, "Well, the way I
see it, I wouldn't like to do anything until we get rid of
this occupying power, you know, get the Brits out." The
short term objective of the P.I.R.A. —"Brits Out"! The long
term objective--a Democratic Socialist Republic.
Prison cells of the Republican prisoners are guite
different from those of their Loyalist counterparts. Irish
history texts, Marx-Engels readers and Third-World
revolutionary writings adorn the bookshelves. Walls are
decorated with snap-shots of relatives, wives, Celtic
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designs and pictures of the Irish landscape. There is a
noticeable absence of Catholic religious symbols. Although
membership in the I.R.A. does not mean automatic
excommunication from the Church, most of the Republican
prisoners seem to have rejected Catholicism.
B. THE IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY
A new recruit into the Provisional I.R.A. is given a
complete indoctrination from the "Green Book" 2 to give the
recruit the ability to withstand outside pressures to inform
and constantly keep the I.R.A. 's political goals in mind.
Direct lineal succession of the P. I.R.A. is traced to the
Provisional Government of 1916, the first Dail of 1919 and
the second Dail of 1921. The Dail had declared in 1921 that
if enemy action reduced its ranks to a minimum, the
remaining deputies should turn over the executive powers to
the Army of the Republic, which would then constitute itself
as a Provisional Government. When the Dail overwhelmingly
accepted the Treaty in 1922, the I.R.A. withdrew its
allegiance, recognizing the minority in opposition as the
"final custodians to the Republic. ;l When a veteran of the
1916 Uprising was asked his opinion of the present P. I.R.A.,
2The Green Book refers to the I.R.A. plan of action
developed after the three-day and seven-day detention orders
were so successful at breaking volunteers. See Tim Pat





the answer was a short, curt, "Disgusting. And they have
the nerve to claim heritage in the original I.R.A." 3
Eamond de Valera had been among the minority of the Dail
representatives who rejected the 1921 Treaty which
partitioned the six northern counties from the remainder of
Ireland. But after he came to power, despite his
republicanism, de Valera consistently pursued a policy of
opposing the physical-force tradition. He initiated
legislation in 1939 after a continued period of I.R.A.
violence to enable the government to intern members of the
I.R.A. without trial. Earlier, in 1936, the I.R.A. had been
declared an illegal organization by the Irish Government.
The I.R.A. organization particularly lent itself to
classic guerrilla warfare. It adopted three main tactics
which were easily implemented by comparatively few people
with relatively simple equipment. The first tactic was the
planting of bombs on fixed targets, including government
buildings, the economic and communications infrastructure,
police barracks and military installations. The second was
the assassination of individual security-force personnel,
particularly those recruited locally. The third tactic
involved larger scale attacks on security forces, either by
ambush or against police barracks. The goal of these
3Veteran of the 1916 Uprising, interview held during
the 71st Anniversary Ceremony of the Execution of the 1916
Rebels, Kilmainham Jail, Dublin, Ireland, 3 May, 1987.
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tactics was to expel the British from the North and unite
the island into 32 counties.
Consistent with past experience, every I.R.A. campaign
failed to achieve the goal of unity with the South. Each
defeat produced a new martyr to rally around and support for
the I.R.A. ebbed between the traditional support of
nationalism and disgust for the seemingly endless violence.
By the mid-1960s, support for the I.R.A. had all but
disappeared. Civil Rights' movements in the United States,
however, sparked a new awareness within the Catholic
minority in Northern Ireland. This minority began peaceful
demonstrations in hopes of bringing attention to the
ineguities between Catholics and Protestants in Northern
Ireland. These protest marches were at first peaceful and
some gains were made. But in 1969, violence broke out in
the Bogside area of Derry (Londonderry) which led to the
army being put on the streets to help the Royal Ulster
Constabulary (R.U.C.) maintain order.
By 1969, the majority of the I.R.A. now favored
political action as opposed to violence. The plan was to
put up candidates for election in Dublin, Belfast, and
London on a leftist, broadly Marxist policy. This was a
break with previous I.R.A. and Sinn Fein policy which had
traditionally regarded all existing parliaments as
irrelevant to the struggle for power. At the Dublin
conference of Sinn Fein in January 1970, this new approach
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failed to secure a two-thirds majority. 4 The more militant
members of the organization then splintered off to form the
Provisional I.R.A. (P. I.R.A.), an<^ the more moderate
majority became known as the Official I.R.A. (O.I.R.A.). In
1970, the strength of the I.R.A. in Northern Ireland was
estimated at 600 members, mostly in Belfast. The
Provisionals rapidly exceeded this number drawing popular
support as the "defenders" of the people against Loyalist
attacks. By 1971, the Provos could count on over 1,000
volunteers in Belfast alone. 5
Both wings of the I.R.A. perpetrated violence in
Northern Ireland in the early 7 0s many times fighting each
other as well as the security forces and militant Loyalists.
By 1971, as a result of I.R.A. violence, Stormont 6 resorted
to internment without trial. This touched off new
hostilities toward the governmental authorities on a massive
scale. Many of those interned were people who had a
previous police record of I.R.A. activity. The Provos, who
had benefited from new recruitment, claimed that only about
3 of their members had been arrested.
4W.D. Flacks, Northern Ireland, A Political Directory.
1968-1979 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), p. 99.
5Jeffery, Northern Ireland , p. 53.
6Stormont or Stormont Castle outside of Belfast was the
seat of the Northern Irish Parliament until it was prorogued
in 1974 by the British Government.
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On 29 May 1972, the O.I.R.A. declared a ceasefire.
Since the P.I.R.A. was responsible for the overwhelming
majority of shootings and bombings, this truce had little
effect on the level of violence. Later, on 26 June the
P.I.R.A. also called a truce. Its leadership was secretly
flown to London by the R.A.F. 7 for a discussion with British
representatives. These discussions yielded no concessions
from either side, but the truce was not withdrawn. This
peace was very short-lived however as the P.I.R.A. accused
the British Army of breaking the truce on 9 July 1972. The
Provos renewed their campaign of terror. In contrast, with
a few exceptions of occasional conflict with the P.I.R.A.,
the O.I.R.A. has successfully abandoned its policies of
armed action for those of political action.
Escalating violence brought about the collapse of the
Northern Irish Parliament at Stormont and direct rule from
Westminster was introduced. This was seen as an interm
achievement by the P.I.R.A. The Provos promulgated a Eire
Nua (New Ireland) 8 as the final goal of their method. This
Eire Nua declaration included the non-negotiable demand that
the British government declare its intent to withdraw from




Eire Nua . Kevin Street, Dublin, 28 June 1972.
n, Chief of Staff, Provisional I.R.A.,
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The Strategy is generally as follows:
1) To conduct a war of attrition against enemy personnel
which is aimed at causing as many casualties and deaths as
possible so as to create a demand from their people at
home for British withdrawal.
2) To conduct a bombing campaign aimed at making the
enemy's financial interest in Northern Ireland
unprofitable while at the same time curbing long term
financial investment in the country.
3) To make the six counties as at present and for the
past several years ungovernable except by colonial
military rule.
4) To sustain the war and gain support for its ends by
national and international propaganda and publicity
campaigns.
5) To defend the war of liberation by punishing
criminals, collaborators and informers. 9
Eradication of the I.R.A. is not possible now or in the
near future. Social-economic conditions in the Catholic
community and government errors, be it under-reactions or
over-reactions to the situation, has created a steady flow
of support to the more radical P.I.R.A. The Provos have the
capability to create a crisis unexpectedly. While they
cannot strike a decisive blow to the security forces to
achieve their objective, neither can the British eradicate
them militarily.
C. THE PROTESTANT PARAMILITARIES
There are about forty illegal Loyalist paramilitary
groups. The overlapping membership, fragmentation and names
9Tim Pat Cogan, The IRA . 10th Ed. (Glasgow: William
Collins and Sons & Co., 1987), p. 693.
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of convenience make it more difficult to distinguish the
different Protestant Paramilitaries in comparison to the
Catholic I.R.A. The largest is the Ulster Defense
Association (U.D.A.) consisting at its peak in 1972-1974 of
about 50,000 members, although only a few were involved in
sectarian killing. It was formed to protect Protestant
areas from I.R.A. violence. The U.D.A. was successful in
forcing the government into taking action against Republican
No-Go (i.e., do not enter) areas previously off limits to
the security forces.
The most deadly offshoot of the U.D.A. is the Ulster
Freedom Fighters (U.F.F.). This group has claimed
responsibility for many of the sectarian murders and was
proscribed by the government in 1973, while, in contrast,
the U.D.A. remained a legal organization. As Republican
violence declined, so did membership of the U.D.A. By 1977,
the numbers were down to about 10,000. 10
The Ulster Volunteer Force (U.V.F.) is a particularly
brutal Protestant paramilitary. One particular U.V.F. unit
from West Belfast would abduct its Catholic victims by car
and carry out the assassination with meat cleavers. The
gang became known as the Shankill Butchers. A series of
arrests in 1977 neutralized the U.V.F., and it was forced to
declare a ceasefire out of necessity rather than by
10Jeffery, Northern Ireland , pp. 83-85
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choice. 11 The Red Hand Commandos (R.H.C.)/ a small but
violent organization that emerged in 1972, merged with the
U.V.F. in 1974.
Protestant paramilitaries do not enjoy the same type of
close-knit support from the Orange (Protestant) community
that the P.I.R.A. gets from the Green (Catholic). The
Protestant community suffers to a much larger extent from
intimidation and protection racketeering at the hands of its
own extremists. The gap between the paramilitary and his
community, while exaggerated by the means employed, narrows
at the ends sought. One of the goals which the UDA
espouses—an independent state on the Dutch model—is
religious apartheid. This plan is a popular solution in the
more hard-line Loyalist areas, and it is not so completely
rejected as one would expect in Catholic areas. The Provo
plan for an autonomous Protestant enclave within a 3 2 county
Republic is a solution that is generally detested by
Loyalists. 12
D. THE COUNTER-TERRORIST FORCES
Law enforcement authorities represent the cutting edge
of the state's application of power. Enforcement policies
not perceived as equitable will alienate the minority ethnic
group and undermine government legitimacy more quickly than
1]
-Ibid.
12 Deryla Murphy, A Place Apart (Devin, England: Old
Grenwich, 1980), pp. 132-137.
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perhaps any other areas of public policy. 13 Actual
enforcement activity is the X- factor of a government's
ability to control terrorist violence through anti-terrorism
legislation. In the case of Northern Ireland, the Catholic
minority views government security forces with great
distrust, even hatred. Security forces are seen as an
occupying power and considered as legitimate targets by the
P.I.R.A. and other Nationalist splinter groups. This
targetting has the effect of provoking over-reaction and
brutal enforcement measures further perpetuating the
alienation of the Catholic population.
The Royal Ulster Constabulary (R.U.C.) forms the core of
the security forces in Northern Ireland. The British Army
and Special Air Service (S.A.S.) function in support of
R.U.C. efforts. This was not always the case. In 1969, the
Constabulary was not prepared for nor could it effectively
restore order in the violence of the Bogside Riots. The
Stormont Government was at the end of its list of options
for dealing with the situation politically when the Home
Affairs Minister, Robert Porter, announced that the army
would be brought into Londonderry. The action was approved
by London, and the Home Secretary, James Callaghan, told
Westminister MP's:
13 David E. Schmitt, "Conflict and Accommodation in
Northern Ireland," Terrorism: An International Journal
(Vol. 9, No. 3, 1987), p. 269.
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The General Officer Commanding (G.O.C.) Northern
Ireland has been instructed to take all necessary steps,
acting impartially between citizen and citizen, to restore
law and order. Troops will be withdrawn as soon as this
is accomplished. This is a limited operation and during
it the troops will remain in direct and exclusive control
of the G.O.C, who will continue to be responsible to the
United Kingdom Government. . . . The Ireland Act of 1949
affirms that neither Northern Ireland nor any part of it
will in any event cease to be part of the United Kingdom
without the consent of the Parliament of Northern Ireland,
and the United Kingdom reaffirms the pledges previously
given that this will remain the position so long as the
people of Northern Ireland wish. 14
At first the British Army was welcomed by the Catholic
minority who had been brutalized by Protestant mobs. The
R.U.C. and the auxiliary police, the B-Specials, more than
ninety-five percent Protestant, had only worsened the
situation. The Army deployed and the R.U.C. fell back. The
role of the British Army was to stop the terrorists and
create a political structure which would be acceptable to
the population and allow the province to be governed
normally; but how all this was to be done was not
specifically spelled out. The Ministry of Defense had
issued every soldier a "Yellow Card" containing detailed and
rather complex instructions on the circumstances in which
the troops on duty were permitted to open fire. 15 But in
the confusion of the riots eighteen and nineteen year old
14 Desmond Hamill, Pig in the Middle, The Army in
Northern Ireland. 1969-1984 (London: Methuen London, 1985)
,
p. 7 .
15Joseph W. Bishop, Jr. , "Law in the Control of
Terrorism and Insurrection: The British Laboratory
Experience," Law and Contemporary Problems (Vol. 42, No. 2,
Spring 1978), p. 179.
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soldiers were bound to make errors in judgment. The
Catholics, prodded by I.R.A. propaganda, were unforgiving.
Soldiers who were once welcomed with sweets and tea were now
sometimes offered sandwiches with ground glass in them. The
"honeymoon" was over.
Two decades later, the British Army continues to patrol
in Northern Ireland. Troop strength peaked in 1972 when
over 21,000 British soldiers were assigned to the province.
Over the past ten years the Army has kept between 13,000-
15,000 regulars in Ulster. These are broken down into
permanent garrison (resident) troops and roulement units
which serve short four month tours. By 1984, the presence
had been reduced to six resident and two roulement
battalions. The units were organized as the 39th Brigade in
Belfast, the 8th Brigade in Londonderry, and the 3rd Brigade
along the border. The 1984 reduction also eliminated the
3rd Brigade Headguarters, but a troop presence is
maintained. Ulster peace-keeping duty adversely affects the
readiness of the British Army on the Rhine where up to seven
battalions may be absent at a given time, but it is also
used to the fullest extent for counter-insurgency
training. 16
The Ulster Defense Regiment is the locally recruited
unit of the British Army. It replaced the B-Specials which
16David C. Isby and Charles Kamps, Jr. , Armies of





were disbanded as a result of its complicity with the
Protestant mobs in the 1969 riots. The goal of the
government was to form up a unit free from the religious
bias that was a formally accepted way of life in the
province. This ambition was not realized as former B-
Specials joined en mass and Catholics who aspired to do so
were ostracized in the unit and from their community. If
that were not enough to discourage them from enlisting, they
were tortured and assassinated by the P.I.R.A.
The unit is made up of 7,500 members including 2,200
full-time and 5,300 part-time. It is organized into 45 line
and one headquarters companies making up 11 battalions which
vary in strength from 400-1,000 personnel. Eight of the 11
battalions have their own security districts which cover
over half of Ulster with 41 company posts.-1- 7
The R.U.C. has improved significantly over the last 18
years, increasing in size from a force of 3,500 members to
12,670 highly trained and equipped police. In 1976 the
timing was thought right to bring the R.U.C. back to the
front-line role of law enforcement and place the British
Army in the support role. Sir Kenneth Newman, who had spent
the previous three years laying the groundwork for the
R.U.C. to take on the high-risk profile, was brought in as
the new Chief Constable. He and the General Officer
Commanding, Lieutenant-General Sir David House produced a
17 Ibid.
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document known as the "Joint Directive." This detailed the
'how-to' of reversing the roles of the Army and police.
This document directed that all Army activity be in response
to police requirements.
The new security policy was called "Ulsterization" and
despite pressure to bring in more troops as the I.R.A.
successfully escalates crisis situations, the program has
been consistently pursued. Casualty rates were shifted from
the British Army to the R.U.C. and the U.D.R. Perhaps the
most difficult period for the R.U.C. occurred during the
1981 Hunger Strikes. As each of the ten hunger strikers
died, intensive rioting festered at the funerals. The
R.U.C. did not withdraw from the front-line role entrusted
it and relinquish control to the Army as it had in 1969.
The 1987 escalation of violence once again has seen the
call for more troops in Ulster from the Province and Great
Britain. In a special security debate in the House of
Parliament on 6 May 1987, Tom King, the Secretary of State
for Northern Ireland, announced that "More R.U.C. full-time
reservists are to be recruited immediately to help in the
fight against terrorism in Ulster," but again, consistent
with past security policy, he did not cave in to demands for
more troops. The policy of Ulsterization appears to be
established into the near future.
The security forces of the Republic of Ireland play an
important role in the efforts to curb I.R.A. terror. The
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Irish Army and the police force (Gardai) have received much
criticism from Loyalists who regard the Southern state as an
I.R.A. safe-haven. But a closer look at the facts reveal
otherwise. During the 1985-1986 fiscal year, the Irish
Army, in cooperation with the police, provided 11,000
parties of various sizes for operational duties in the
border area. Three "border" battalions deploy from eight
permanent bases in the area, two of them with attached
helicopter fight. The Irish Army's other eight infantry
battalions are regularly rotated in support and provided
1,500 patrols and 9,500 checkpoints in that same year. The
small Irish Navy has intercepted various attempts to import
arms into the Republic by sea. The spillover of violence
into the South manifested in a series of armed robberies,
assassinations, and bombings have made the Republic
painfully aware that the 'Troubles' are not just a problem
for Northern Ireland. 18
E. MORALE; THE INTANGIBLE EDGE
The confidence of the I.R.A. is reinforced through the
ability to carry-on a successful campaign and hit big marks
such as Lord Justice Maurice Gibson, the second highest
ranking judge in Northern Ireland. 19 While these terror
18Adrian J. English, "The Irish Republic's Security
Effort," Janes Defence Weekly
.
27 September 1986, p. 673.
19Lord Justice Maurice Gibson, and his wife, Cecily,
were murdered in a bomb blast when returning from a holiday
trip on 25 April 1987. Although the I.R.A. had recent
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campaigns are condemned from all Northern Irish political
and social institutions, save Sinn Fein, from the Irish
government, and from the United States, there exists a tiny
Nationalist minority of hardcore radicals throughout which
condones the murders as justified in the struggle against
British colonial rule. From this minority the I.R.A. draws
support directly as new volunteers, indirectly as support
volunteers and sympathizers and internationally with
political 20 and financial aid. The financial support drawn
from Noraid21 allows the I.R.A. to purchase sophisticated
modern weapons lending credibility to it as a fighting force
and enhancing morale.
The morale of the I.R.A. is severely underminded when an
operation goes wrong as a result of an informer. The
sentence for "talking" is death. The May 1987 ambush of an
I.R.A. bombing attempt on a R.U.C. Station in Loughgall
where eight I.R.A. members were killed as they drove an
earthmover loaded with explosives toward the station was
success in assassinating R.U.C. and U.D.R. members, Lord
Gibson's murder attracted world headlines.
20Sinn Fein, the political wing of the I.R.A. polled
83,389 votes in the June 1987 British general election.
This represents 11.4% of the total vote.
21Noraid (Irish Northern Aid)
,
is an American
organization established by Irish Republican immigrant
Michale Flannery for the purpose of providing financial
support to the I.R.A. The organization also acts as a
political lobby. See, for example, James Adams, The




assessed as the largest I.R.A. disaster since the current
round of violence ensured in 1969. 22 An I.R.A. defeat,
however, can be quickly turned into a rallying point around
which new martyrs are produced to gain support from the
nationalist community.
The morale of the Royal Ulster Constabulary is an item
of constant debate. The circumstances of terrorist violence
dictate support by the British Army and the R.U.C. cannot
function without it. Although community leaders loudly
proclaim their support for the R.U.C, the constabulary must
police in a community where they have little if any actual
support from the local population.
Security force activity is ten times higher in Catholic
areas than Protestant, and Loyalists regard the police as
their legitimate military arm whose job it is to dominate
Catholics. Distrust of the R.U.C. by Catholics, and the
Loyalist fear of no impartiality of treatment from the
police accounts for the undermining of morale and
ineffectiveness in controlling violence. London Chief
Commissioner, Robert Mark, stated: "Police depend entirely
for their successful operation on their acceptability to the
220n 8 May 1987 two I.R.A. units were ambushed in an
attempt to blow up a R.U.C. station in the border town of
Loughgall. The Sinn Fein spokesman stated that several
members of the operation had escaped. He claimed that they
witnessed their colleagues being shot on the ground after
being captured. The R.U.C. denied the Sinn Fein claims.
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community they serve, and this, in turn, depends entirely on
their accountability for their actions." 23
Police interrogation methods were investigated after
1979 when the rate of confessions while in police custody
rose in direct proportion to the number of complaints of ill
treatment from those in custody. Judge Harry Bennett QC, 24
an English Crown Judge, was commissioned to head an inquiry
into the allegations. In publishing his committee's
findings, the report mentioned that there had been cases
where medical evidence had been produced concerning injuries
sustained in police custody that were not self-inflicted.
The United States Congress reacted to the report by placing
an embargo on the sale of 6,000 .357 revolvers to the R.U.C.
Police morale dropped, as did the rate of convictions.
When the I.R.A. conducts a successful campaign, i.e., a
sustained period of crisis events without capture and
conviction, the R.U.C. morale again suffers and the
constabulary is prodded into a reactive mode. How the
police act is exemplified by the leadership of the Chief
Constable, first in Sir Kenneth Newman who became known for
his even temper in crisis and triumph alike, 25 and then in
Sir John Herman. At the funeral of Lord Justice Gibson--a
23Mark Monday Collection, "Northern Ireland Has a
Police Problem," 5 March 1975 (Stanford: Hoover Archives),
Box III, H007.
24Queen's Council.
25Hamill, Pig , p. 218.
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security nightmare—Sir John could be seen walking calmly
among his men, the epitome of reassurance. 26
Competition between the R.U.C. and the British Army has
flared up at points and exposure in the press brings the
cooperation efforts of the security forces into question.
In 1979 when Lord Mountbatten was murdered and 18 British
soldiers killed in one engagement the Army briefed Prime
Minister Thatcher that it would prefer to have the control
of security returned to them. The Army had neither
confidence that the police could manage on their own nor in
the triumvariate committee system consisting of Lt. Gen.
Creasy, Chief Constable Newman, and Secretary of State
Atkins for liaison between the forces. According to the
Army, the Catholics would rather see British soldiers doing
the job (of policing) than the Protestant policemen. 27
The British Army's assessment was questionable. Two
cases of British soldiers accused of manslaughter were
brought to trial. Each case was characterized by a wide
discrepancy in testimony from witnesses who were Catholic
bystanders and British soldiers. Someone was lying, and the
prosecution failed to prove either case beyond a reasonable
doubt. Both defendants were acquitted. Needless to say,
the acquittals did nothing to improve morale between the
26
"Blunt Talker at the Sharp End," The Times (London),
30 April 1987, p. 12.
27llWho's in Charge in Ulster—the Soldiers or the
Police?" The Economist , 15 September 1979, p. 38.
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Catholics and the security forces. The civilians felt
themselves oppressed by a ruthless soldiery; the soldiers
could see no reason to expose themselves to danger in order
to safeguard the lives of people who might or might not be
innocent. There is no easy solution to the problem of
punishing lawless behavior by the security forces trying to
cope with guerrillas amid a hostile civilian population. 28
One of the stated objectives of the P.I.R.A. is to
undermine the morale of the security forces through a war of
attrition inflicting as many casualties as possible and
creating a lack of will among the British people to continue
the troop presence in Northern Ireland. But the policy of
Ulsterization has served to bring the P.I.R.A. up against
other Irishmen in the U.D.R. and R.U.C. who have equal
determination not to be defeated. Tom King, Northern
Ireland Secretary of State, opened his address to the House
of Commons on 6 May 1987 by underscoring the fact that the
members of the I.R.A. had failed in all their objectives:
They had failed to undermine the moral of the R.U.C. They
had failed to spread disaffection in the British Army or
create a reluctance to serve in Northern Ireland. They
have failed in their campaign for international support;
abroad they were seen as "an unholy mismatch 11 of
racketeers and Marxist terrorists.
28 Bishop, "Control of Terrorism," p. 182
47
IV. EMERGENCY LEGISLATION
Terrorism incites public outrage; public outrage
motivates political reaction; political reaction results in
ill-conceived emergency legislation which perpetuates
violence rather than putting an end to it. This appears to
be the vicious circle of political action taken in response
to I.R.A. violence. Successive governments in London,
Dublin and Belfast have enacted some of the most severe
legislation known to free democracies in an effort to deal
with I.R.A. terrorism.
Terrorism is especially difficult to combat in the free
world; that is no secret. The basic human rights and civil
liberties taken for granted in the West shield a terrorist
from detection. When emergency measures are authorized,
these basic rights are the first victims. There is no doubt
that these measures have been effective; terrorists in jail,
arms and explosive caches found, etc. , all can be
empirically measured. What is not so easily calculated is
the violence provoked through draconian enforcement. The
I.R.A. thrives on the propaganda value of the laws
instituted to deal with them which undermine civil
liberties. The security forces often find themselves in a
no-win situation when they enforce the law.
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What are the options open to the government and why have
previous actions failed to eradicate the I.R.A.? The first
portion of the question will be dealt with by examining past
legislation established. The second part of the question is
not so simple. Mistakes have been made, the primary one
probably being an attempt to resolve the situation by
overemphasis on security. The great emphasis on security
has tended to obscure the fundamental problem, of why the
I.R.A. exists, and thus has probably exacerbated conditions.
Since the recognition that problems in Northern Ireland
could not be solved through increased security, progress has
been made in reducing extremism in the two communities.
Housing, governmental representation, and employment are
important parts of the problems. A voice in government and
new with fair methods of allocation have both been areas of
marked improvement for the Catholic minority. High
unemployment in Northern Ireland has inhibited progress in
fair employment practices. Employers, for example, are not
likely to fire Protestant employees so that Catholics can be
employed in their place. Increased employment is the order
of the day, but Northern Ireland must compete for new
investment with Ireland, Scotland, and the North of England
all of which also suffer high unemployment rates.
A. THE CIVIL AUTHORITIES (SPECIAL POWERS) ACT, 1922
The Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act was the first
piece of emergency legislation introduced into Northern
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Ireland after the partition. The Act enabled the Minister
of Home Affairs "to take all such steps necessary for
preserving the peace." It was renewed annually until 1933
when it was superseded by a permanent act. The common
abuses of power were often carried out under the authority
of the Act's provisions. The draconian measures were used
as a model by the South African Government, another similar
democracy, when enacting its own emergency legislation. 1
Under the provisions of the Act, the police were
authorized to search, arrest, and imprison without warrant,
charge, or trial any person of their choosing. The security
authorities could suspend at will any and all of a citizen's
basic rights, from habeas corpus to freedom of the press.
An individual could be incarcerated indefinitely without
appeal or a right to know the reasons for his detention.
The police did not have to reveal the fact that they were
holding a suspect for 48 hours, and during that time the
person could be interrogated without the right to a lawyer.
There were no legal safeguards for those arrested on the
suspicion of acting, having acted, or being about to act
"contrary to the peace." 2 In Northern Ireland, the Catholic
•^-Keith Jeffery, Northern Ireland, the Divided Province
(New York: Crescent Books, 1985), p. 44.
2Gary McEoin, Northern Ireland, Captive of History (New




minority was seen by the Protestant majority as the internal
enemy without guaranteed constitutional rights. 3
In 1936, the National Council for Civil Liberties
published the report of a Special Commission of Inquiry into
the Special Powers Act. That report concluded:
First, that through the operation of the Special Powers
Acts contempt has been begotten for the representative
institutions of government.
Second, that through the use of Special Powers individual
liberty is no longer protected by law, but is at the
arbitrary disposition of the Executive. This abrogation
of the rule of law has been so practised as to bring the
freedom of the subject into contempt.
Third, that the Northern Irish Government has used Special
Powers toward securing the domination of one particular
political faction and, at the same time, towards
curtailing the lawful activities of its opponents. The
driving of legitimate movements underground into
illegality, the intimidating or branding as law-breakers
of their adherents, however innocent of crime, has tended
to encourage violence and bigotry on the part of
Government's supporters as well as to beget in its
opponents an intolerance of the "law and order" thus
maintained. The Government's policy is thus driving its
opponents into ways of extremists. 4
Despite attacks from the National Council of Civil
Liberties and other legitimate moderate groups throughout
Ireland, Northern Ireland, and Great Britain the Special
Powers Act endured until 1972 when it was replaced by an
Order of Council. This was superceded in turn by the
3Jeffery, Northern Ireland , p. 44.
4Catherine Scorer, Sarah Spencer, and Patricia Hewitt,
The New Prevention of Terrorism Act: A Case for Repeal
(London: Yale Press, 1985), p. vii.
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Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act in 1973 which
will be examined later in this chapter.
B. THE OFFENSES AGAINST THE STATE ACT, 19 3 9
The Dublin government was not immune to the violent
antics of the I.R.A. The anti-treaty dissenters prompted
the Dail Eireann to first invoke martial law and then a
series of measures similar to the Special Powers Act. Eamon
de Valera had, after renouncing the 'physical-force*
tradition of Republicanism in 1926, reemerged in 1932 as the
leader of the government. In 19 3 6 he declared the I.R.A. an
illegal organization5 and in 1939 he put through the
Offenses Against the State Act.
Although de Valera is considered to be a radical
Republican, he was not enough so for the I.R.A. While de
Valera had set about a public relations campaign in Great
Britain his case for an All-Ireland Parliament in 1939, the
I.R.A. had also carried a campaign to Britain—a bombing
campaign. An ultimatum had been served on the British
Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, demanding the withdrawal of
British troops from Northern Ireland. When this demand was
not met in the specified period, bombs began to explode in a
number of public places in England. Five people were killed
and about 70 others injured in one explosion in Coventry.
The bombs blew sky-high any hopes which de Valera had of
5Jeffery, Northern Ireland , p. 25
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convincing British public opinion of the justice of the
Irish Cause. 6
The Irish government was the first to act passing the
Offenses Act on 14 June 1939. The British government
followed this up shortly afterwards with the Prevention of
Violence (Temporary Provisions) Bill. The Offenses Against
the State Act set up military tribunals and gave the
government the power to issue a suppression order against
anyone who 'raises or maintains a military or armed force. 1
The Act stated:
Every person who usurps or unlawfully exercises any
function of Government whether by setting up, maintaining
or taking part in any way in a body of persons purporting
to be a Government or by any other action or conduct
whatsoever shall be guilty of felony and shall be liable
in a conviction thereof to suffer penal servitude for a
term not exceeding ten years or to imprisonment for a term
not exceeding two years. 7
C. THE PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE (TEMPORARY PROVISIONS)
BILL, 1939
Until the I.R.A. had commenced and was substantially
into the bombing campaign, the British government had not
proscribed the I.R.A. The police had been collaring I.R.A.
agents under the normal provisions of the law. On 24 July
the Home Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare, introduced the
Prevention of Violence (Temporary Provisions) Bill into the
6The Earl of Longford and Thomas P. O'Neill, Eamon de
Valera, A Biography (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1971), p.
342.




William Collins & Sons, 1987), p. 168.
53
House of Commons. Any opposition to the Bill was
extinguished with another bomb explosion on 2 6 July in which
a Scottish doctor lost both his legs.
The Prevention of Violence Bill gave the Home Secretary
the powers to issue expulsion orders against suspected
persons living in England and to issue prohibition orders
against suspects wishing to enter the country. The Bill
stated that »• in emergencies/' search warrants were to be
issued by police officers not below the rank of
superintendent and the police could arrest and detain
suspects for five days without warrants. This Bill is
important because, combined with some of the provisions of
the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Bill, it makes
up the controversial Prevention of Terrorism Act.
D. THE NORTHERN IRELAND (EMERGENCY PROVISIONS) ACT, 197 3
The Emergency Provisions Act was the result of
recommendations made by Lord Diplock who was commissioned by
Whitehall 8 to investigate the law and order situation in
Northern Ireland. Lord Diplock came to the Province to get
a 'feel for' what was going on. He travelled across the
country, talked with many of the people involved, and at one
point even watched a riot. British soldiers had been
performing as police since their introduction in 1969 and
Lord Diplock wanted to find out exactly what sort of
8The official offices of the British Government.
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difficulties the soldiers were facing in the execution of
their duties as they tried to control the violence.
Soldiers were not trained as policemen, which often seemed
to be merely a technicality—like the use of the wrong
words—when a "known" terrorist was allowed to escape
justice because of improper arrest procedures. 9
The Diplock Report or Report of the Commission to
Consider Legal Procedures to Deal with Terrorist Activities
in Northern Ireland (Cmnd. 5259 March 1973 London) as
officially published by H.M.S.O. (Her Majesty's Stationary
Office) identified three factors hindering the effective use
of the courts in this regard: the intimidation of
witnesses; the danger of perverse acquittals by biased
juries and the legal technicalities on the admissibility of
confessions and on proof of possession in firearms cases.
The recommendations included suspending the right to trial
by jury for certain indictable offenses and the introduction
of amended rules on the admissibility of confessions and the
onus of proof in firearms cases. It advocated greater
freedom to soldiers for powers of arrest 10 and restricted
the conditions under which bail could be granted. The
I.R.A., Cumann nam Ban (I.R.A. women's auxiliary), Fianna
^Desmond Hamill, Pig in the Middle, The Army in
Northern Ireland 1969-1984 (London: Methuen London, 198 5)
,
p. 130.
10Dermot P.J. Walsh, The Use and Abuse of Emergency





Eire (Soldiers of Ireland)
,
Saor Eire (Free Ireland)
,
Sinn
Fein, and the Ulster Volunteer Force were proscribed.
These measures institutionalized the use of
extraordinary powers and indicated how seriously the
Unionist authorities took the threat of nationalist
subversion. With amendments the Act continues the present
emergency provisions and allows for renewal annually.
E. THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM (TEMPORARY PROVISIONS) ACT
The I.R.A. brought a bombing campaign straight to
Westminister's front door in 1973. More than 25 people were
killed and about 4 00 wounded in a series of bombings brought
to the British mainland. Most of the victims were innocent
civilians; passers-by, tourists in the Tower of London, and
people in pubs frequented by soldiers. The campaign
culminated on 21 November 1974. Satchel charges planted in
two pubs in Birmingham, which were crammed with teenagers,
killed 21 people and wounded many more. 11 Within a week,
Parliament had passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act
(P.T.A.). Had there been no bombs in Birmingham, presumably
there would have been no Act. 12 Actual preparations for the
P.T.A. had begun earlier, after the 1973 Old Bailey
bombings. There had been several draft bills drawn up
1:LCoogan, The I.R.A. . p. 679.
12Harry Street, "The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary





similar to the 1939 Prevention of Violence Bill. The new
bill proscribed the I.R.A., restricted movement of Irish
people from Ireland and Northern Ireland into the United
Kingdom, and later, Exclusion Orders were added to the list
of proposals being considered by the Government. 13
The P.T.A. passed through Parliament with little
opposition and empowered the government to exclude suspected
terrorists from the United Kingdom at the discretion of the
Secretary of State; the police were authorized to hold
suspects for up to seven days without charge for
questioning; and the I.R.A. was declared an illegal
organization. Membership in the I.R.A. was punishable by
five years in prison and a fine. An exclusion order had no
court of appeal except to the Secretary of State. Those who
challenged exclusion orders sometimes were held in custody
for periods exceeding three weeks. The seven- day custody
period for questioning could also be, and often was,
extended.
The P.T.A. became an effective tool in the effort to
curb terrorism. Suspects spent detention periods undergoing
heavy interrogation, exposed safe houses, and frustrated
plans for future terrorism. The I.R.A. was forced to change
its mode of operation as a result. A captured I.R.A.
document states the exact nature of the problem:
13 Scorer, Prevention of Terrorism Act , p. 1
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The three-day and seven-day detention orders are breaking
volunteers, and it is the Republican Army's fault for not
indoctrinating volunteers with the psychological strength
to resist interrogation. 14
The effect on the Irish community in Britain, 750,000 by
British government estimates, eight million when the
American definition of "Irishness" is applied, 15 was
devastating. An editorial in the London Times on 23
November 1974 epitomized British outrage at the time of the
Birmingham bombings:
This is an Act of War; there are times when the emotional
response to a public event is also the soundest one. The
natural response to the murders in Birmingham is one of
anger and determination . . . only the most effective
countermeasure will satisfy public opinion. . . . 16
Much legitimate political activity in the Irish
community was silenced through fear and intimidation.
Quasi-legitimate political groups such as Sinn Fein, Clann
na hEireann, and the Workers' Party were banned. The first
14 Coogan, The I.R.A. . p. 679.
15The American definition of "Irishness" is to have one
or more grandparents from Ireland. In some parts of the
country, Boston for example, fifth or sixth generation
Americans still consider themselves Irish. Dr. Mary
McDevitt, President of the San Francisco Irish Forum said it
best:
As an Irish-American I went to Britain looking for my
counterpart, the Irish-Britisher. Even if a term with a
less harsh sound could be invented, the concept of love
and loyalty to two cultures and two countries does not
exist. You are "Irish in Britain" for many generations
until you become "British with distinct Irish Ancestry."
16Roger Falipot, Britain's Military Strategy in
Ireland, The Kitson Experiment (London: Zed Press, 1983), p.
165.
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section of the P.T.A. made it an offense to collect money,
make speeches and generally disseminate propaganda in favor
of the Republican Movement. The objectives here were to
remove public manifestations of the existence of and support
for terrorist organizations rather than to prevent
terrorism. The Act created a new concept of moral
complicity with terrorism which had spread since the case of
the lawyer of the Red Army Faction, Klaus Croissant in West
Germany; the imprisonment of Professor Negri in Italy
because of his theoretical writings; and the journalist,
Xavier Vanders ' sentence of seven years imprisonment in
Spain for publishing an interview with a policeman who named
Spanish anti-Basque fascists, some of whom were later
assassinated by the ETA-Militar. 17
The P.T.A. was meant to be a six month temporary measure
as the words Temporary Provisions were inserted
parenthetically into its title. Six months later the Bill
was renewed and still again six months later on 28 November
1975. In 1976, a new Prevention of Terrorism Bill amended
the 1974 Act in three ways: a person served with an
exclusion order was given an extension from 48 to 96 hours
as the period in which to petition the Home Office with
representations of why he/she should not be excluded; gave
that person the right to a personal interview with a
government nominee; and doubled the lifespan of the Act from
17 Ibid.
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six months to one year. The P.T.A. was again renewable
after that year for additional periods up to 12 months for
as long as was considered necessary.
Another important change to the 1974 version of the
P.T.A. made it an offense not to pass on information to
police about terrorism. The provisions relating to
financial and political support for the proscribed
organizations were widened and exclusion orders were
expanded to include exclusion from Northern Ireland back to
Great Britain. Enoch Powell, Member of Parliament for the
Northern Ireland Official Unionist Party, argued for more
severe measures while more moderate members of parliament
maintained that the Act was already a gross violation of
individual civil liberties. Demands for compulsory
identification cards and the reintroduction of hanging were
tabled as well as the abolition of exclusion orders and to
give the Judge's Rules statutory force.
The Prevention of Terrorism Act has undergone many
revisions since 1974—over 10 by Parliament and two by
independent investigations: the Lord Shackleton Inquiry of
1978 and the Lord Jellicoe Report of 1983. 18 Because the
limitations placed on each of these independent reviews,
there were few innovative recommendations or conclusions
18Review of the Operation of the Prevention of
Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Acts of 1974 and 1976 (The
Shackleton Report, 1978; Cmnd. 7324) and (The Jellicoe
Report, 1983; Cmnd. 8803).
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resulting from them. The bulk of the P.T.A. legislation has
survived unscathed. The commissions of Lord Shackleton and
Lord Jellicoe incorporated the assumption that "There is
continuing need for legislation against terrorism..." and
the Review "... ought not to focus on whether or not we need
the Act." 19
Lord Shackleton' s recommendations are summarized as
follows:
- Statistics on the operations of the Act should be
published quarterly;
- Exclusion order cases should be reviewed with the
possibility of the orders being revoked;
- The government should reconsider its policy on financial
assistance to relatives of excluded persons;
- Section 11 (withholding information) should be allowed
to lapse;
- Improvements should be made in the diet and comfort of
detainees
;
- The Judges* Rules should be uniformly followed;
- Fullest possible records of interviews should be kept;
- Detention at ports should be for the same maximum period
as elsewhere, i.e., seven days, not 12. 20
Most of his recommendations were incorporated with the
exception of allowing Section 11 to lapse and providing
financial assistance to relatives of excluded persons. When
the P.T.A. came up for its annual review in 1982, the Labor
19 C.P. Walker, "Reports of Committees," The Modern Law
Review (Vol. 46; July 1983), p. 484.
20Scorer, Prevention of Terrorism , p. 3.
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Party in opposition abstained from the vote to renew the
Act. As a consequence, Lord Jellicoe was commissioned to
carry on a further study of the P.T.A.
Lord Jellicoe, former S.A.S. officer and ex-head of the
Secret National Security Commission, made 59 total
recommendations of which only six were rejected in whole or
part. 21 The report recognized that the ultimate test of the
performance of a terrorist campaign is the measure of
support which it commands. Counter-terrorist strategy must
also maintain public approval. Three types of limiting
principles were proposed. The first was that the traditions
of the legal system should be respected and "normal" law
should be applied unless ineffective. Second, that even if
special legislation is justified, it should nevertheless be
subject to measures which guard against its unwarranted
introduction and exercise. Traditional liberties should be
respected as far as possible. The third limiting principle
was, since the foregoing considerations are secured by the
European Convention for Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, its requirements merit close attention. 22
The report went on to expand the powers of arrest and
detention and extend these powers to cover those suspected
of involvement in international terrorism. Ironically, one
21Clive Walker, "Legislation," The Modern Law Review
(Vol. 47; November 1984), p. 712.
22Walker, "Reports of Committees," p. 485.
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of the recommendations not adopted was the removal of
(Temporary Provisions) from the title of the Act. The
Prevention of Violence (Temporary Provisions) Act had lasted
from 1939 through 1954, and the Jellicoe Report indicated
that the epithet of "Temporary Provisions" had a hollow ring
to it. Overall, the implementation of the Jellicoe Report's
recommendations improved the structure and functioning of
the legislation for those entrusted with the responsibility
of enforcement. Where it failed, delivering its own hollow
epithet, was in making specific recommendations on its own
limiting principles. The guarantee of respect as far as
possible for civil liberties was left to the arbitrary
secret decision-making of police, civil servants, and a
minister on evidence which might not withstand the scrutiny
of a court of law.
Catherine Scorer, Sarah Spencer, and Patricia Hewitt, in
their review of the Prevention of Terrorism Acts, stated
that: 23
Supporters of the Act argue that civil liberties must be
sacrificed to deal with those suspected of terrorism.
They are wrong. First, it is not necessary to introduce
excessive powers which infringe civil liberties when the
ordinary criminal law provides the police with wide powers
to arrest and detention of anyone suspected of a terrorist
offense. The small percentage of those arrested under the
Act and later charged with a criminal offense could have
been made under normal, preexisting police powers, and
brought before a court in the usual way. Secondly, it is
just as important that the rights of someone suspected of
a terrorist offense are respected as those of someone
suspected of a non-political offense. Given the
23Scorer, Prevention of Terrorism , p. 10.
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overwhelming horror which juries and judges feel when
dealing with terrorist crimes, safeguards for the suspect
are arguably even more important than in lesser cases.
The partly counter-productive nature of draconian
legislation partially bears out this thesis, but a free
democracy must have some visible measure of combating
terrorism. This is not to say that the P.T.A. is a
palladium of legitimacy, but when an armed minority attempts
to impose its will on the majority of a community,
extraordinary measures are justified. These measures may be
essentially weak, the less harsh, the less counter-
productive, yet the end product can demonstrate "curing,"
government action to protect that majority of the citizens
which have elected that government to serve them.
Civil libertarians do have a valid claim that the rights
of someone suspected of a terrorist offense must be
protected. Laws are only as good as the people charged with
the responsibility of enforcing them. Unfortunately, these
people sometimes make mistakes as the presence of 10
innocent people in British prisons 24 confirms. The public
24The innocent people in British prisons include the
Birmingham Six (Johnny Walker, Paddy Hill, Dick Mcllkenny,
Hugh Callaghan, Bill Power, Gerry Hunter, convicted shortly
after the Birmingham bombings on the basis of confessions
extracted in a questionable manner from them and forensic
evidence later proven to be inaccurate) . Also are the
Guildford Four (Carole Richardson, Patrick Armstrong, Paul
Hill, and Gerald Conlon) also convicted on the basis of
confessions derived from questionable interrogation
techniques. When the actual Guildford bombers were later
captured and admitted to the crime, the Guildford Four were
not pardoned, or even given a chance for retrial. See, for
instance, Chris Mullen, An Error in Judgement, The Case of
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reaction of outrage to terrorist offenses may sadly pressure
blind justice into a hasty, wrongful conviction. The
dilemma for a democracy—what is the worst of the two evils;
an innocent man in prison or guilty terrorist on the
streets? The answer is that neither are acceptable. Police
authorities must be totally committed to lawful, effective
enforcement. Emergency legislation must be able to
withstand careful scrutiny from the staunchest of civil
libertarians and justify its existence with empirical data
of results.
the Birmingham Six (Longon: Chatto & Windus, 198 6) and
Robert Key, Trial and Error (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1986) .
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V. THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT
If the I.R.A. are bombing and shooting because the British
will not leave Ireland, why should it stop because Garret
FitzGerald and John Hume tell the British they can stay? 1
On November 15, 1986, former Prime Minister Garret
FitzGerald of Ireland and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher
signed the Anglo-Irish Agreement at Hillsborough, Northern
Ireland. The most significant items in the agreement were
the Irish government's recognition of British sovereignty in
the North and the British government granting Dublin a
consultative voice in Ulster affairs. Hailed as a landmark
of cooperation and compromise not previously exhibited in
Anglo-Irish affairs, it has emerged uniguely as an issue
that has united extreme and moderate Unionists against it.
Simultaneously, the Treaty has lent subtle support to the
Catholic nationalist community and increased its morale, the
logic being that "If the Loyalists dislike it so much, it
must not be all bad." 2
A. BACKGROUND TO THE ACCORD
Why was such an agreement necessary and what were the
events which led to its realization? Terrorist violence in
-'-Anthony Coughlan, Fooled Again? The Anglo-Irish




2 Cardinal Tomas O'Fiach, interview, Armagh, Northern
Ireland, 3 May 1987.
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Northern Ireland has never been acceptable. For almost 20
years the British government has attempted to deal with the
I.R.A. as a security problem. While this approach has
maintained the status quo, the terrorists can not be
defeated until their support has been extinguished, a goal
requiring initiatives in addition to security. Security
measures are highly visible and most always draw criticism
from the Catholic nationalists as being unnecessarily harsh.
This has resulted in a small number of extremists in the
Nationalist community supporting the I.R.A. To terminate
this support, something other than increased security
measures were called for. The Irish government was called
on to moderate its formal claim (Articles 2 and 3 of the
Irish Constitution, a major cause of Unionist hostility to
the Republic) to sovereignty over the whole island of
Ireland. The British government was to reciprocate by
allowing Dublin to put forward views and proposals on
certain aspects of administration of the Province.
Out of these concessions the Anglo-Irish Agreement was
born. The strategy was to gain the support of the Roman
Catholic nationalists through the consultative role of the
Irish Republic so that the I.R.A. would have its support
undermined, violence would wane, and the new situation would
pave the way for the moderates in the Loyalist community to
emerge. I.R.A. violence gives Unionist extremists their
narrow margin of legitimate existence just as violence
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generated from the security forces lend a false sense of
credibility to the existence of the I.R.A.
To trace the genesis of the Hillsborough Accord, the
clock must be turned back to the political initiatives of
the early 1970s. At the heart of each initiative were the
same conditions promulgated by the Anglo-Irish Agreement:
United Kingdom sovereignty over the North and a parallel
Irish dimension—cooperation with the Republic. 3 The
variance in this core issue has been the degree of
participation from the different political parties in
Northern Ireland. Exclusion combined with boycotts has
resulted in the demise of each governmental endeavor towards
power-sharing. Decisive representation from each community
could not be realized.
In 1980 the Irish Prime Minister, Charles Haughey, and
Margaret Thatcher agreed that regular Anglo-Irish summit
meetings should be held, involving the two Heads of
Government, in order to strengthen the unigue relationship
between the two sovereign states. These meetings evolved
into the Angle-Irish Intergovernmental Council and later,
the establishment of the New Ireland Forum to examine the
realities of a United Ireland. The Forum was made up of the
four major Nationalist parties of all Ireland: Fianna Fail,
Fine Gael, the Irish Labor Party and the Social Democratic
3Sean Cronin, Washington's Irish Policy: 1916-1986
(Dublin: Anvil Books, 1987), p. 308.
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and Labor Party (S.D.L.P.). The Unionist parties boycotted
the proceedings and Sinn Fein, which had generated the whole
initiative because of its electoral success at the expense
of the S.D.L.P. moderates, was deliberately not invited.
The New Ireland Forum was therefore established in the
summer of 1983 to find a new way in which "lasting peace and
stability could be achieved in a New Ireland through the
democratic process." 4 The findings were reported on May 2,
1984. Analysis of economic policy, the legal systems North
and South, the cost of violence, the cost of the division of
Ireland since 1920, and other related matters were included.
The report defined three possible models for a New Ireland
and most suggestions favored a unitary state governed from
Dublin.
The personalities of the individuals involved must be
taken into account to decipher how things evolved. John
Hume, Member of Parliament and the leader of the S.D.L.P.
was the primary catalyst of the initiative. Charles Haughey
had been replaced by Garret FitzGerald and Margaret Thatcher
was in her second term as Prime Minister of Great Britain.
While Mr. Hume had been the architect, Mrs. Thatcher
certainly had the final word as to the implementation of any
of the recommendations. Dr. FitzGerald was more concerned
that the talks be kept alive at all costs. The three
4Kevin Boyle and Tom Hadden, Ireland, A Positive
Proposal (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1985), p. 21.
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proposals which the Forum had made were for a unified
Ireland, a confederation system, and joint authority.
Unfortunately, before Irish television cameras, Mrs.
Thatcher made it clear that none were acceptable. She
stated:
I have made it quite clear, and so did Mr. Prior, when he
was Secretary of State, that a unified Ireland was one
thing that was out. A second solution was a confederation
system: that was out. A third solution was joint
authority: that is out. 5
The United States had traditionally taken an impartial
stance in Anglo-Irish affairs, but when Mrs. Thatcher
dismissed the efforts of the Forum with her intransigent
"out-out-out" comment, political pressure was exerted to
find accommodation with Mr. Hume and Dr. FitzGerald. Her
stance had damaged Garret FitzGerald politically and the
moderate brand of S.D.L.P. nationalism was also losing out
to the extremist Sinn Fein since the insensitive handling of
the Hunger Strike issues by the Thatcher Administration.
This is not to say Mrs. Thatcher was wrong in most
assessments of most Irish issues, but her reputation for
insensitivity undermined effective policymaking.
Irish and British top-level civil servants were
commissioned to take another try at an agreement. Their
efforts resulted in the Anglo-Irish Accord unveiled at
Hillsborough Castle outside Belfast (thus dubbing it the
5Tim Pat Coogan, The I.R.A. , 10th Ed. (Glasgow:
William Collins Sons & Co., 1987), p. 640. (author's
emphasis)
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Hillsborough Accord). In total, the 1985 Agreement contains
13 clauses aimed at working towards peace and stability. In
addition to the Irish recognition of British sovereignty and
British recognition of the "Irish dimension," both
governments condemned I.R.A. terrorism and agreed to
cooperate in security and related matters.
The international attention accorded to Northern Ireland
is clearly apparent in the contributions to the
International Fund as noted, for example, in the following
clause of the Hillsborough Accord (Article 10a) that: 6
The two Governments shall co-operate to promote the
economic and social development of those areas of both
parts of Ireland which have suffered most severely from
the consequences of the instability of recent years, and
shall consider the possibility of securing international
support for this work.
As a result, the agreement to set up an International Fund
for Ireland was signed by the Governments of Ireland and of
the United Kingdom on 18 September 1986. A week later, on
2 6 September 1986, a trilateral agreement, to which the U.S.
Government was also party, was signed, providing for the
contribution by the U.S. of up to $120 million over three
years. Canada agreed to make available a contribution of up
to ten million Canadian dollars over ten years. New Zealand
promised a donation of NZ $300,000, and the European
Commission has been approached for a contribution from the
European Community.
6The text of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in its entirety
is found in Appendix F.
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B. REACTIONS TO THE ACCORD: LOYALIST
The Unionist Party's response to the Agreement has
simply been to boycott Westminster, wreck local government
in Northern Ireland, and to take politics onto the streets.
Despite their irresponsible behavior, the Unionists do
accurately reflect the opposition of the Unionist community
to the London-Dublin Accord. They have a legitimate cause
for complaint about how the Agreement came into being and
how it is being implemented. The consent of the people who
live in Northern Ireland was neither sought nor given.
Loyalists decry the Accord as a "stab in the back" by
Westminster, a sellout to Republicanism leading to a British
withdrawal from the Province and an eventual absorption into
a United Catholic Ireland.
On 17 December, 1985 all 15 Unionist members of
Parliament resigned their seats at Westminster, forcing
subseguent by-elections on 23 January 1986 under the slogan,
"Ulster says No." The Unionists lost one of their 15 seats
to the moderate nationalist S.D.L.P. which had campaigned in
support of the Accord. Sinn Fein had, like the Unionists,
campaigned against the Hillsborough Accord, but for
different reasons. Two-thirds of the Northern Nationalists
voted to give a chance to "reconciliation and dialogue,"
with a hope of peace at the end of the road. That, however,
reguires Unionist consent which was withheld. 7
7 Cronin, Irish Policy
, p. 325.
72
The Unionist Parties produced no alternative set of
political initiatives. The Ulster Defense Association
(U.D.A.) and Sinn Fein have been first to venture forth with
counter proposals. The U.D.A. document, entitled Common
Sense , credits the Anglo-Irish Accord with two
things: increasing disillusionment for Ulster Catholics in
the prospect of a united Ireland through increased exposure
and examination of Southern Irish society, and forcing
Ulster Protestants to recognize the need for a reasonable
and acceptable alternative to the Agreement. The Sinn Fein
document, entitled A Scenario for Peace . decries the
Hillsborough Treaty as "camouflage for the fact that the
Six-County State is a failed entity, socially, economically
and politically. The Treaty does not challenge the
constitutional status of the Union but actually reinforces
it."
The initial reaction to the Anglo-Irish Accord by the
Unionist paramilitary groups was to increase their
recruiting efforts. As explained earlier in Chapter III,
the Protestant paramilitaries are more fragmented, and thus
a number of groups have joined together under the banner of
the "United Ulster Loyalist Front." The "Ulster Clubs" (as
they are known) originated in opposition to the official
interference with traditional marches in Portadown in July
1985. The Orange Order and Apprentice Boys use these clubs
as rallying points and their leaders do not rule out
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violence. Andy Tyrie, leader of the U.D.A., has offered
support to any of the Unionist politicians who calls for
assistance.
Common Sense was published by the Ulster Political
Research Group chaired by John McMichael, spokesman for the
U.D.A. The document points out that "each community tends
to form its impression of the other from the rhetoric and
posturing of the most zealous and vocal sections of that
group." While it underscored the resolve of the Ulster
Protestants to defeat the Anglo-Irish Accord, Common Sense
placed the Unionist politicians in an awkward position. The
U.D.A. is expected to fulfill the role of the Unionist
paramilitary wing, not that as political spokesmen. Ulster
Unionists appear to be elected on their ability for
political zealousness, Ian Paisley and James Molyneaux being
two prominent examples. The U.D.A. stepped into the role of
spokesman for the silent majority of moderate Ulster
Unionists.
The document proposes:
(a) Devolved legislative government for Northern Ireland
and a written constitution. A set of constitutional laws,
agreed by Ulster Catholics and Protestants together which
would lay the foundations on which to build a new
progressive democracy. An agreement instituted by Ulster
people at referendum which can only be changed by Ulster
people at referendum.
(b) A modern democratic political structure based on
consensus government, proportional representation and
shared responsibility.
(c) A Bill of Rights.
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(d) A supreme court charged with the responsibility to
uphold constitutional law and safeguard the rights of the
individual as represented in the Bill of Rights. 8
Protests by the Unionist hard-liners were wasted effort
against Mrs. Thatcher. The call for a Round Table
Conference to discuss devolution by the Unionist Parties is
conditioned by the suspension of the Agreement, and while
she was ready to take part in such discussions, Mrs.
Thatcher's resolve to stand by the Dublin-London Pact was
equal to that of the Unionists for the demise of the pact.
Many Unionists had hoped that when Charles Haughey took
office in February the Irish government would abandon its
commitment to the Accord. As leader of the opposition, Mr.
Haughey had spoken out against the 1985 agreement signed by
his predecessor, Dr. FitzGerald, and Mrs. Thatcher, even
though it had been his initiatives in 1930 which had led to
the Intergovernmental Conferences paving the way to
Hillsborough. Mr. Haughey, much to the chagrin of the
Unionists, issued a pledge of continued commitment to the
Accord.
C. REACTIONS TO THE ACCORD: NATIONALIST
The Nationalist reaction is divided into the moderates
of the S.D.L.P. who support the Accord and the radicals of
Sinn Fein who oppose it. The Sinn Fein opposition centers
on the Hillsborough Agreement being yet another instrument
8John McMichael, Common Sense , Belfast, Ulster
Political Research Group, 1987. See Appendix D.
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of British colonial rule over the North, this time with the
consent of the quisling administration in Dublin.
Throughout A Scenario for Peace (Appendix C)
, Sinn Fein
underscores its commitment to nothing less than a complete
British withdrawal. It is divided into three sections; the
first is Sinn Fein's interpretation of Irish history to
reiterate the Irish people's right to national self-
determination. The second addresses Loyalist issues and how
Sinn Fein proposes to deal with them, and the third section
gives the details of how the British government could
withdraw and transfer power to an all-Ireland constitutional
convention and national government.
The document was a propaganda coup for Sinn Fein which
had mounted a substantial terror campaign following its
crushing electoral defeat in the February elections in the
South. Distribution was meant for elected representatives
in Britain and Ireland as well as in the United States,
Canada, and Australia. The document was also sent to the
representatives of the member states of the United Nations.
Its release date of 1 May 1987, followed on the heels of the
assassination of Chief Justice Maurice Gibson and his wife,
which had commanded international attention for the I.R.A.
Party spokesman Danny Morrison had previously claimed that
Sinn Fein would "take power in Ireland with an Armalite in
one hand and the ballot box in the other," yet the party
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denied that the document had anything to do with the dismal
election results in the South. 9
The document was immediately attacked by the S.D.L.P.,
and the Workers Party. 10 Nicholas Scott, the Deputy
Secretary of State, said:
For Sinn Fein to offer a document entitled A Scenario for
Peace while their brothers in arms the I.R.A. continue to
offer their fellow Irishmen and women nothing but a recipe
for death is the height of hypocrisy. The elections of
the Republic recently gave their verdict on that hypocrisy
when they recognized the I.R.A. and Sinn Fein as being the
enemies of their own people.
-
1- 1
The S.D.L.P. West Belfast representative, Dr. Joe Hendron,
said that the timing and the title of the discussion paper
confirmed yet again Sinn Fein's "open contempt for the
intelligence of the average man in the street." 12
With the exception of Sinn Fein, the nationalist
community has generally welcomed the Hillsborough Accord and
recognized the spirit of cooperation which it is intended to
promote. The British general election in June saw the
election of an additional S.D.L.P. member of Parliament
bringing the total representation for that party up to
three. In West Belfast, home of the hard-core Republican
9
"S.F. Document 'Insulting and Hypocritical'," The
Irish News (Belfast), 2 May 1987, sec. 1, p. 1.
10The Workers Party evolved from the Official wing of
the I.R.A.; it has renounced violence and run on a Socialist
Workers platform.
11m SF Reiterates Call for Withdrawal," The Irish Times ,
Dublin, 2 May 1987, sec. 1, p. 2.
12The Irish News , 2 May 1987.
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Nationalist, Dr. Hendron was able to strengthen his position
even though Gerry Adams retained his seat. Overall, Sinn
Fein lost ground dropping from 102,000 in the 1983 General
Elections (13.4% of the total vote) to 83,389 (11.4% of the
total vote) in 1987. In the General Election of 1983 Sinn
Fein took 44.8% of the nationalist vote, and the S.D.L.P.
52.3%. The June election saw the S.D.L.P. strengthen its
hold on the nationalist vote, winning 65%, a total of
154,087, 21.8% of all ballots cast.
The success of luring nationalists back to a moderate
line after a rally in support of the hunger strike martyrs
was mixed. Sinn Fein received 83,389 nationalist votes and
thus a vote of support for the I.R.A. The Hillsborough
Accord has succeeded in undoing some of the damage done to
the S.D.L.P. in the early 1980s by nationalist's perception
of a maladroit performance by the British government in the
hunger strikes and Mrs. Thatcher's rejection of the New
Ireland Forum proposals. Yet, more is needed. Without the
support of the Unionists, one million of the population in
Northern Ireland, peace and reconciliation will remain only
words. John Hume, always a catalyst in search of a solution
to the problems of Northern Ireland has characterized the
Accord best: "It's a stepping stone."
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VI. THE U.S. -UK SUPPLEMENTARY EXTRADITION TREATY
The U.S. -UK Supplementary Extradition Treaty would not
have been ratified by the United States Senate if the
American government had not carried out the retaliatory
strike against Syria's Colonel Muammar Gaddafi because of
his support of international terrorism. On 21 April 1986,
under cover of darkness, 13 U.S. Air Force F-lll fighter-
bombers flew out of Britain and 12 U.S. Navy A-6 attack
planes were launched from 6th Fleet aircraft carriers in the
Mediterranean. Air strikes were made on military and
intelligence targets in and around Tripoli and the coastal
city of Benghazi. This action was taken on the basis of
evidence directly linking Libya to the bombing of the La
Belle disco in West Berlin where U.S. Army Sergeant Kenneth
Ford and a young Turkish woman were killed. Of the 23
people injured, 79 were Americans.
Secretary of State George Shultz announced in an address
to the National Security Council, "We have taken enough
punishment and beating. We have to act." 1 U.S. Ambassador
to the United Nations, General Vernon Walters, acted as the
presidential envoy to West European allies, pre-warning them
of the action and presenting the evidence against Libya.
1George J. Church, "Targeting Gaddafi," Time , 21 April
1986, p. 21.
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After the attack had been executed, only Britain (which had
given permission for the F-llls to use English bases)
,
Canada and Israel supported the U.S. action.
Britain's Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher has made
independent action a hallmark of her leadership among her
fellow European leaders. But her support of the U.S.
President in the use of force in dealing with Libya brought
on a barrage of criticism not only from the opposition
parties, but also from her own Tory back-benchers. She was
guick to remind her critics of Libya's support to the
Provisional I.R.A. and the murder of Constable Yvonne
Fletcher who was killed by gunfire form the Libyan "people's
bureau." 2 She also pointed out to Members of Parliament
that Britain "owed" the U.S. for the military assistance
given Britain in recapturing the Falkland Islands. The
United States guickly showed gratitude to Mrs. Thatcher for
her support. Riding the crest of American good will towards
Britain, the U.S. -U.K. Extradition Treaty, which had been
faltering in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was
guickly approved in committee and then ratified by the
United States Senate on 18 July 1986 by a vote of 87-10.
The Libyan raid was just the diversion Congressional
pro-treaty lobbyists needed to go on the offensive. Once
the treaty was put on the table, it became a must-win
2George J. Church, "The Iron Lady Stands Alone," Time ,
28 April 1986, p. 24.
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situation for the British Government. The legitimacy of
British sovereignty over Northern Ireland had never been a
topic of debate in the U.S. Senate. This Treaty, however,
facing opposition from the powerful Irish National Caucus,
threatened to bring up for public debate and close American
public scrutiny the open sore of Ulster. Yet most doubts
about the treaty hinged on resistance to the precedent of
breaking with the American tradition of granting asylum to
political refugees rather than any of the Irish issues.
The Supplementary Extradition Treaty was jointly
negotiated by the U.S. Departments of State and Justice with
the British Government. The Treaty was initiated in
reaction to the frustrated attempts of the British
Government to extradite four men wanted for so-called
criminal activity in connection with Northern Ireland.
These attempts to extradite them had been thwarted in each
case by the fugitives' successfully invoking the political
offense exception clause of the Extradition Treaty. These
four men were Desmond Mackin, Joseph Doherty, William Quinn,
and Peter McMullen.
A. THE WATERSHED EXTRADITION CASES
The case of Desmond Mackin had come before the United
States 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals in 1981. Mackin was a
P.I.R.A. member sought for allegedly shooting a British
soldier in 1978. A U.S. Magistrate had previously found
that, at the time of the offense, the P.I.R.A. was
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conducting an armed uprising in the portion of Belfast where
the crime was committed; that Mackin was an active member of
the P.I.R.A.; and that the attack on the British soldier was
incidental to Mackin's role in the P.I.R.A. 's political
uprising. Extradition was denied and that decision was
upheld on appeal to the district court, and in a judgment of
great significance the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
refused to disturb the lower court decision. 3 The appellate
court decision that the refusal to grant extradition
requests in certain contexts is not an appealable order, was
to stand later in the case of Joseph Doherty.
The U.S. government then deported Mackin as an illegal
alien to Ireland. The Irish government could extradite him
to Britain, or try him there under the Criminal Law
Jurisdiction Act of 1976. This law was enacted to ensure
that those who commit crimes in one country (i.e., Northern
Ireland) can not escape prosecution by seeking refuge in the
other (i.e., the Republic of Ireland).
Joseph Doherty was one of the four P.I.R.A. members
accused of participation in a shoot-out with a British Army
undercover unit in Belfast in May 1980. A British officer,
Capt. Herbert Westmacott, died in the shootout. While
awaiting a court's decision on the charges, Doherty escaped
from Belfast's Crumlin Road jail to the U.S. In absentia he
3Abraham Sofaer, "The U.S. U.K. Supplementary
Extradition Treaty," Terrorism . Vol. 8, No. 9, p. 334.
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was sentenced to life in prison. Doherty was arrested while
working as a bartender at a New York pub owned by an
American supporter of Irish Republican causes. The request
from the British Government for his extradition was turned
down by District Judge E. Sprizzo in the Southern District
of New York in 1984. The judge found that Doherty had been
convicted of crimes that were "political in nature" and was
not subject to this country's extradition treaty with
Britain.
The decision infuriated the British government and
embarrassed the Reagan administration which had seen this
action as part of its own effort to defeat international
terrorism. The U.S. government, as in the Mackin case,
sought a declaratory judgment from the 2nd U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals. In a unanimous 3-0 decision released in
March 1985, the court held that "As early as 1847 the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled that there is "no provision for the
revision" of decisions made by magistrates denying foreign
governments requests for extradition." The late Judge Henry
J. Friendly also observed in his opinion that "under
existing law, the government's only option is to submit the





"Federal Appeals Court Refuses to Extradite IRA
Fugitive," Irish Echo , 29 March 1985, p. 1.
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The next case was that of an American, William J. Quinn
who was extradited to Great Britain in December 1986 to be
tried for the 1975 murder of London police constable Stephen
Tribble and for "conspiracy to cause explosions." Quinn is
a native San Franciscan who spent most of the 1970s in
Ireland where he served a year in a Dublin prison for his
membership in the I.R.A. He returned to the United States
in 1979 and in 1981, he was arrested for the murder and
conspiracy charges at the request of the British Government.
In September 1982, a Federal Magistrate in San Francisco
found Quinn extraditable on the grounds that he could not
prove his membership in the I.R.A. He therefore could not
claim the political exceptions clause in the U.S. -UK treaty
as a bar to his return to England. In 1983 a Federal
District Judge, Robert P. Aguilar, ruled that the Federal
Magistrate was incorrect in ruling that proof of membership
was a requisite for claiming the political exceptions
defense. Judge Aguilar ordered Quinn freed, but was
overruled by the 9th Circuit Court judges who blocked his
release pending U.S. government appeal on behalf of the
British.
Judge Stephen Reinhardt of the 9th Circuit Court found
that "though the clause might well apply to 'criminal
activity in Northern Ireland 1 connected with the uprising--
it does not cover terrorism or other criminal conduct
exported to other locations—an uprising is both temporarily
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and spatially limited." He said that the I.R.A. by
attacking in England had "exported their struggle for
political change across the seas to a separate geographical
entity." This reinterpretation of the political exceptions
defense was declared by Quinn's attorney, Patrick Hallinan,
as an illegal "bill of attainder" specifically targeted at
his client, but to no avail as William Quinn was
successfully extradited under the provisions of the old
U.S. -UK Extradition Treaty. 5
Peter McMullen was arrested by United States immigration
officials in his Murray, Utah apartment on 16 December 1986.
McMullen was a former I.R.A. man wanted by the British
government for allegedly causing explosions at the Palace
Barracks of the British Army which killed several people in
1972. He claims that he has since quit the I.R.A. and
refused to carry out further assignments. Because of this,
he claims that the I.R.A. has and will continue attempts to
assassinate him.
The original intent of the United States government was
to deport McMullen as an illegal alien. Under the new
supplementary provisions of the extradition treaty, however,
he is eligible for extradition. Peter McMullen is currently
5
"IRA Suspect Called Target of U.S. Vendetta," San
Francisco Chronicle , 29 August 1985; "US-British Treaty on
Extradition At Issue in 2 IRA-related Cases," New York
Times , 20 August 1985, p. 5, Section A; "Extradition
Battles—One Is Lost, Another Is Won," Irish Echo , 2 9 March
1985, p. 2, Section 1.
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being held in federal custody pending conclusion of the
British government's initiates extradition proceedings
against him.
B. THE SUPPLEMENTARY EXTRADITION TREATY BATTLE
The old Extradition Treaty between the United States and
Great Britain was similar to the extradition treaties which
America has with 87 other countries. The purpose of the new
supplement was to exclude from the political exceptions
clause offenses such as air piracy, kidnapping, offenses
using bombs or automatic firearms that endanger human life,
and attacks on diplomatic personnel. The 1976 European
Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism states that these
offenses may not be regarded as political offenses for the
purpose of extradition. Also included in the four
substantive articles were a statute of limitations, the time
limit within which documents must be submitted in support of
an extradition request following a provisional arrest, and
retroactive application of the treaty.
Following the conclusion of the intragovernmental
negotiations on the treaty, the White House transmitted the
new Supplementary Extradition treaty to the Senate for
ratification in July 1985. The treaty was received for
review in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The
battles between the forces for and against ratification
elicited almost immediately Irish-American activism from all
parts of the country.
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The Executive Branch of the United States Government
stood united with the British government in the push towards
ratification. Sir Oliver Wright, the former British
Ambassador to the United States emphasized that the
terrorists in Ireland were not "poets or dreamers" striving
to emancipate Ireland; they are sophisticated murderers
whose aim is the violent overthrow of government in Belfast
and Dublin. He stressed the Marxist ideology of the I.R.A.
while downplaying the issues brought up by his opponents in
reference to the Diplock Courts 6 and other questionable
judicial practices in Northern Ireland. In a speech given
18 September 1985 to the Foreign Law Society in Washington,
D.C., Sir Oliver made the following remarks about the
treaty:
Most recently we have updated the US-UK Extradition
Treaty. Up till now, U.S. courts have tended to release
murderers convicted in Irish courts who have found refuge
in the U.S. on the grounds that what they were doing was
politics. If the Senate gives its advice and consent,
murder, manslaughter, kidnapping and hijacking will no
longer be recognized as legitimate grounds for refusing
extradition. We regard advocacy of Irish unity as a
legitimate political aspiration. Political parties exist
in Northern Ireland and put up candidates for elections
who espouse Irish unity. Nothing wrong about that. All
they have to do is what anyone has to do in America or
Britain for any legitimate political aspiration: collect
6A Diplock Court is a juryless, single judge judicial
system initiated in 1972 after Lord Diplock recommended that
an extra-judicial process was required in Northern Ireland.
"The only hope of restoring the efficiency of criminal
courts of law in Northern Ireland to deal with terrorist
crimes is by using an extra-judicial process to deprive of
their ability to operate in Northern Ireland those
terrorists whose activity result in the intimidation of
witnesses (and juries)."
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a majority for it. There are hearings on the Hill at
which the opponents of the Treaty will have their say.
That is right. But I hope that at the end of the day the
Senate in its wisdom will give its consent and deny
murderers asylum.
In March 1986 pro-treaty factions failed to get the
Treaty tied to a $250 million aid bill in support of the
Anglo-Irish Agreement passed by the House of
Representatives. Hearings in the Foreign Relations
Committee dragged on. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher took
the opportunity of a radio address to admonish the U.S. for:
taking a foremost part against terrorism and then not
being as strict as they can be against Irish terrorism,
which afflicts one of their allies. To suggest that there
is any form of terrorism even justified in democracy is
totally and utterly wrong. 7
The Irish government took a neutral position while
Charles Haughey, leader of the opposition party Fianna Fail,
came to Washington to lobby against the Treaty. This was an
embarrassment to the Irish Prime Minister, Dr. Garret
FitzGerald who was attempting to keep the delicate
negotiations of the Anglo-Irish Accord on track. These
negotiations could easily have been scuttled had the Irish
government come out against the treaty.
Republicans on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
outnumbered the Democrats nine to eight, but the Democrats
successfully opposed the treaty when Republican Senator
Jesse Helms voted against the treaty. The Irish-American
7
"Free Societies Must Fight Terror Together," USA
Today . 6 April 1986.
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anti-treaty lobby included the powerful Irish National
Caucus led by Father Sean McManus, the American Irish
Political Education Committee, the Ancient Order of
Hibernians, and even the radical pro-I.R.A. Noraid. Each
State Department expert to testify for the Treaty was met
with hostility from the gallery. Lobbyists had come from
all over the country for these hearings, the first time in
64 years in which Ireland was to be discussed in the United
States Senate.
Those who testified against the treaty included an
impressive array of Senators, Congressmen, Community
leaders, Academics, Clergy, and leading Irish-American
citizens. The rhetoric was strong in condemning British
actions in Ireland and Northern Ireland and emphasized that
many Irish Americans were here because of British
persecution. The most damaging statements to Treaty
ratification were those addressing the Diplock Courts in
Northern Ireland. This resulted in Sen. Biden of Delaware
calling for a hearing on the nature and state of the laws in
Northern Ireland. Even pro-treaty senators agreed that the
matter was very complex.
Just as the opposition was killing the Treaty in
committee, the Libyan bombing in West Berlin and our
retaliatory strike dominated world events. In a renewed
effort to seek ratification, President Ronald Reagan
intervened in the wake of Senate opposition with a radio
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address given to the nation from Camp David on 31 May 198 6.
The last four paragraphs specifically addressed the
Extradition treaty and would have spelled political suicide
for those senators who continued to oppose the treaty:
Well in Tokyo, the democracies declared there is no
political or any other justification for terrorist acts,
and those who commit them should be brought to justice.
The world is watching. If actions by a few Senators allow
terrorists to find safe haven in the United States, then
there will be irreparable damage. Refusal to approve the
supplementary treaty would undermine our ability to
pressure other countries to extradite terrorists who have
murdered our citizens. And rejection of this treaty would
be an affront to British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher
—one European leader who, at great political risk, stood
shoulder to shoulder with us during our operations against
Qaddaf i ' s terrorism
.
Some members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committed
have gone so far as to prepare a substitute treaty
permitting those who have murdered British policemen and
soldiers, for so-called political reasons, to avoid
extradition. Well, this substitute is not a compromise
—
it's retreat. Its passage would be a victory for
terrorism and a defeat for all we've been trying to do to
stop this evil.
One concern about the treaty is that it may set a
precedent for other treaties, which will then be used
against those who simply oppose totalitarian regimes. We
can never permit that to happen. Our country will always
remain the beacon of hope and freedom to all oppressed
peoples.
I therefore urge the Senate to promptly approve the
revised treaty and reinforce the momentum building against
terrorism. With good sense, courage and international
cooperation, our struggle against terrorism will be won.
And the United States will lead the way into a freer and
more peaceful tomorrow.
Opponents of the Treaty were effectively neutralized and
less than two months later, the Senate voted 87-10 in
favor of ratification.
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The ratification of the Supplementary Extradition Treaty
by the Senate was an important symbol of the Anglo-American
mutual support system. The extradition of Joseph Doherty
and Peter McMullen to the United Kingdom will signal the
I.R.A. and the world, that the United States does not
condone its violent methods and desires a peaceful
resolution to the problems in Northern Ireland. It also
awakened the Irish-American lobbyists to the political power
which they have at their disposal to help resolve Irish problems.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
Government counteraction plays an important part in
curbing terrorist violence, but to be effective, action must
be initiated on a wide front which deals with the root
causes of terrorism as well as defense against terrorist
attack. Westminster, Dublin, and Stormont have enacted some
of the harshest laws in the free world directed in an effort
to deal with I.R.A. terrorism. The security forces (the
British Army presence throughout Northern Ireland is the
largest outside of NATO forces in Europe) on both sides of
the border have had many years to perfect enforcement
techniques. Yet Northern Ireland remains a paradox of
perhaps the easiest and most dangerous area of the world for
political revolutionaries to practice terrorism. It is the
easiest area because of the community support which exists
—
83,159 votes for Sinn Fein in the 1987 British general
election—and the most dangerous area because of the
effectiveness of the security forces.
The Prevention of Terrorism Act, the Anglo-Irish Accord,
the U.S. -UK Supplementary Extradition Treaty as well as
other government measures enacted as a result of terrorist
violence in Northern Ireland that were not covered in this
study, represent a visible means that a free democracy can
point to as effective methods of dealing with terrorism.
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Extraordinary measures are justified when an armed minority
attempts to impose its will on a majority of a community.
The aggravation of day to day life living with terrorism
prevention measures is something the people of Northern
Ireland have grown accustomed to over the past 18 years.
One can debate the question, would reform for Catholics have
occurred in a province that festers with tribal intransi-
gence? "Before the unreasonable or the unyielding, even
moderation has to resort to violence to be heard. However
unpalatable, the fact is that violence, and often only
violence, has been effective in achieving progress in
Ireland. nl
Although the majority of the population, North and
South, desire peace and stability and seek the benefits that
are acquired through EEC membership, 1.8% of the Irish
Republic and 10.4% of the Northern Irish electorate voted
for Sinn Fein. Sinn Fein and the I.R.A. are violently
opposed to EEC membership and Irish involvement in any type
of defensive alliance. Progress towards greater European
Community cooperation which includes Ireland must withstand
future attacks from the I.R.A. until support for the I.R.A.
can be eradicated. And eradication of the I.R.A. can only
be accomplished by drying up the seas in which the terrorist
fish swim. The process may be long, and must work for
'John Conroy, Belfast Diary War as a Way of Life
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1987)
,
p. 217 as quoted from Thames
Television reporters in their book, The Troubles .
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Protestants and Catholics alike. The desire to obey the
laws of society is born out of a perception of fair and
equal treatment to all.
On the security side of the problem, the policy of
Ulsterization also represents a positive move towards
diminishing violence. Using the Royal Ulster Constabulary
and the Ulster Defense Regiment to combat the I.R.A., pits
Irishman against Irishman and represents a step towards
devolution of government back to the people of Northern
Ireland. When Chief Justice Gibson and his wife were
murdered in April 1987 by the I.R.A., the British Government
came under a lot of pressure from the Ulster Unionists to
increase security, i.e., bring in more British Army
soldiers. In a special debate over security held in the
House of Commons on 6 May 1987, Ulster Unionist, who had
been boycotting Parliament since the enactment of the Anglo-
Irish Accord, returned to make their points heard.
As Tom King, the Secretary for Northern Ireland,
outlined the government's program to improve security, the
Unionist MPs made it known through their own special brand
of political rhetoric that the government actions were too
little too late. The I.R.A. had mounted a successful
campaign of murdering R.U.C. and U.D.R. men which had only
culminated with the murder of Chief Justice Gibson.
The plan to deal with this new upsurge in I.R.A.
violence was to increase recruitment for the U.D.R. and
94
R.U.C. Part time members of the U.D.R. were called up to
permanent duty for an indefinite period of time to increase
the force levels in support of the R.U.C. Despite the
criticism from the Unionists, these actions were consistent
with Ulsterization. The long range goals of this policy
must not be sacrificed to short term political pressure.
Seamus Mallon, deputy leader of the S.D.L.P. stated:
One lesson we have learned in the last 16 years is that
those who are involved in paramilitary activities and who
have committed themselves to violence can live with
repression. They will also try to promote repression
because it is their biggest single propaganda weapon.
They cannot do without it, because they cannot live
without that type of repression. In both propaganda and
political terms, repression is their lifeblood. It would
be a tragic mistake to provide them with that lifeblood. 2
The National community, which endures the brunt of security
measures, is critical of any effort which includes increased
British security forces to cope with higher violence levels.
More informative in the quest of why a situation like
Northern Ireland exists than the debate that day, was who
was present at the debate. The Unionists had returned, but
who was there to listen? The two S.D.L.P. MPs were there,
John Hume and Seamus Mallon. The governmental majority
conservatives had 17 members present which included Tom King
and Nicholas Scott, cabinet members with responsibility for
Northern Ireland. The Labor party mustered five members and
2Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates
(Commons), Vol. 115, No. 102, 6 May 1987, p. 396.
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the Alliance Party, one. The Rev. William McCreay, a
Unionist MP, made a comment to this fact:
Two honorable Members were in a discussion and were
laughing together about why the House was so sparsely
attended today. They said that there was "a difficult
decision of priorities." They had to decide between
Rolls-Royce shares and attending this debate. I quote
these remarks made by two honorable Members in a corridor
of this House today because it typifies what many of my
colleagues feel, that there is little interest among
honorable Members across the water in the suffering and
anguish of the people in Northern Ireland. 3
The British Isles—Ireland, Northern Ireland, and Great
Britain, represent 60 million people—the majority of whom
have little concern about Northern Ireland. Those who are
concerned, the Unionists and Nationalists of Northern
Ireland have little influence over their future. The
Unionists, who represent approximately one million people in
Northern Ireland, hold only 13 of the 650 seats in the House
of Commons (three of the seats are held by the moderate
Nationalist Party, the S.D.L.P., and one by Sinn Fein).
Since the Anglo-Irish Agreement, the Unionists have felt
betrayed by the British Government and have boycotted their
seats in the House of Commons.
One Unionist supporter in the gallery observing the
debates—a young man of no more than 18 years—wore his
politics on his back: "Ulster Says No!" referring to the
Anglo-Irish Accord. He reminded me of why the problem in
Northern Ireland will be perpetuated unless some type of
3Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Commons) , Vol
115, No. 102, 6 May 1987, p. 402.
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integration is sponsored by the government similar to forced
busing in the U.S. An Ulster Protestant is very likely to
grow up never knowing a Catholic, and vice-versa. The
educational system, supported by the government, is
segregated. Catholics go to government-supported Catholic
schools and Protestants go to government-supported "public
schools." John Conroy, in his book Belfast Diary, War as a
Way of Life , gives an excellent illustration of "who" is
likely to be tomorrow's I.R.A. volunteer and why:
While the world finds the problem in the North complex, a
teenager in Clonard or Ballymurphy sees it as elementary.
He knows he will have no work, or if he does have it, it
will not reflect his intelligence or pay him enough to
escape the ghetto. He finds himself regarded not as a
citizen, but as a suspect, and at some point in his young
life he will probably have a confrontation with the army
or police that will convince him that those forces are not
his protectors. He will probably get little guidance from
his parish priest, except perhaps at election time, and it
is unlikely that he will reach adulthood knowing a single
neighbor who is active in the S.D.L.P. Given his natural
desire for dignity and his conviction that the system is
unjust, it comes as no surprise when he assumes the role
of the violent man or his auxiliary.
John Hume, leader of the S.D.L.P., has stated,
only a process will heal the division in Ireland. Too
many seeking to remedy the problems of Ulster attempt to
start where they would like to be rather than where we are
at now. Only patient work in developing that process over
the years will produce the final stability.
Anti-terrorism laws with stiff punishments, internment
without trial, harsh interrogation methods, Diplock Courts
(trial without jury) , international extradition agreements,
security cooperation agreements, and even the construction
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of a wall called the "Peace Line" 4 to keep Belfast
Protestants and Catholics separated, have not ended the
violence. The best start to the process which John Hume
speaks of is the recognition of the two legitimate
traditions—Nationalist and Unionist-—has begun with the
Angle-Irish Agreement. There is no way forward through
violence; violence only destroys justice for all.
Enlightened citizens of Northern Ireland acknowledge this
and the international interest accorded to the province has
raised the stakes to succeed.
4 Peter Maas, "Can the War in Northern Ireland End This
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Apprentice Boys—A loyalist body with strong links to the
Orange Order. Its members march once a year in Derry to
celebrate the Protestants who in 1688 shut the gates of
the city against the Catholic pretender to the English
throne, James II. A confrontation between the
Apprentice Boys and local Catholics led to a serious
outbreak of violence in Derry on August 12, 1969, which
in turn set off a series of riots throughout Northern
Ireland, forcing the British government to introduce the
Army.
B-Specials—Set up in 1920 before partition as part of a
Protestant militia recruited to reinforce the police in
northeast Ireland, the B-Specials remained as an
auxiliary force for the Royal Ulster Constabulary when
it was created two years later to defend the newly
established state. They soon gained a reputation among
Catholics for bigotry and violence. In August 1969 the
B-Specials played a controversial role in the civil
disruptions, which led to the force's abolition by the
British Labor government, which replaced it with the
Ulster Defense Regiment, under the control of the
British army.
Bloody Friday—21 July 1972. Eleven people were killed and
130 injured after 26 bombs, planted in Belfast by PIRA,
exploded during a busy shopping afternoon.
Bloody Sunday— 30 January 1972. Thirteen people shot dead
by 1st Parachute Regiment after rioting by a mob of
breakaway 'hooligans' which followed an illegal (but
otherwise peaceful) march organized by the Derry Civil
Rights Association)
.
Brick—A unit peculiar to Northern Ireland. It was the
basic patrolling unit and contained just four men,
commanded by a Corporal or Lance-Corporal . Different
tasks would be met by using a variable number of bricks.
Democratic Unionist Party—Founded by the extreme loyalist
leader, the Reverence Ian Paisley, in 1971, it is a
vehicle for right-wing Unionist policies, though with a
populist, working-class base.
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Diplock Courts—Following proposals by Lord Diplock,
provisions were made in the Emergency Powers Act 1973
for 'no jury 1 courts for cases involving terrorist
offenses. One reason given for this was that witnesses
were being intimidated by having to appear in front of a
jury.
Direct Rule--Imposed by the central Government at
Westminster in March 1972. The Northern Ireland
Parliament at Stormont was suspended, which meant direct
rule of the province from London.
Falls Road—The main Catholic area of Belfast, running from
the city center largely parallel to the Protestant
Shankill Road. It has seen endless confrontation
between PIRA and the security forces, and sometimes
between PIRA and the OIRA, and between the OIRA and the
IRSP.
Fianna Fail—The largest political party in the Republic of
Ireland, founded by Eamonn DeValera in 192 6 after the
split from Sinn Fein. Fianna Fail, adopting a
pronationalist approach and vowing to end partition
peacefully, went on to become the party of government of
the Irish republic for most of the state's sixty-year
history.
Fine Gael—Founded in 1933 as a right wing, pro-Fascist
party, it grew into the second largest of the Irish
political groupings (after Fianna Fail) , with a more
conservative line.
H-Block—The name (based on the shape of the buildings)
given by Republicans to the Maze prison outside Belfast
for those convicted of terrorist offenses. The prison
was first officially known as Long Kesh, and later as
the Maze Prison. It was here that Republican prisoners
went 'on the blanket' in protest at the ending of the
Special Category status. They stepped this ' up by
refusing to leave their cells, wash or use toilet
facilities. The protest culminated in the hunger strike
of 1981 in which ten prisoners died. The first was
Bobby Sands, on 5 May, and the last Mickey Devine, on 2
August.
Internment—Internment without Trial was introduced on 9
August 1971 under the Special Powers Act. In an initial
dawn swoop code-named 'Operation Demetrius,' the
security forces arrested 346 IRA suspects out of a total
of 520 on their lists. One hundred and four were
released within 48 hours, but in the same period
widespread rioting claimed the lives of 23 people.
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Irish Labor Party—A trade union-based, mildly reformist
grouping in the Irish Republic with only marginal
support among the Irish working class (who traditionally
support Fianna Fail)
.
Irish National Liberation Army—Made up of ex-Official IRA
men who wanted to end the Officials' cease-fire and,
when unable to do so, launched their own guerrilla
group, which became involved in a bloody feud with their
former comrades. INLA maintains a sporadic campaign of
attacks on British soldiers, policemen, and prison
officers throughout Northern Ireland. It is regarded by
the security forces as small but dangerous, with a hard
core of veteran guerrillas.
Irish Republican Army—The nationalist guerrilla organiza-
tion; which fought the British during the 1919-21 war of
independence. In the 1940s, 1950s, and early 1960s, the
IRA conducted sporadic and unsuccessful campaigns
against the Unionist government in Northern Ireland, but
it won little support from local Catholics there, and by
the mid-1960s was regarded as something of an
anachronism. During this period another Communist
Party-dominated leftward tendency developed among IRA
leaders in Dublin like Cathal Goulding, who were
disillusioned by the failure of previous campaigns. At
the same time the crisis in Northern Ireland reached
violent proportions, galvanizing the Northern-based IRA
into action and eventually splitting the movement into
those who favored a violent attack on partition and
those who continued to pursue the line of compromise
with emphasis on political and social action. The
former became the Provisional IRA and the latter the
Official IRA.
Irish Republican Socialist Party—Formed in late 1974 by
members of the Official IRA and Official Sinn Fein who
became concerned at what they considered the lack of
militancy in the leadership and the failure of the
movement to emphasize the question of partition.
Nationalist Party—The anti-partition party of Northern
Ireland founded in 1921.
'No Go* Areas—The phrase used to describe areas behind
barricades set up between 1969-1972, to keep out the
Army, the police and other sectarian groups. They were
mainly in Catholic areas of West Belfast, and the
Bogside and Creggan in Londonderry, and dominated by
PIRA. Sometimes the Protestants set up their own 'No
Go' areas, but usually in order to pressure the security
forces to act against those in Catholic areas.
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Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association—Founded in 19 67
by diverse elements, including republicans, in order to
draw attention to discrimination in housing allocation
and job opportunities against Catholics by Unionist
regime. A series of well-publicized protest marches was
met by violent opposition from the government and
loyalist groups and set off a chain reaction which
brought Northern Ireland to the verge of civil war in
August 1969.
Orangemen—'Members of the Orange Order, the largest Protes-
tant Organization in the province. It was first formed
in 1795 and took its name from King William of Orange
who, during the religious wars of the late 17th century,
beat King James at the Battle of the Boyne in 1690.
This victory is celebrated each year on 12 July with
huge Orange Lodge parades across the province. There
are close links, and overlapping membership, with the
Apprentice Boys of Derry, and Unionist politicians have
nearly always felt it necessary to be members of the
Orange Order.
Royal Ulster Constabulary—Founded as the Northern Ireland
police force in 1922, it was a paramilitary force with
mostly Protestant membership. (Catholics only made up
10% of the RUC at most.) Its function was not so much
that of a civil police body as a defender of the
Unionist government and the territory of Northern
Ireland. Reformed in 1969 and again, though less
drastically, in the mid-1970s as part of the British
government's policy of "Ulsterization, " the RUC has been
regaining its importance as the primary security force
in Northern Ireland, in spite of many controversies
created because of its documented violations of
prisoners' rights.
SAS--22 Special Air Service, the modern counterpart of the
SAS Regiment raised in 1941 to operate behind enemy
lines. Particularly trained for long-term surveillance
and covert operations, each four-man operational patrol
contains a signals, medical, demolition and linguistic
capability to provide maximum flexibility. Its organi-
zation and operations are shrouded in secrecy, to the
extent that in some circles it is considered an
assassination unit, whose reputation strikes more terror
than its deeds.
Shankill Road--Considered as the major Protestant area of
Belfast, and the very core of loyalty strength.
Sinn Fein—The nationalist party founded in 1907 which went
on to become the political wing of the IRA. After the
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IRA split, Sinn Fein followed suit with the formation of
the Official and Provisional Sinn Finn organizations.
Since then neither faction has exercised much political
influence in Ireland, where they remain essentially rump
parties.
Ulster Defense Association—The largest of the Protestant
paramilitary organizations and the one responsible for
most of the sectarian violence in Northern Ireland.
Founded first in 1969 as a loose collection of vigilante
groups. It was taken over in 1971 by extremist elements
who transformed it into a militia with a hard core of
assassins.
Ulster Defense Regiment—Formed by the British government in
April 1970 to replace the abolished B-Specials, the
Ulster Defense Regiment (UDR) is a locally recruited
unit of the British Army.
Ulster Freedom Fighters—In 197 3 the UDA assassins started
calling themselves the Ulster Freedom Fighters and
issued statements claiming responsibility for sectarian
murders under that name. Its actions have remained at a
sectarian level, responding to the IRA campaigns.
Ulster Protestant Volunteers—Formed in the mid-19 60s by the
Reverend Ian Paisley, the Ulster Protestant Volunteers
(UPV) was a paramilitary body attached to the Free
Presbyterian Church.
Ulster Unionist Party—For many years the leading loyalist
party in Northern Ireland, committed to opposing Irish
unity.
Ulster Volunteer Force— (1) A Protestant militia formed in
1912 to oppose home rule for Ireland. (2) A paramili-
tary group created by Gusty Spence in the mid-1960s,
using the emotive initials "UVF" and determined to
oppose what its members perceived as the threat of IRA
subversion.
Sources: Jack Holland, Too Long A Sacrifice ,
Desmond Hamill, Pig in the Middle
,
W.D. Flackes (ed.), Northern Ireland
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Issued by Sinn Fein Ard Chomhairle
112
SINN FEIN A SCENARIO FOR PEACE
THIS DOCUMENT is presented by Sinn Fein for dis-
cussion and as an answer to those who claim that there
is no alternative to the continuation of British rule. It
does not represent the definitive republican position,
nor is it exclusive of other proposals dealing with alter-
native scenarios for a British withdrawal from Ireland.
The first section reiterates the Irish people's right to
national self-determination, the second section deals
with the question of the loyalists and the final section
proposes a way in which the British government could
withdraw and transfer power to an all-Ireland constitut-




The island of Ireland, throughout history, has been univ-
ersally regarded as one unit.
The historical and contemporary existence of the Irish
nation has never been in dispute.
The Irish people have never relinquished their claim to
the right to self-determination.
What has been in contest is the right of the Irish peo-
ple, as a whole, to self-determination and their freedom
to exercise that right.
For centuries, the relationship between the British
government and the Irish people has been the relation-
ship between the conqueror and the conquered, the
oppressor and the oppressed.
The perennial cycle of oppression/domination/resistance/
oppression has been a constant feature of the British
government's involvement in Ireland and the Irish peo-
ple's rejection of that government's usurpation of the
right to exercise control over their political, social,
economic and cultural destiny.
From the late 17th century onwards, that usurpation
provoked both revolutionary resistance and - within
the narrowest confines of British constitutional legality
— constitutional opposition. In the course of the 19th
century, British oppression and famine caused the popu-
lation of Ireland to be halved.
The only occasion on which the people of all Ireland
have been permitted to hold free and fair elections to
determine their political future was in the 1918 West-
minster Elections. Sinn Fein, with a political programme
demanding complete independence for the unitary state
of Ireland, won the election with 69.5% of the vote.
Those democratically-elected representatives of the Irish
people formed Dail Eireann and, on January 21st 1919,
enacted the Declaration of Independence.
The Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1922, the partition of Ire-
land and the Constitution of the Irish Free State were
imposed on the Irish people under the threat of "immed-
iate and terrible war". They were not submitted to the
Irish people for ratification and their imposition repre-
sents a denial to the Irish people of the freedom to
exercise their right to self-determination.
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The pretext for partition - the wishes of a national
minority to maintain British rule - holds no validity
against the express wishes of the vast majority of the-
Irish people.
Secession is not the same as self-determination.
Partition perpetuates the British government's denial
of the Irish people's right to self-determination. It per-
petuates the cycle of oppression/domination/resistance/
oppression.
In the words of Sean MacBride, winner of the Nobel
and Lenin Peace Prizes:
"Ireland's right to sovereignty, independence
and unity are inalienable and indefeasible. It is
for the Irish people as a whole to determine the
future status of Ireland. Neither Britain nor a small
minority selected by Britain has any right to partit-
ion the ancient island of Ireland, nor to determine
its future as a sovereign nation."
LAW
IRELAND'S RIGHT to sovereignty, independence and
unity - the right of the Irish people, as a whole, to
self-determination — is supported by universally-recog-
nised principles of international law.
The right to self-determination is enshrined in the
two United Nations' Covenants of 1966 - the Internat-
ional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic Social and Cul-
tural Rights. Article 1 of each covenant states:
"1. All peoples have the right to self-determinat-
ion. By virtue of that right they determine their
economic, social and cultural development."
The landmark Declaration on Principles of Internat-
ional Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-oper-
ation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations declares:
"... all people have the right freely to determine,
without external influence, their political status
and to pursue their economic, social and cultural
development and every state has the duty to respect
this right in accordance with the provisions of the
Charter."
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Partition is in contravention of the United Nations'
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Col-
onial Countries and Peoples. Article 6 of which states:
"Any attempt aimed at the partial or total dis-
ruption of the national unity and the territorial
integrity of a country is incompatible with the pur-
poses and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations."
LOYALISTS
THE MAJOR stumbling block to independence is Brit-
ish colonial interference. However, it suits the British
and the loyalists for the loyalists to be portrayed as the
real obstacle to that independence and allows Westmin-
ster off the hook, projecting itself as the "honest broker'.
While we in no way wish to ignore the economic
challenge which reunification presents, or minimise the
extent of the problem, or the great trauma that will be
experienced by the unionist population, we believe that
loyalism derives an artificial psychological strength
from the British presence, from the Union. Indeed, the
relationship between unionist intransigence and past
unconditional British support is recognised (though
unacknowledged) by Thatcher's government, part of
whose present strategy, via the Hillsborough Treaty, is
to rock the morale of loyalists, split the unionists and
force the emergence of a pragmatic leadership which
will do an internal deal with the SDLP.
The loyalists are a national minority in Ireland. Acc-
ording to most opinion polls, the majority of people in
Britain want to wash their hands ol Ireland. Increas-
ingly, loyalists are finding themselves in an untenable
position. Their protest campaign against the Hillsbor-
ough Treaty has cost them dearly in PR terms and to
the British public it has only emphasised the differences
between the Six Counties and Britain. Their refusal to
enter into dialogue (with anyone) and their disillusion-
ment with the British government is producing a mom-
entum towards disaster where Civil War, or a Unilateral
Declaration of Independence, or repartition are among
the irrational proposals put forward by some of the
paramilitaries and politicians.
Sinn Fein seeks a new constitution for Ireland which
would include written guarantees for those presently
constituted as 'loyalists'. This would recognise present-
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day social reality and would include, for example, the
provisions for family planning and the right to civil
divorce.
The resolution of the conflict would free unionists
from their historic laager mentality and would grant
them real security instead of tenure based on repress-
ion and triumphalism. We do not intend to tum back
the pages of history, or to dispossess the loyalists and
foolishly attempt to reverse the Plantation. We offer
them a settlement based on their throwing in their lot
with the rest of the Irish people and ending sectarian-
ism. We offer them peace. We offer them equality.
It is only through the process of decolonisation and
dialogue that a peaceful, stable Ireland will emerge.
Only when independence is restored can Ireland hope to
prosper and take her place among the nations of the
world. Britain must take the initiative and declare its
intention to withdraw. That is the first step on the road
to peace. Republicans will respond quickly and positiv-
ely.
A SCENARIO FOR PEACE
THE ENDING of partition, a British dis-
engagement from Ireland and the restoration
to the Irish people of the right to exercise
self-sovereignty, independence and national
self-determination remain the only solution
to the British colonial conflict in Ireland.
The Hillsborough Treaty and the processes it involves
seek merely to camouflage the fact that the Six-County
state is a failed entity, socially, economically and polit-
.. 'I; The Treaty does not challenge the constitutional
tatus of the Union but actually reinforces it.
Sinn Fein seeks to create conditions which will lead
to a permanent cessation of hostilities, an end to our
long war and the development of a peaceful, united and
independent Irish society. Such objectives will only be
achieved when a British government adopts a strategy
for decolonisation.
It nuisi lieuiu 1>\ repealing! the liovemnieiii i>l
Ireland \ct' ami publicly declaring that the 'Northern
Ireland' statelet is no longer part ol the United Kingdom
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Furthermore, it must declare that its military forces
and its system of political administration will remain
only for as long as it takes to arrange their permanent
withdrawal.
This would need to be accomplished within the
shortest practical period. A definite date within the life-
time of a British government would need to be set
for the completion of this withdrawal.
Such an irreversible declaration of intent would min-
imise any loyalist backlash and would go a long way
towards bringing round to reality most loyalists and
those of their representatives genuinely interested in
peace and negotiation. It would be the business of
such negotiations to set the constitutional, economic,
social and political arrangements for a new Irish state
through a Constitutional Conference.
CONSTITUTIONAL
CONFERENCE
FREE ELECTIONS to an all-Ireland Constit-
utional Conference would be arranged. The
conference would consist of the elected
representatives of the Irish people and would
be open to submissions from all significant
organisations in Ireland (e.g. the Trade Union
Movement, the Women's Movement, the
Churches) and would draw up a new constit-
ution and organise a national system of
government.
While this conference could have no influence on the
decision by Britain to withdraw, it would play an im-
portant role in organising the transition to a new govern-
mental system. Should it fail to find agreement on a
new Constitution, or on any other matter, a British
withdrawal would proceed anyway within the fixed
time period.
Republicans have consistently asserted that the loyal-
ist people in common with all other citizens, must be
given firm guarantees of their religious and civil' liberties
and we repeat our belief that, faced with a British
withdrawal and the removal of partition, a considerable
body of loyalist opinion would accept the wisdom of
negotiating for the type of society which would reflect
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(.heir needs and interests. The irreversible nature of
a British withdrawal strategy wouid be a major influ-
ence in convincing loyalists that we were entering
into a new situation which could not be changed by the
traditional methods of loyalist intransigence.
BRITISH
WITHDRAWAL
AS PART of the military withdrawal, the
RUC and UDR would be disarmed and
disbanded.
The introduction of United Nations forces or Euro-
pean forces to supervise a British withdrawal or fill any
alleged vacuum would only frustrate a settlement and
must be avoided. Experience in other conflicts has
shown that such a 'temporary' presence would become
'permanent' and the deployment would have apolitical
bias. Their subsequent withdrawal would become a
point of contention and there would be a re-run of the
bloodbath-threat scenario. Similarly, there shouid be a
real effort to avoid the introduction of forces from the
Twenty-Six Counties.
The Constitutional Conference would be responsible
for determining the nature and composition of an emerg-
ent national police service and the judiciary. There is
absolutely no doubt in our minds that, if Britain were to
be sincere about disengaging and was committed to an
orderly transference of power, this could be achieved
with a minimum of disorder.
All political prisoners would be unconditionally
released.
A cessation of all offensive military actions by all
organisations would create the climate necessary for a
peaceful transition to a negotiated settlement.
As part of the settlement, the British government
must accept the responsibility for providing financial
support by agreeing by Treaty with the national govern-
ment to provide economic subvention for an agreed
period. Given the disastrous involvement of British rule
in Ireland, reparations for an agreed period are the least
contribution Britain could make to ensure an ordered
transition to a national democracy and the harmonisat-
ion of the economies. North and South.
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A SCENARIO FOR PEACE SINN FEIN
Anyone unwilling to accept a united Ireland and
wishing to leave should be offered resettlement grants
to permit them to move to Britain or assist them to
move to a country of their choice.
The onus is on the British government to ensure a
peaceful transition to a united and independent Ireland.
The shape of that society is a matter for the Irish peo-
ple. Only when Britain recognises that right and initiates
a strategy of decolonisation along these lines will peace
and reconciliation between Irish people and between
Britain and Ireland be established.
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SINN FEIN's ultimate objec-
tive is to see established in
Ireland a thirty-two-county,
democratic, socialist republic
based on the principles con-
tained in the 1916 Proclama-
tion. However, more pressing
is the fact that partition is the
immediate cause of bloodshed
and division in the North,
perpetuating the sectarianism
which prevents the emergence
of class politics.
For further information on the policies of Sinn Fein
or the Republican Movement please contact Sinn Fein
Head Office, 44 PameU Square, Dublin 1. Tel: 726932,
Telex 30109, or 51/55 Falls Road, Belfast, Tel: 230261.
Telex 747523
Printed by Republican Publications
44 Parnell Square, Dublin I. Tel:747611









At the time of writing we are suffering yet another Ulster constitutional crisis, this time provoked
by the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Violence, intercommunity strife, polarisation and uncertainty are
all at a higher level than at any time for almost a decade. The accord' will not bring peace, stability
nor reconciliation to Northern Ireland because it is a contract between two governments and not
an agreement between those in the cockpit of the conflict — Ulster Protestants and Ulster
Catholics.
This whole document could be used to expound the faults and failures of the Anglo-Irish
approach to the Ulster problem but that is not the purpose of this paper. It is enough to say that
after more than a year in existence the accord' has not won over the support of even one small
loyalist group, opposition to the agreement remains absolute. Any scheme which is opposed to
such a degree has little or no chance of developing into a solution.
Yet the Anglo-Irish Agreement has at least done two things which may speed movement towards
a real internal agreement in Ulster. The increased exposure and examination of Southern Irish
society has further increased disillusionment for Ulster Catholics in the prospect of a united
Ireland. At the same time Ulster Protestants are increasingly heard to say that whilst they are
totally resolved to defeat the Anglo-Irish Treaty they recognise the need for a reasonable and
acceptable alternative to the agreement. They recognise that it is not enough to simply say NO.
With this in mind the Ulster Political Research Group presents this paper for discussion as one
possible alternative.
We are all part of the problem but how many are prepared to be part of the settlement. It costs
nothing to think about it.
"Perhaps the sentiments contained in the following pages, are not yet sufficiently fashionable to
procure them general favour; a long habit of not thinking a thing wrong, gives it a superficial
appearance of being right, and raises at first a formidable outcry in defence of custom. But the
tumult soon subsides. Time makes more converts than reason.... " (Thomas Paine 1 776).
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INTRODUCTION
Who (in 1 969) would have thought that after nearly Twenty years the 'troubles' would still rage
unabated with the Ulster Protestant-Loyalist-Unionist community and the Ulster Catholic-Irish
Nationalist-Republican community still locked in stalemate? Yet here we are in 1987 with
nothing to show for it all but the prospect of looking forward to an ever polarising society
brutalised by violence, ravaged by fear and demoralised by economic depression.
HOW LONG CAN THIS GO ON?
The stubborn determination of each community not to 'give in' to, nor be beaten by, the other
ensures that the conflict could continue indeterminately unless we can produce a settlement
which removes the main sources of antagonism to each side. In the quest for proposals which
may lead to a social and political solution to the Ulster conflict we must first identify the
parameters within which such proposals are realistic. Surely by now we recognise that there are
limits beyond which each community will not (under any circumstances) retreat nor indeed be
forced. It is not always that which is true which is important, but that which is believed to be true.
Each community tends to form its impression of the other from the rhetoric and posturing of the
most zealous and vocal sections of that group. The trouble with the silent majority is that it is
indeed silent, and therefore makes little impression.
WHAT IMPRESSION THEN DOES EACH COMMUNITY HAVE OF THE OTHER?
Ulster 'protestants' do not fear nor mistrust Ulster 'catholics' because they are catholics but
because they believe them to be Irish Nationalists — fifth columnists — uncommitted citizens,
intent on the destruction of Northern Ireland in pursuit of a united CATHOLIC-GAELIC-IRISH
NATIONALIST-REPUBLIC. Loyalists fear that if these Irish Nationalists are allowed any authority
or position of 'power' within the political framework of Northern Ireland then they will use that
'power' and authority to undermine, or even overthrow the State to achieve their Nationalist
ambitions. For this reason Loyalists have opposed, and will continue to oppose, any proposal or
scheme which contains an 'Irish dimension' or which Loyalists believe is contrived by Irish
Nationalists to either undermine the 'Union' with Great Britain or bring a United Ireland one step
nearer.
"The Unionists are a majority in Northern Ireland, but their political behaviour there can only
be understood if they are seen, as they feel themselves to be, as a threatened minority on the
island of Ireland. Theirs are the politics of the besieged. Hence their stubborn refusal to
share power with the minority in Northern Ireland, whom they fear as the Trojan horse of the
real majority in Ireland, the catholics."
(JOHN HUMESDLP)
Ulster Loyalists live in a state of eternal siege; a people instinctively driven by the overpowering
need to defend the frontiers against the enemy without, and to suppress the enemy within. Ulster
'catholics' generally believe that Ulster 'protestants' wish to preserve an ascendancy society; a
religious and political hierarchy from which they are excluded, or 'alienated', for no apparent
reason other than that they are cat holies (the symptoms of mistrust and uncertainty are mistaken




The more Loyalists suspect 'Catholics' of being Irish Nationalists, the more defensive they
become and close ranks. The more defensive 'Protestants' become, the more 'Catholics' believe
themselves to be excluded and display disaffection and agitatiorf usually through the medium of
Irish Nationalism.
In turn 'Protestants' interpret the display of agitation as further evidence that the minority is
nothing more than a bunch of 'rebels' and become even more defensive. And so it goes on.
The consequence is a stalemate situation where Protestants feel threatened, and Catholics feel
alienated and dominated by a protestant majority. It creates a society that can not move forward,
so it does not move. If we are to break this deadlock or if any proposed solution is to stand any
serious chance of success then it must attempt to ensure two things:—
1
.
That Ulster 'Protestants' no longer feel compelled to defend the frontier.
2. That Ulster 'Catholics' support, and play a full role, in society.
Whilst we have no doubt that compromise and accommodation can be reached between
Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, it is impossible to compromise on the existence of
Northern Ireland itself— it either exists or it doesn't. At present it exists and is a part of the United
Kingdom. This situation may not be the whole-hearted wish of everyone in the province but must
be recognised to be the wish of most. Surely then this is the logical place to make a beginning.
It is our firm conviction that the vast majority of both religious communities long for peace,
reconciliation and the chance to create a better future for their children. But longing is not
enough; there must be a mechanism created to harness the love, generosity, courage and
integrity of Ulster people in both religious communities and direct its great power towards the
light of a new beginning.
In an attempt to create such a mechanism we propose the following:
—
(a) Devolved legislative government for Northern Ireland and a written constitution. A set of
constitutional laws, agreed by Ulster catholics and protestanis together which would lay the
foundations on which to build a new progressive democracy. An agreement instituted by Ulster
people at referendum which can only be changed by Ulster people at referendum.
(b) A modern democratic political structure based on consensus government, proportional
representation and shared responsibility.
(c) A Bill of Rights.
(d) A supreme court charged with the responsibility to uphold constitutional law and safeguard
the rights of the individual as represented in the Bill of Rights.
There is no section of this divided Ulster community which is totally innocent or indeed totally
guilty, totally right or totally wrong. We all share the resoonsibility for creating the situation,
either by deed or by acquiescence. Therefore we must share the responsibility for finding a




Northern Ireland is not unique because its inhabitants are in conflict. In every age and in every
part of the globe, man has confronted man on every issue imaginable. Within comparatively
recent times almost every country in Europe has experienced violent struggle because of serious
ethnic, religious or class divisions in society. Stalemate, and the gradual acceptance that to
continue the conflict was senseless and futile, forced the antagonists to negotiate a variety of
settlements. Almost always the settlement took the form of a contract between the various
parties (A WRITTEN CONSTITUTION).
Most modern democracies, which have emerged from conflict, are based on the sovereignty of
the people. Elected representatives of the various sections of the population negotiated and
agreed on what powers the citizens were prepared to devolve to their government, the structures
of government and what safeguards to civil liberties were to be incorporated in the constitution.
The main provisions of such agreements are often drawn up in one binding document (written
constitution) which defines the structures and powers of government and the relationship
between the several parts of government and between government and the citizen. In other
words, the people lay down the ground rules inside which the politicians and civil servants are
expected to operate; A set of rules which form the basic blueprint for society and which can be
referred to for guidance when a dispute arises; A set of constitutional laws which can only be
changed by the people, usually by means of a referendum. To ensure that no one faction, which
may achieve a simple majority, could revoke or change any or all of the agreement it is established
practice to employ some mechanism which ensures that the constitution cannot be amended
except where there exists a proven consensus for change. Generally speaking, for a proposed
constitutional amendment to succeed it requires the support of a considerable majority of the
parliament (often at least 2/3 ) and then must be ratified by a majority in a referendum.
A considerable portion of most written constitutions relates to the protection of civil liberties and
the relevant constitutional articles are commonly known as a Bill of Rights. For example the first
nineteen articles of the Federal Republic of Germany define specific basic human rights.
Where a written constitution is established it is regarded as a morally and legally binding
document. Should a government seek to introduce any measure which is regarded by any citizen
or group of citizens to be in breach of the contract then that measure can be challenged through
the courts. The judiciary has the power to overrule even an act of parliament if it is judged to be
unconstitutional.
THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE WINDS OF CHANGE
The constitution of the United Kingdom is mainly an 'unwritten one. It consists of the collection
of all acts of parliament, parliamentary conventions and case law which exists at any one time.
Parliament is absolutely sovereign and any statute can be passed or repealed by a simple majority
in both Houses at Westminster. It is in fact an elected dictatorship.
The parliament of the U.K. could abolish jury trials, permit imprisonment without trial, abolish the
welfare state, or enact an Anglo-Irish treaty without askance of, or accountability to anyone. No
law enacted by parliament can be challenged, not even by the courts. There is no set of laws or
rules to control the conduct of government.
This system of government has been successful for hundreds of years for a number of reasons
which are no longer as valid as they once were; the United Kingdom was the centre of a vast
economic empire which ensured that all parts of the kingdom shared relative prosperity; there
existed a reasonably accepted balance of power between central and local government; the
populace still had faith in the parliamentary process.
Yet, even in Great Britain, the winds of change are gathering force. Economic decline, racial
tensions, massive unemployment, the breaking down of the two-party system and the growing
dissatisfaction with increasing centralised authority are creating pressures and strains beyond
the experience or capability of the present centralised political system.
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"The greatest threat to the balance of powers and civil liberties in Britain comes not from a
potential dictator but from a succession of government measures forced by pressure of
circumstances which can be individually justified but which add up to a steady diminution of
freedom".
(ALAN BEITH-LIB/SDP ALLIANCE)
There are growing demands for regionalisation in England, a devolved legislative assembly for
Scotland is imminent, devolved administration for Wales will follow while electoral reform to PR.
and a Bill of Rights are inevitable. All these reforms, and many others, are on the political agenda
and many in Great Britain recognise that the present constitution is totally inadequate to cope
with this new set of circumstances.
"1 have reached the conclusion that our constitution is WEARING OUT. Its central defects
are gradually coming to outweigh its merits... I envisage nothing less than a written
constitution for the United Kingdom".
(LORD HAILSHAM, THE LORD CHANCELLOR)
The United Kingdom is undoubtedly moving towards regionalisation and such a situation would
require a written agreement defining the relationship between the various parts of this kingdom
and how they should be governed
An opportunity exists for Northern Ireland to be in the vanguard of the coming age of constitut-
ional reform within the United Kingdom. Where there is no change there is no democracy.
CO-DETERMINATION
(An Agreed Process Of Government For Northern Ireland)
Northern Ireland is a geographical and political entity and the majority of its citizen swish it to be
part of the United Kingdom. This is one fundamental reality of the situation. Another fundamental
reality is that Northern Ireland will never realise political and social stability until there is
consensus on how it will be governed. We in Northern Ireland cannot remain isolated from the
progressive changes in political practice and thinking developing in Europe generally and in the
U.K. in particular. The hour has arrived for the representatives of the various Ulster minorities to
appraise the situation pragmatically and talk to each other with a view to agreeing a process of
government for Northern Ireland and entering into a contract with each other which both defines
and guarantees that agreement. Others have done it before u$, now it is our turn.
The task of formulating an agreed process for Northern Ireland will not, we recognise, be an easy
one. It will be fraught with difficulties and will require political statemanship. Yet, if the various
factions agree to embark on this great endeavour, an opportunity would be created by which
'Ulster Catholics' and 'Ulster Protestants' could co-determine the very nature of their society;
how it would be shaped, and how it would be governed.





The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland would invite all political parties to discuss the
principle of creating a written constitution. and subsequent form of government.
2. If the various parties agree in principle, the Secretary of State would call an election for the
parties to seek a mandate from the electorate for their attendance at a constitutional
conference.
3. On a day decided in advance of the election, the newly elected representatives would
convene the conference.
4. The Chairman of the conference would be appointed by the Secretary of State but must be
ratified by the conference.
5. The conference would require expert assistance to prepare its draft constitution. It may
consider inviting experts from the Commonwealth, the E.E.C., and the U.S.A. to act as
advisers and observers.
6. The draft constitution would be ratified by the Conference, then it would be put to the people
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for acceptance by means of a referendum. We recommend that the constitution should not be
implemented, (nor amended once it has been ratified) unless it commands the support of not
less than 2/3 of the voters in a constitutional referendum.
7. If the constitution is ratified by the people of Northern Ireland and the Westminster
Parliament it would automatically become law and the conference would dissolve.
8. Elections would be held to the structures of government according to the articles of the
constitution.
9. Northern Ireland would continue to return members of Parliament to Westminster using the
present franchise.
WHAT WOULD A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE DO?
The conference will be faced with the task of debating and resolving the most fundi mental issues
inherent in constructing a modern, pluralist and progressive democracy.
• GOVERNMENT
Perhaps the most difficult task facing the conference will be to agree on how Northern Ireland is
to be governed;
— How should central and local government be structured?
— What powers should be given to the various parts of government?
— How and when would elections take place?
— What would be the relationship between the government of Northern Ireland and the
government at Westminster?
A political structure which we believe may attract a wide consensus of support is outlined below.
• STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT
The people of Northern Ireland would elect representatives to a legislative assembly to govern on
their behalf over all matters excepting those matters reserved by the Westminster parliament
(e.g. national defence, and foreign affairs). The assembly would govern within the terms of the
new constitution. Because Northern Ireland would have its own written constitution the people
of Northern Ireland would, in many respects, be renegotiating the Act of the Union not to weaken
that Union but to bring to it a more realistic and stabe relationship.
• ELECTIONS
Elections to the legislative assembly and to local government councils would be held every four
years using proportional representation, multi-constituency representation system of voting, as
currently used in Northern Ireland.
• ASSEMBLY
The assembly would be the only body in Northern Ireland with the authority to legislate. Seats on
each of the assembly committees would be appointed in such a way that each committee would
directly reflect the proportional strength of the parties within the assembly. Committee Chairmen
would be appointed using the same principle. (If a political party obtained 30% of the seats in the
assembly, then that party would automatically be entitled (as far as it is arithmetically possible) to
30% of the seats and chairmanships of the committees).
An illustration of how committee chairmanship could be allocated can be found on page 6.
• EXECUTIVE
Seats on the executive government committee would be allocated (as far as it is arithmetically
possible) using the same principle of proportional representation within the assembly.
(An illustration of how appointments to the executive committee could be allocated can be found
on page 6).
The acceptance of the practice of proportionality at all levels of government would change the
very nature of politics in Northern Ireland. For the first time the people would effectively and
directly determine the make-up of the executive by their votes. Coalition is now the practice
rather than the exception in modern pluralist societies. We have become so accustomed to
equating democracy with majority rule that we tend to forget that majority rule is democratic only
when there is alteration in office or when there is broad consensus for it. Majority rule in deeply
divided societies is likely to be profoundly undemocratic, and the only democratic system is one
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that allows participation in government by coalition of all groups, majority and minority, on a
more or less permanent basis. In such a coalition agreement a duty would be placed on the
minority participants to clearly demonstrate their unreserved support for the constitution, the
political institutions of the state and law and order.
• THE ELECTION OF AN EXECUTIVE AND OF COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN
(The following is a selected and edited part of a paper by Sidney Elliot — Q.U.B.).
Any devolved government in Northern Ireland faces formidable problems which might be delayed
by dispute about how to constitute itself. Given the degree of segmented distrust the use of an
electoral device might be recognised as fair and have the merit of being automatic. This paper,
therefore, seeks to apply one of a number of well known electoral formulae to the selection of an
Executive and committee chairmen.
An electoral mechanism must determine two things, namely, the party composition of the
membership of the assembly and the allocation of specific offices and departments between
them. The approach illustrated below requires the Assembly to elect the required number directly
to a specific post.
To illustrate the effect of the electoral formula some assumptions have to be made. It is assumed
here that there will be ten executive seats and that it will reflect the current civil service
departmental organisation. The departments are therefore assumed to be — Administration of
Justice, Economic Development, Agriculture, Environment, Health & Social Services, Education,
Finance & Personnel. In addition, it is assumed that there will be a Chief Executive, a Deputy
Chief Executive and a Minister without Portfolio (perhaps to keep an eye on reserved matters).
(*We have substituted the office of whip suggested by Mr. Elliot in his paper, with that of an
Administration of Justice).
For the purpose of illustration the party representation and share of the vote is assumed to be that
prevailing in the Assembly in October 1 982. The method requires the direct election of each post
in the Executive by the 78 members of the Assembly. The political representation in the Assembly
is 26 Official Unionists, 21 Democratic Unionist, 1 4 Social Democratic & Labour, 1 Alliance, 5
Sinn Fein, 1 Ulster Popular Unionist and 1 Independent Unionist.
D'Hondt Rule
The votes of each party are divided successively by 1 , 2, 3, 4, etc. and put in a table. The choice of
seats on the Executive is then allocated in order of the largest numbers.
TABLE 1
DIVISOR OUP UDUP SDLP APNI SF UPUP INDU
1 26* 21* T4* 10* 5 1 1
2 13* 10.5* 7 • 5 2.5 0.5 0.5
3 8.7* 7* 4.7 3.3 1.7 0.3 0.3
4 6.5* 5.3 3.5 2.5 1.3 0.3 0.3
Hence the party composition of the Executive would have been 4 OUP, 3 DUP, 2 SDLP, 1 APNI,



































© A SILL OF RIGHTS
This would be an essential part of the constitution. All local political parties (except Sinn Fein)
have accepted, at least in principle, the need for a Bill of Rights in Northern Ireland. The
conferencecould formulate its own set of articles relating specifically to basic human rights or it
could agree to adopt the European Convention on Human Rights into the constitution. Obviously
nothing could be entered into the constitution which would adversely affect the rights of other
citizens in the United Kingdom or EEC.
9 ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
The conference would formulate a set of articles in the constitution dealing specifically with the
administration of justice; specifying the variouscourts, their structures, powers and jurisdiction,
the mechanism for appointing judges and their term of office. Because the judiciary will become
the supreme arbiter between the people and government it is obvious that there will be a need for
the creation of a supreme court qualified and competent to deal with issues relating to
constitutional law and human rights.
EQUAL CITIZENSHIP
POLITICAL PARTIES OF GREAT BRITAIN
It is not widely known that the main British political parties (i.e. Conservative and Labour Parties)
do not permit Ulster people to join these parties. The SDP allow Ulster people party membership
but refuse to organise candidates in Northern Ireland. The Liberal party alone does not exclude
either membership or organisation in Northern Ireland.
Although we canvass for a written constitution to define the authority of government and
therefore political parties, we believe the party system to be an essential part of the process of
government and change.
As we see it, the Ulster people will be able to affect their society through the constitution, the local
assembly and Westminster, but without the freedom to participate in the British party system, an
integral part o? the political process will be denied to them. For it is through the party system that
Ulster people of all political persuasions can assert influence at Westminster, whether it is
through the ruling party or opposition. After all, the parties will all seek to be represented in the
devo'ved asr.emolies of Scotland and Wales.
Ulster people may well find it strange ihat 3ritish political parties suggest that we turn away from
'sectarianism', yet refuse to provide organised alternatives for the Northern Ireland electorate.
When the constitution for Northern Ireland is settled we wouldihope that the political divisions
between the parties would be based on social and economic doctrine rather than Unionist versus
Irish Nationalist or Catholic versus Protestant. To that end it would be beneficial if the national
political parties grasped the nettle and helped to bring abput the necessary transition by
becoming organisationally involved in Northern Ireland.
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CONCLUSION
A written constitution would not be a magic formula to solve all the problems of Northern Ireland
overnight. But it would provide an agreed morally and legally binding contract between the
various peoples of this province; a foundation on which to build a new pluralist society. The rest
will depend on the integrity and statesmanship of the political leaders of this community.
The fact that Northern Ireland's 'status' within the United Kingdom could not be changed without
the consent of at least two thirds of those voting in a referendum would raise the siege on 'Ulster
Protestants' and create a new atmosphere of security and stability conducive to reconciliation
and political development. A Northern Ireland existing by consent would remove the need to
constantly defend the psychological border.
Our proposals do not in any way deny any section of the community its aspirations. Any group
which aspires to a united Ireland, an independent Ulster or any other constitutional change may
achieve its objective if it commands a broad consensus of support for change.
"No sane person could wish to change the status of Northern Ireland without the consent of
the majority of its people. That would be a recipe fordisasterand could, I believe, leadonlyto
civil war, that would be destructive of the life of people throughout our island".
(Dr. Garrett Fitzgerald — Irish Times, 20th November 1985)
It is our contention that it would be a recipe for disaster and probable civil war if the 'status' of
Northern Ireland were to be changed without the consent of the majority of each of the two main
communities.
The fact that the new political structure, ensuring consensus and coalition, and the constitutional
articles protecting basic human rights could not be revoked or changed without the support of at
least two thirds of those voting in a referendum, would dispel the fear of exclusion felt by the
'Ulster Catholic' community and allow all minorities to play a full and productive role in our
society.
FOR PERHAPS THE FIRST TIME IN THE HISTORY OF NORTHERN IRELAND THE SAME
PROTECTIVE MEASURE COULD BE MADE TO WORK FOR BOTH PROTESTANTS AND
CATHOLICS. THAT PROTECTIVE MEASURE WOULD BE THEIR MUTUALLY AGREED CON-
STITUTION.
Such a settlement by consent, would release those in political life from the treadmill of 'border'
politics and allow them to use their various talents to tackle the real enemies which confront and
terrorise the whole community:— Social deprivation, economic recession, unemployment, the
need for more housing and the breakdown of respect for law and order. To overcome such
formidable obstacles Northern Ireland will need a coalition of all the talents and resources that
Ulster people can provide.
"LAW IS NOT WITHOUT MORAL INFLUENCE: IT SETS A STANDARD FOR BOTH THE
PUBLIC AND THE POLITICIANS ... SOTO WRITE THE COALITION IDEA INTO THE FORMING
OF A GOVERNMENT IN PLACE OF THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT VERSUS OPPOSITION
IDEA WOULD IN ITSELF BE QUITE A STEP FORWARD".
(Sir Arthur Lewis-Nobel Prize Winner)
The pragmatic alternative to co-determination is to fight a bloody civil war and let the victor
dictate the rules by which we will live.
What we propose will probably be described by some as idealistic, ambitious, fraught with
difficulties and even dangerous to attempt: but so then has anything that was ever worth doing.
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AN END TO THE DRIFT
THE TASK FORCE REPORT
AP* ABRIDGED VERSION OF THE REPORT
PRESENTED TO
MR. MOLYNEAUX <& DR. PAISLEY
16tfi JUNE, 1987.
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1 Sth June 1237
To MR. MOLYNEAUX and DR. PAISLEY
From HAROLD McCUSKER, PETER ROBINSON and fRANK MILLAR.
REPORT FROFV! THE UWOMIST TASK FORCE
On 23 February 1987 you requested us to consult with the widest possiole range o(
interest groups within the pro-union community —
(1) To secure support for the continuing campaign against the Anglo-Irish
Agreement, and
(2) To ascertain what consensus, it any. exists about alternatives to the
Agreement.
To tilts end we have \\ad discussions with.
The Archbishop ol Armagh. Dr. Robin fames
The Moderator of the Presbyterian Church. Rev Or Jor-n Thompson
The New Ulster Political Research Group
The Charter Group
The Ulster Chjbs
The Independent Orange Order
The Orange Order
Tire Royal Black Institution




The Progressive Umontst Party
The Ulster Young Unionist Council
The Chamber ol Commc-'Cs and Industry
The Apprentice Boys ol Derry
The Northern Consensus Group
The Confederation ol British Industry
In addition we have received and considered over 100 written submissions from
concerned and interested individuals.
We are gratetul to all those who panicipateu* in what has undoubtedly been the most
exhaustive — and, we think, the most honest — analysis by Unionists ot their pos»i«on
and prospects in the period post Hillsborough.
Some ol those we met presenled papers outlining their position, and at an early stage
we considered publishing these as an appendix to our, own report. However most
people a/ected to speak lo us on a confidential "oft the record" basis. This facilitated
an openness and candour not always possible under the gaze of public scrutiny
In consequence we make no attempt here to rehearse or represent the delalt of the
views received Rather we will convey the broad themes which emerged in the course
of our undertaking.
Our original brief identified two majcx areas for investigation and we received
substantial opinion about both. However it is certainly the case that the burden of our
discussions focused on the search for an alternative to the Agreement.
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We make this observation at l he outset to register the depth ol sni'dy which etf&vu"
wilhin lhe Unionist community, and tne determination of most of those we met that
pro'.est can be no substitute tor politics.
That in itself is a major finding ol ou* report.
HSSTORICAL BACKGROUND
Since the tale 1960s Unionism Mas lost a series ol vital rounds in the battle to preserve
Northern frefand's position wttnin the United Kingdom.
Much ground was lost during the Civil Rights crisis itsell. The highly sirnpiist.c notion
of Protestant 'guilt' and Catholic "grievance" persists to the present day. and this
despite the fact that since 1972 the government ol Northern Ireland has been the
exclusive preserve of the Westminster Parliament.
This dismantling of our secunty base and the la 1 ! ol SlO'mont paved the way fur a
Whitehall machine unashamedly neutral on the issue of the constitutional position
All that has followed sjnce is symptomatic of the poiicy carved and created by Lord
Canington on befvalf of Edward Heath, 'hie/ Ms/esty's Govemrr.cn; has no desire to
impede the realisation ol Irish unity'.
The minority Labour Government of James Caitaghan offered a brief respite
Increased parliamentary representation and a more robust security policy did much
tc reassure Unionists: Direct Rule was apparently giving way to gradual integration
and Lhe Conservative Party tn Opposition had elected a leader who seemed set to
complete trie, process.
However, Article One of the Anglo-Irish Agreement confirms that under Mrs
Thatchers administration the wheel has turned full circle.
H is a matter ol record 1hat Auey Neave's Ulster policy died *vith hirn jus! weeks beto>c
the 1979 General Election.
Mr. Atkins' round table conference. lollowed by Mr. Prior's scheme for Rolling
Devolution, w-re a far cry from the Regional Council promised in the Conservative
•Parry's 797.9 Manifesto.
Out if some Unionists were slow to accept even thts evidence of a move away from,
Integration. Mrs. Thatcher's rhetoric and her ability to distance herself from decisions
of her own Govttrnment. provide at least part explanation.
for a long time Mrs. Thatcher s pragmatism was kept well concealed from her own
natural Conservative supporters Having declared herself "rock firm lor the Union"
and Northern Ireland "as Bntnh as Fmchley". >\ isn't hard to see why beleagured
Unionists chose lor so long to give t^er her the benefit of the douot.
Mrs. Thatcher, some rationalised, was consumed by economic concerns and would
hardly have addressed hersell to the peripheral issue ol Northern Ireland, policy
persued ir. her name certainly didn't retiect her personal view and In all probability
had not obtained t\e.r seal of approval.
When Mrs. Thatcher fortrightly rejected the principal findings of the Forum Report,
the exponents of this view proclaimed themselves well satrsfied.
The Union appeared once more secure!
With hindsight it may be said tnat Mrs. Thatcher did Northern Irefand few favours with
her famous "ouf. out. out'' declaration. Whilst significant policy initiafves were
signalled by the rwo Unionist parlies in "The Way Forward"' and "Ulster The Future
Assured", they were not pursued with sufficient vigour.
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Dr. Paisluy offered their alternate 3riliSh.'lrish scenario in August 1965. the dye
*.as ca$t.
Mrs. Thatcher was set on conlrontation with the Unionist commuriiiy. and me.jia
critics, quite unjustifiably, said Unionists had ottered too little, too late.
To Unionists Themselves of course the opposite appeared all too obviously the case
Few outsiders can understand the bitterness and indignation ot Unionists unfairly
characterised as teh guilty party in the Ulster conflict.
A supporter of the police and a devotee of the democratic process, the ave rage
Unionist has had to witness the impotence o* lawful authority and the inadequacy of
democratic safeguards in face of violent political rebellion.
Tr>a Slormont Parliament had been successfully discredited as the keeper of
Protestant privilege. Its demise paved Ihe way for a form of colonial rule which
violates the fundamental rights and entitlements of all the people of Northern Ireland
as citizens ot the United Kingdom.
Security powers were removed trorri Sleimonl and the PUC placed under the direct
control of a Westminster whrch more than once has sanctioned negotiations witn the
Provisional IRA.
In Town Hails across ;be province the denial ot real local democracy pales beside the
presence of an army of Sinn Fein Councillors bent on the destruction of Northern
Ireland ~W/fh an armalife in one hanj and a ba//of paper m tne other".
The catalogue of injury and insult Is endless. The ne4 effect Is a community
increasingly confused as to what is and what ;s not acceptable in a democratic
society; a community torn between loyalty to the law and established order, and the
compelling conclusion thai violence ana anarchy are the likeliest route to poetical
cevj-artl
A.t various times in tne past eighteen years it has looked as if the populous mignt take
matters into their own hands Indeed they did so in 1974 Unfortunately the
Sunningdale Agreement lell without any understanding or agreement as to what
should take Its ps'ace.
rV.u/der at Darkley and a succession of other atrocities brougni the province
periodically back to the brink Howeverno smgte issue or event captured the public
mood or provided the dynamic lor change evidenced in 1974 — unhl the Angle- Irish
Agreement.
The Unionist leadership in Northern Ireland reacled to the Agreernen: with clarity and
cor,\-icl'(Qn.
On the evening of 15 November 1935 \ir Molyneoux desenbed it as "'he beginning of
Hrc end o/ the Union as we have known it". He and Dr. Paisley pledged to resist to the
end "an emergent joint authority" and that same evening set m motion a chain o'
events designed to manifest the absence of Unionist consent for tne system Dy which
Northern Ireland was to be governed.
Any doubt about the attitude of the community generally was effectively dispelled at
the C4ty Hall on Saturday Novembei 23rd. 1985.
Some 203,000 people rallied to the joint leadership's calf and gave an emphatic "NO"
to the Agreement Less than t«vo montlis later Unionist candidaies received the
endorsement of 420.000 electors for Iheir proposed campaign of resistence.
The leadership and Ihe community were united in an historic purpose, and t! "S
salutary to recall that those most hostile to Unionist unity conveniently and
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consistently ignore (he fact that Unionist politicians have acted at ail lanes in
accordance vr'.h. a policy put )o. and endorsed by. the people. All those we mt,
confirmed their view that this unity ol purpose is entrenched in the community at
Large.
THE CAFVJPASG&i AGAINST THE AGREEMENT
Y?'e have received much opinion and advice about ihe Unionist campaign against '.he
Agreement. For us the remarkable thing is i^si the views received reflect an across
the board desire to make the anti-Agreement movement more effective.
Norhe of those we met counselled capitulation. Where they were critical, their criticism
reflected only the conviction that they have and know a bene* way.
Our various meetings established also a common irritation with the casual, and often
contemptuous, manner in which the dignified and constitutional protests of a whole
community hove been received and treated
Members of Parliament have been imprisoned Otherwise law abtding citizens nave
decided to withhold revenues 1rom central government in (as yet) token civil
disobedience. Local government busjness has been sustained only by the
intervention ol Government nominees, in a province denied the principles, practices
and procedures which obtain in every other p-art of the State to which it belongs.
Such "withdrawal of consent'" in Johannesburg or Soweto would win rave reviews in
the British national press. In Northern Ireland, in puisuit ol Unionist objectives, it is
the pretext for cueJ cynicism and abuse. We do not intend lo fuel or faaMate that
cynicism by detailing here our considered views about the protest campaign
The generality ol our final recommendations ts indicated in due course.
ALTERNATIVES TO THE AGREEMENT
In all discussions about possible alternatives to the Agreement we made pla»n our
vievr.
<1) That the early suggestion by Mrs. Thatcher that the Agreement could be
"devolved away" docs not accord with the terms ol tne Agreement itself
(2) That the Agreement establishes clear, and in our view unrealistic, limits on the
powers which might be devolved, and
(3) That Unionists could not contemplate participation in any form o< devolved
government whose work anp functions would be supervised and overseen by
an Anglo-Irish Conference.
We encountered little disagreement in regard lo these matters.
Whilst we retained the suspicion that one group to whom we spoke would eventually
come to terms with whatever Westminster requires, otherwise those we met accepted
that the scope for possible Unionist concessions in negotiation ts extremely limited,
and tha* failure by Westminster to meet the Unionist community halt way in the quest
for a reasonable alternative wouW have profound consequences for the existing
constitutional relationship between Britain and Northern Ireland.
Only one group invited us to consider as a serious proposition the return of majority
rule devolution within the United Kingdom. Our expressed Incredulity prompted them
in tum to speculate as to the viability of independence and repartition.
Certainly none of the others were prepared to consider repartition as an option.
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"[jowevBT we have Jo report "hat negotiated independence feature:; increasingly m
*sfious discussion ol a possible wr.y forward.
The Campaign for Equal Citizenship advanced their view, previously publicly known
that the real choice lies between integration and mdepenoer.ee. Those favouring
devolution were equally clear that independence must be considered if the Br.-hsh
Government rejects a serious and genuine attempt by the Unionist community to
devise a reasonable alternative Jo the Agreement
The burning question for politicians of course is precisely what might constitute a
"reasonable alternative".
Regardless of its origins, the UDA document "Common Sense" has attracted
considerable interest and some support.
Thi3 may have less to do with the detail or the particular merits of the UDA proposal
than with a general perception th2t they nave addressed some of the hard political
questions wfuch some politicians would choose to ignore.
Many in addition to the UDA would dearly he prepared to contemplate SfJlP
participation in the Government ol Northern Ireland provided the SDIP agreed to
forfeit the role of the Government ot the Irish Republic as custodians of the nationalist
interest.
Tbena is general support too 'or the proposition that a Government in Northern
Ireland without control of Internal security would be unworthy of the name.
The discussions we now report obviously invite the Unionist leadership to
contemplate variations of political structures lor Northern Ireland which they, and we.
t\av& previously rejected.
Time moves on and circumstances change. We found no suggestion that Unionists
should be ashamed to adapt to cnangmg circumstances
We certainly 60 not intend "adapting to changed circumstances" to serve as cover lor
"s^tf out" or "betrayal" This is why we were at pains to register with all those we met
our determination that the Unionist leadership could not permit itseM to be sucked
;n-o an endless process of compromise and concession.
Specifically we told Churchmen, and the leaders of trade and industry, that failure to
gr«=a with Parliament an alternative basis lor the government ot Northern Ireland
within the United Kingdom would- confront the whole community witn the painful
choice — to accept the Anglo-Irish Agreement as the price for trie Union or to
negotiate a new constitutional basis for Northern Ireland.
Tivery agreed. And wc were gratified to find a ready acknowledgement by those to
whom we have specifically referred that in such an event they could not continue to
occupy thew current public position as almost neutral observers of the political scene
but woukj have to identify themselves rather with a community engaged in a fife and
tfeauh struggle for the right to sell-determination
The Campaign for Equal Citizenship would endorse the demand for self-
determination and they enjoy trve benefits of a popular policy well rooted m the
history of the Unionist movement
However the CEC is wedded to a rig»d definition o' equality not shared even with the
two other organisations — the Young Unionist Council and the Hoyal Black
Institution — representing an integratlonalisl position.
A cfear majority were agreed that mainland parties would not be persuaded to extend
their organisation to Northern Ireland and that, in any event, such a development
would not secure or. "copper lasten" the Unionist interest.
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We confessed lo some myswhcaiion as to the mentions oi the CEC but were assumed
their concern is to seue "the high moral ground from nationalism
In fairness to the CEC we should also make tt clear thai they disdain creeping or
cosmetic integration. Their (determination, as we understand it, is that Westminster
must either govern Northern Ireland like every other part ot the Uru;ed Kingdom or
forfeit all claims in respect of the government ot the province
We asX.ec? the CEC representatives if any who had embraced the concept o' equal
citizenship could in lacf accept me idea of a time limit, tn other words we put it to
tnem that whilst they spoKe of integration ot independence, by its very nature the
Campaign for Equal Citizenship was an open-ended affair.
However the CEC delegates were adamant that if a serious nno sustained campaign
for integration was mounted, and manifestly failed, they would then seek to negonate
tfie province's independence.
Wnen we probed the question of time-scale we found some CEC members less than
specific. However, the Implication was that by the end of the next (this) Parliament
(assuming a full lerm) Ihe answer would be clear, one way or the other.
We frankfy would see great difficulty holding the community together over such a
protracted period. We believe moreover that if the Anglo-Irish Agreement can survive
such a time, it will in all prob-abflity prove immovable.
However we consider this aspect of the CEC's proposals important.
CONCLUSIONS
We have found absolutely no lessening in the Unionist community's antipathy to the
Anglo-Irish Agreement. At the same time our investigations have unearthed do^p
disquiet about the current protest campaiyn and a simple disbefiet that on its own it
can or will persuade Mrs. Thatcher to change course.
There Is recognition tnat Northern Ireland's position within tr*> Union has bt-en
steadily and successfully undermined since the late 1960s.
Our various discussions pointed to the need lor action lo arrest a widely perceived
drift in our affairs. This demand for action is tempered Oy a realistic appraisa' of the
limits 0/ Unionism's negotiating strength and. on the other hand, by anxiety that 3
commitment to negotiate "a reasonable alternative" should not be construed, in
London or elsewhere, as evidence of a willingness to comi; to terms v.'iih the
Agreement itself
The temptation in such circumstances might be to do nothing However we would
consider this the ultimate abdicalfon of responsibility.
It seems to us that those who counsel against negotiation must make plain The
alternative means by which they D fopose to determine the future of the people of
Northern Ireland. Reliance on other people to undertake a cjmpaign of violence
which can be disowned, but Worn which can be extracted political aovantage. would
be disreputable and dishonest m the extreme.
for our pan we are confident that Unionists have the abiUy to recognise the point in
negotiation beyond which the search for consensus about the future government of
Northern Ireland becomes damaging to the Unionist interest
Negotiation ne*d not tw the precursor to "s-ell out" or "betrayal". Indeed the
assumption that Unionists must inevitably be bested in any negotiations can only
rsfled the judgment ot those who have already sotd out and accepted defeat. We
must give hope to a community dangerously immune to disappointment and defeat.
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(0\tc opinion survey confirmed that the policy of total migration continues to at tract
Substantia/ support tn the Unionist community However, the survey also confit ms our
view that the Whitehall establishment is strongly opposed to such a course a^d mat
Evolution is the more attainable objective.
All the principal parties in Britain favour Insh unity, which cause has been advanced
and enhanoeO by fifteen years of Direct Rule
We cannct believe that constitutional security is to oe tound in a campaign to
persuade mainland political parties to extend their organisation \o Northern Ireland
We believe that only a government representative of and answerab e to tne people of
the province can properly understand and respond to the continuing terrorist
campaign, Devolved-governmeni therefore is our objective and whilst we hooe this
wiH prove attainably within the context of the United Kingdom. Unionists wou'd be
wise and prudent to anticipate that it might not.
We> ar« convinced and agreed that the Anglo-Irish Agreement represents a
fundamental and unacceptable change in the constitutional relationship between
Great Britain and Northern Ireland We have no doubt that the Anglo-Irish
Conference is tantamount to joint authority and that its early demi:e is vital if we are
to arresJ a quickening process leading to our inevitable absorption ;n an Insh unitary
State. Having sworn nerer fo accept ths Agreement as a basis for continued
n>emb4r%hJp of the United Kingdom, we must ascertain what altematire terms tor the
Ifak&y can be found.
Recognising the inadequacies ol tne existing protest campaign we propose the
creation of a Unionist Convention to construct and lead a renewed campaign to
manifest the absence of consent tor the arrangements by which Northern Ireland is
presently governed.
In addition we suggest that the Unionist Convention be invited to endorse the demand
to* an alternative to and replacement of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. 3n(j the
commencement of "without prejudice" discussions with Her Majesty's Government
thereto.
We see a clear distinction between such discussions and formal negotiations, and ask
you to appoint a panel to establish whether a base lor formal negotiations exists or
can be established.
tn order to protect and reserve your position we recommend tnat fhe said pan«l bt.*
appointed otsfy 'o consult and report.
in the course of our investigation it nas become apparent that some people 'u'l to
understand the nature and bans of negotiation We repeat our view that Unionists
woukJ be foolhardy to reveal the ir nand ahead oi negotiation and whils' two of the
parties. Her Majesty's Government and the SDIP. continue to set the pre-condit'on
that political development in Northern Ireland- must fall within the framework of ttie
Anglo-Irish Agreement
However we submit that in earnest of your desire to find a ren-onab.'e alternative you
shoutd 9ignal thai no matter could or should be precluded from any negoiiations.
In addition, and in order to prevent any misunderstanding or confusion amongst your
own supporters. w« believe you should draw public notice to plans and proposals you
have previously offered as a base 'or negotiation
Specifically Ln this regard we have in mind the Calherwood Ptan in which both
Unionist parties abandoned pure majority rule as the price lor Devolution, and your
correspondence with the Prima Minister in August and September 1985 in which you
pledged your willingness to negotiate a Dniisnyirtsh framework tor the promotion of
friendship and co-operation within these islands.
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In our opinion ihis emphasis on Unionist flexibility must be ba anced by dear and
repeated warning that the expedient of compromise and barter cun only succeed if •'
Is a two way process.
In advance of any negotiation we tee! it must be made plain that failure to arrive at
consensus would leave the Unionist leadership no alternative bt. I to seek An entire 1 /
new base for Northern Ireland outside the present constitutional context
To this end it should be observed that Article 1 ol the Angio-lr sn Agre^rnert use'f
purports to recognise and safeguard the right of the people of Northern irpia'-d to
saif-determination.
In reality of course Article 1 concerns itself only with a decision by the majority of the
people of Northern Ireland either to remain w.ihm the United Kingdom cr alternatively
to join the Irish Republic. However it seems to us inescapable that the same Article
could be invoked to give effect to a majority decision in favour of some other
alternative.
We offer no precise or definite suggestion as to wh^t that alternative might be But we
are convinced thai, whatever the Intentions of the Governments in London and
DuSUn. membership of the United Kingdom or membership of an Irish Rep^bi'C are
not the onJy options available Jo the people ol Northern Ireland
In this regard wc propose the appointment of a Special Commission to consider and
advise upon those alternative constitutional models, their implications viz a v,z *ut."c
relationships with Britain and Ihe Irish Republic, and the steps by which an a'ternnt-ve











The Government of Ireland and the Government of the United
' Kingdom:
Wishing further to develop the unique relationship between their
peoples and the close co-operation between their countries as friendly
neighbours and as partners in the European Community;
Recognising the major interest of both their countries and, above all,
of the people of Northern Ireland in diminishing the divisions there
and achieving lasting peace and stability;
Recognising the need for continuing efforts to reconcile and to
acknowledge the rights of the two major traditions that exist in
Ireland, represented on the one hand by those who wish for no
change in the present status of Northern Ireland and on the other
hand by those who aspire to a sovereign united Ireland achieved by
peaceful means and through agreement;
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Reaffirming their total rejection of any attempt to promote political
objectives by violence or the threat of violence and their
determination to work together to ensure that those who adopt or
support such methods do not succeed;
Recognising that a condition of genuine reconciliation and dialogue
between unionists and nationalists is mutual recognition and
acceptance of each other's rights;
Recognising and respecting the identities of the two communities in
Northern Ireland, and the right of each to pursue its aspirations by
peaceful and constitutional means;
Reaffirming their commitment to a society in Northern Ireland in
which all may live in peace, free from discrimination and intolerance,
and with the opportunity for both communities to participate fully
in the structures and processes of government;
Have accordingly agreed as follows:
STATUS OF NORTHERN IRELAND
ARTICLE 1
The two Governments
(a) affirm that any change in the status of Northern Ireland would
only come about with the consent of a majority of the people of
Northern Ireland;
(b) recognise that the present wish of a majority of the people of
Northern Ireland is for no change in the status of Northern Ireland;
(c) declare that, if in the future a majority of the people of Northern
Ireland clearly wish for and formally consent to ,the establishment of
a united Ireland, they will introduce and support in the respective





(a) There is hereby established, within the framework of the Anglo-
Irish Intergovernmental Council set up after the meeting between
the two Heads of Government on 6 November 1981, an Inter-
governmental Conference (hereinafter referred to as "the
Conference"), concerned with Northern Ireland and with
relations between the two parts of the island of Ireland, to deal,
as set out in this Agreement, on a regular basis with
(i) political matters;
(ii) security and related matters;
(iii) legal matters, including the administration of justice;
(iv) the promotion of cross-border co-operation.
(b) The United Kingdom Government accept that the Irish
Government will put forward views and proposals on matters
relating to Northern Ireland within the field of activity of the
Conference in so far as those matters are not the responsibility of
a devolved administration in Northern Ireland. In the interest of
promoting peace and stability, determined efforts shall be made
through the Conference to resolve any differences. The
Conference will be mainly concerned with Northern Ireland; but
some of the matters under consideration will involve cooperative
action in both parts of the island of Ireland, and possibly also in
Great Britain. Some of the proposals considered in respect ot
Northern Ireland may also be found to have application by the
Irish Government. There is no derogation from the sovereignty o(
either the Irish Government or the United Kingdom Government,
and each retains responsibility for the decisions and adminis-
tration of government within its own jurisdiction.
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The Conference shall meet at Ministerial or official level, as required.
The business of the Conference will thus receive attention at the
highest level. Regular and frequent Ministerial meetings shall be held;
and in particular special meetings shall be convened at the request of
either side. Officials may meet in subordinate groups. Membership of
the Conference and of sub-groups shall be small and flexible. When
the Conference meets at Ministerial level an Irish Minister designated
as the Permanent Irish Ministerial Representative and the Secretary
of State for Northern Ireland shall be joint Chairmen. Within the
framework of the Conference other Irish and British Ministers may
hold or attend meetings as appropriate: when legal matters are under
consideration the Attorneys General may attend. Ministers may be
accompanied by their officials and their professional advisers: for
example, when questions of security policy or security co-operation
are being discussed, they may be accompanied by the Commissioner
of the Garda Siochana and the Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster
Constabulary; or when questions of economic or social policy or co-
operation are being discussed, they may be accompanied by officials
of the relevant Departments. A Secretariat shall be established by the
two Governments to service the Conference on a continuing basis in
the discharge o( its functions as set out in this Agreement.
ARTICLE 4
(a) In relation to matters coming within its field of activity, the
Conference shall be a framework within which the Irish
Government and the United Kingdom Government work together
(i) for the accommodation of the rights and identities of the two
traditions which exist in Northern Ireland; and
(ii) for peace, stability and prosperity throughout the island of
Ireland by promoting reconciliation, respect for human
rights, co-operation against terrorism and the development of
economic, social and cultural co-operation.
(b) It is the declared policy of the United Kingdom Government that
responsibility in respect of certain matters within the powers of
the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland should be devolved
within Northern Ireland on a basis which would secure
widespread acceptance throughout the community. The Irish
Government support that policy.
(c) Both Governments recognise that devolution can be achieved
only with the co-operation of constitutional representatives
within Northern Ireland of both traditions there. The Conference
shall be a framework within which the Irish Government may put
forward views and proposals on the modalities of bringing about
devolution in Northern Ireland, in so far as they relate to the




(a) The Conference shall concern itself with measures to recognise
and accommodate the rights and identities oi the two traditions
in Northern Ireland, to protect human rights and to prevent
discrimination. Matters to be considered in this area include
meaure.s to foster the cultural heritage of both traditions, ehanixs
in electoral arrangements, the use of Hags and emblems, the
avoidance ol economic and social discrimination and the ad\;m
tages and disadvantages of a Bill of Rights in some form in
Northern Ireland.
(b) The discussion of these matters shall be mainly concerned with
Northern Ireland, but the possible application of any measures
pursuant to this Article by the Irish Government in then
jurisdiction shall not be excluded.
(c) If it should prove impossible to achieve and sustain devolution on
a basis which secures widespread acceptance in Northern Ireland,
the Conference shall be a framework within which the lush
Government may, where the interests of the minority commuiui\
are significantly or especially affected, put forward vieus on
proposals for major legislation and on major policy issues, which
are within the purview of the Northern Ireland Departments and
which remain the responsibility of the Secretary of State for
Northern Ireland.
ARTICLE 6
The Conference shall be a framework within which the Irish
Government may put forward views and proposals on the role and
composition of bodies appointed by the Secretary of State for
Northern Ireland or by Departments subject to his direction and
control including
the Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights;
the Fair Employment Agency;
the Equal Opportunities Commission;
the Police Authority for Northern Ireland;
the Police Complaints Board.
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DSECURITY AND RELATED MATTERS
ARTICLE 7
(a) The Conference shall consider
(i) security policy;
(ii) relations between the security forces and the community;
(iii) prisons policy.
(b) The Conference shall consider the security situation at its regular
meetings and thus provide an opportunity to address polic>
issues, serious incidents and forthcoming events.
(c) The two Governments agree that there is a need for a programme
of special measures in Northern Ireland to improve relations
between the security forces and the community, with the object
in particular of making the security forces more readily accepted
by the nationalist community. Such a programme shall be
developed, for the Conference's consideration, and may include
the establishment of local consultative machinery, training in
community relations, crime prevention schemes involving (he
community, improvements in arrangements for handling com-
plaints, and action to increase the proportion of members of the
minority in the Royal Ulster Constabulary. Elements ol the
programme may be considered by the Irish Government suitable
for application within their jurisdiction.
(d) The Conference may consider policy issues relating to prisons.
Individual cases may be raised as appropriate, so that
information can be provided or inquiries instituted.
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LEGAL MATTERS, INCLUDING
THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
ARTICLE 8
The Conference shall deal with issues of concern to both countries
relating to the enforcement of the criminal law. In particular it shall
consider whether there are areas of the criminal law applying in the
North and in the South respectively which might with benefit be
harmonised. The two Governments agree on the importance of public
confidence in the administration of justice. The Conference shall
seek, with the help of advice from experts as appropriate, measures
which would give substantial expression to this aim, considering inter
alia the possibility of mixed courts in both jurisdictions for the trial
of certain offences. The Conference shall also be concerned with
policy aspects of extradition and extra-territorial jurisdiction as
between North and South.
CROSS-BORDER CO-OPERATION
ON SECURITY, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL
AND CULTURAL MATTERS
ARTICLE 9
(a) With a view to enhancing cross-border co-operation on seen it \
matters, the Conference shall set in hand a programme o\ Ki'ik
to be undertaken by the Commissioner o\ the Garda Sioehana
and the Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and,
where appropriate, groups of officials, in such areas as threat
assessments, exchange of information, liaison structures,
technical co-operation, training of personnel, and operational
resources.
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(b) The Conference shall have no operational responsibilities;
responsibility for police operations shall remain with the heads ol'
the respective police forces, the Commissioner of the Cat da
Siochana maintaining his links with the Minister for Justice and
the Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary his links
with the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.
ARTICLE 10
(a) The two Governments shall co-operate to promote the economic
and social development of those areas of both parts of Ireland
which have suffered most severely from the consequences of the
instability of recent years, and shall consider the possibility of
securing international support for this work.
(b) If it should prove impossible to achieve and sustain devolution on
a basis which secures widespread acceptance in Northern Ireland,
the Conference shall be a framework for the promotion of co-
operation between the two parts of Ireland concerning cross-
border aspects of economic, social and cultural matters in
relation to which the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland
continues to exercise authority.
(c) If responsibility is devolved in respect of certain matters in the
economic, social or cultural areas currently within the
responsibility of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland,
machinery will need to be established by ..the responsible
authorities in the North and South for practical co-operation in
respect of cross-border aspects of these issues.
ARRANGEMENTS FOR REVIEW
ARTICLE 11
At the end of three years from signature of this Agreement, or earlier
if requested by either Government, the working of the Conference
shall be reviewed by the two Governments to see whether any changes




It will be for Parliamentary decision in Dublin and in Westminster
whether to establish an Anglo-Irish Parliamentary body of the kind
adumbrated in the Anglo-Irish Studies Report of November 1981.
The two Governments agree that they would give support as approp-
riate to such a body, if it were to be established.
FINAL CLAUSES
ARTICLE 13
This Agreement shall enter into force on the date on which the iwu
Governments exchange notifications of their acceptance ol this
Agreement.
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In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto by
their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.
Done in two originals at Hillsborough
on the 15th day of November 1985
For the Government For the Government
of Ireland of the United Kingdom
Gearoid Mac Gearailt Margaret Thatcher
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APPENDIX G
THE U.S. -U.K. SUPPLEMENTARY EXTRADITION TREATY
EXTRADITION
United States No. 3(1986)
Exchange of Notes
between the Government of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
and the
Government of the United States of America
amending the Supplementary Treaty of
25 June 1985 concerning the Extradition
Treaty signed at London
on 8 June 1972
Washington, 19 and 20 August 1986
[The Supplementary Treaty is not in force]
Presented to Parliament
by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
by Command of Her Majesty
October 1986
LONDON





BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM
OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AMENDING THE SUPPLEMENTARY TREATY OF 25 JUNE 1985
CONCERNING THE EXTRADITION TREATY SIGNED AT LONDON
ON 8 JUNE 1972
No. 1
The Secretary of State of the United States ofAmerica to the British Charge





I have the honor to refer to the Supplementary Treaty signed at Washington
on June 25, 1985' concerning the Extradition Treaty between the United States
of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
signed at London on June 8, 1972 2 ,
With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate of the United
States to ratification, the President transmitted the Supplementary Treaty to the
Senate. On July 17, the Senate approved a resolution advising and consenting to
the ratification of the treaty subject to the following amendments:
(1) Amend Article 1 to read as follows:
" For the purposes of the Extradition Treaty, none of the following
shall be regarded as an offense of a political character:
(a) an offense for which both Contracting Parties have the
obligation pursuant to a multilateral international agreement
to extradite the person sought or to submit his case to their
competent authorities for decision as to prosecution;
(b) murder, voluntary manslaughter, and assault causing grievous
bodily harm;
(c) kidnapping, abduction, or serious unlawful detention,
including taking a hostage;
(d) an offense involving the use of a bomb, grenade, rocket,
firearm, letter or parcel bomb, or any incendiary device if this
use endangers any person; and
{e) an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offenses or
participation as an accomplice of a person who commits or
attempts to commit such an offense."
(2) Amend Article 2 to read as follows:
" Nothing in this Supplementary Treaty shall be interpreted as
imposing the obligation to extradite if the judicial authority of the
1 United Suies No. 2 (1985), Cmnd. 9565.
2 Treaty Series No. 16 ( 1977), Cmnd. 6723.
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requested Party determines that the evidence of criminality presented is
not sufficient to sustain the charge under the provisions of the treaty.
The evidence of criminality must be such as, according to the law of the
requested Party, would justify committal for trial if the offense had been
committed in the territory of the requested Party.
" In determining whether an individual is extraditable from the
United States, the judicial authority of the United States shall permit
the individual sought to present evidence on the questions of whether:
(1) there is probable cause;
(2) a defense to extradition specified in the Extradition Treaty or
this Supplementary Treaty, and within the jurisdiction of the courts,
exists; and
(3) the act upon which the request for extradition is based would
constitute an offense punishable under the laws of the United States.
" Probable cause means whether there is sufficient evidence to warrant
a man of reasonable caution in the belief that:
(1) the person arrested or summoned to appear is the person
sought;
(2) in the case of a person accused of having committed a crime, an
offense has been committed by the accused; and
(3) in the case of a person alleged to have been convicted of an
offense, a certificate of conviction or other evidence of conviction or
criminality exists."
(3) Insert after Article 2 the following new article:
"Article 3
" (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Supplementary
Treaty, extradition shall not occur if the person sought
establishes to the satisfaction of the competent judicial
authority by a preponderance of the evidence that the request
for extradition has in fact been made with a view to try or
punish him on account of his race, religion, nationality, or
political opinions, or that he would, if surrendered, be
prejudiced at his trial or punished, detained or restricted in his
personal liberty by reason of his race, religion, nationality or
political opinions.
" (b) In the United States, the competent judicial authority shall only
consider the defense to extradition set forth in paragraph (a) for
offenses listed in Article 1 of this Supplementary Treaty. A
rinding under paragraph (a) shall be immediately appealable by
either party to the United States district court, or court of
appeals, as appropriate. The appeal shall receive expedited
consideration at every stage. The time for filing a notice of
appeal shall be 30 days from the date of the filing of the decision.
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In all other respects, the applicable provisions of the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure or Civil Procedure, as
appropriate, shall govern the appeals process."
(4) Renumber the remaining Articles 4, 5, 6, 7.
For your convenience, a fair copy of the text reflecting the amendments made
to the articles of the Supplementary Treaty is enclosed. No changes were made to
the testimonium clause or the Annex.
The President can not execute the instrument of ratification with respect to
the Supplementary Treaty except subject to the amendments set forth in the
Senate resolution. Accordingly, before further action is taken with a view co
ratification on the part of the United States, it is necessary that my Government
ascertain whether the amendments recited above are acceptable to your
Government.
If the amendments are acceptable to your Government, steps will be taken
promptly, upon the receipt by my Government of notification to that effect, to
complete arrangements for the execution by the President of the instrument of
ratification. Arrangements may then be made for the exchange of instruments of
ratification at London.
Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my high consideration.





CONCERNING THE EXTRADITION TREATY BETWEEN THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE
GOVERNMENT OFTHE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND
NORTHERN IRELAND SIGNED AT LONDON ON 8 JUNE 1972
The Government of the United States ofAmerica and the Government of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland;
Desiring to make more effective the Extradition Treaty between the
Contracting Parties, signed at London on 8 June 1972 (hereinafter referred to as
" the Extradition Treaty ");
Have resolved to conclude a Supplementary Treaty and have agreed as
follows:
Article 1
For the purposes of the Extradition Treaty, none of the following shall be
regarded as an offense of a political character:
(a) an offense for which both Contracting Parties have the obligation
pursuant to a multilateral international agreement to extradite the
person sought or to submit his case to their competent authorities for
decision as to prosecution;
(b) murder, voluntary manslaughter, and assault causing grievous bodily
harm;
(c) kidnapping, abduction, or serious unlawful detention, including taking a
hostage;
(d) an offense involving the use of a bomb, grenade, rocket, firearm, letter or
parcel bomb, or any incendiary device if this use endangers any person;
and
(e) an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offenses or participation as
an accomplice of a person who commits or attempts to commit such an
offense.
Article 2
Nothing in this Supplementary Treaty shall be interpreted as imposing the
obligation to extradite if the judicial authority of the requested Party determines
that the evidence of criminality presented is not sufficient to sustain the charge
under the provisions of the treaty. The evidence of criminality must be such as,
according to the law of the requested Party, would justify committal for trial if
the offense had been committed in the territory of the requested Party.
In determining whether an individual is extraditable from the United States,
the judicial authority of the United States shall permit the individual sought to
present evidence on the questions of whether:
(1) there is probable cause;
(2) a defense to extradition specified in the Extradition Treaty or this
Supplementary Treaty, and within the jurisdiction of the courts, exists; and
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(3) the act upon which the request for extradition is based would
constitute an offense punishable under the laws of the United States.
Probable cause means whether there is sufficient evidence to warrant a man
of reasonable caution in the belief that:
(.1) the person arrested or summoned to appear is the person sought;
(2) in the case of a person accused of having committed a crime, an offense
has been committed by the accused; and
(3) in the case of a person alleged to have been convicted of an offense, a
certificate of conviction or other evidence of conviction or criminality exists.
Article 3
{a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Supplementary Treaty,
extradition shall not occur if the person sought establishes to the satisfaction of
the competent judicial authority by a preponderance of the evidence that the
request for extradition has in fact been made with a view to try or punish him on
account of his race, religion, nationality, or political opinions, or that he would,
if surrendered, be prejudiced at his trial or punished, detained or restricted in his
personal liberty by reason of his race, religion, nationality or political opinions.
(b) In the United States, the competent judicial authority shall only consider
the defense to extradition set forth in paragraph (a) for offenses listed in Article
1 of this Supplementary Treaty. A finding under paragraph (a) shall be
immediately appealable by either party to the United States district court, or
court of appeals, as appropriate. The appeal shall receive expedited
consideration at every stage. The time for filing a notice of appeal shall be 30 days
from the date of the filing of the decision. In all other respects, the applicable
provisions of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure or Civil Procedure, as
appropriate, shall govern the appeals process.
Article 4
Article VIII, paragraph (2) of the Extradition Treaty is amended to read as
follows:
" (2) A person arrested upon such an application shall be set at liberty
upon the expiration of sixty days from the date of his arrest if a request for
his extradition shall not have been received. This provision shall not
prevent the institution of further proceedings for the extradition of the
person sought if a request for extradition is subsequently received."
Article 5
This Supplementary Treaty shall apply to any offense committed before or
after this Supplementary Treaty enters into force, provided that this
Supplementary Treaty shall not apply to an offense committed before this
Supplementary Treaty enters into force which was not an offense under the laws
of both Contracting Parties at the time of its commission.
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Article 6
This Supplementary Treaty shall form an integral part of the Extradition
Treaty and shall apply:
(a) in relation to the United Kingdom: to Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, the Channel Islands, the Isle ofMan and the territories for whose
international relations the United Kingdom is responsible which are
listed in the Annex to this Supplementary Treaty;
(b) to the United States of America; and references to the territory of a
Contracting Party shall be construed accordingly.
Article 7
This Supplementary Treaty shall be subject to ratification and the
instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at London as soon as possible. It
shall enter into force upon the exchange of instruments of ratification. It shall be
subject to termination in the same manner as the Extradition Treaty.
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No. 2
The British Charge a"Affaires ad interim at Washington to the Secretary of







I have the honour to refer to your Note dated 1 9 August 1 986 relating to
the Supplementary Treaty signed at Washington on 25 June 1985 concerning the
Extradition Treaty between the United States of America and the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, signed at London on 8 June
1972.
2. I have the honour to confirm that the amendments to the Supplementary
Treaty incorporated in the resolution approved by the Senate on 17 July are
acceptable to the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland who will proceed towards ratification of the Supplementary
Treaty as so amended.
3. I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the
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Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22304-6145
2. Library, Code 0142 2
Naval Postgraduate School
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3. Curriculum Officer, Code 38 1
Department of National Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5000
4. Professor R.H.S. Stolfi 2
Department of National Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5000
5. United States Embassy 1
42 Elgin Road, Ballsbridge
Dublin 4, Ireland
6. Consulate General of the United States 2
Belfast, Northern Ireland
c/o 24-32 Grosvenor Sq.
London W1A 1AE United Kingdom
7. Department Chairman, Code 56Tr 1
Department of National Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5000
8. Center for Naval Analyses 1
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